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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Economic globalization has changed the premises of the international system on various 
counts; multinational corporations (MNCs) operate worldwide and have risen to become major 
players in the international arena. Based on their territorial reach, their strategic positioning in 
many developing countries and emerging markets, and their economic impact, corporations are 
the major beneficiaries of an inter-connected economic world. The annual revenue of some 
MNCs exceeds the GDP of many States; thus, e.g. the annual revenues of Wallmart in 2007 
(around 350 billion USD) equals the GDP of Sweden, Belgium, and Switzerland combined. This 
reality has led civil society and governments alike to call on corporations to take responsibility 
for the societies they are operating in. It is a fact that human rights abuses are no longer confined 
to State actions, but have increasingly been affected, in many different ways, in the context of a 
corporation’s overseas business operations; the scope of human rights affected by international 
business ranges from alleged complicity in international crimes in the extractive sector,1 to labor 
rights violations in the manufacturing industry,2 and to freedom of expression and privacy 
challenges for information communication technology (ICT) companies.3 Human rights have 
become one of the integral pillars of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), alongside labour 
rights, environment, and anti-corruption.4 The Business and Human Rights Resource Center—
known for providing the broadest array of “balanced information of business and human 
                                                 
1 Charges involve complicity in human rights abuses (including crimes against humanity, torture, extrajudicial 
killing, forced displacement, and genocide) committed by government security forces or government authorities 
against local communities to secure pipeline operations on the ground; e.g. Royal Dutch/Shell and Chevron in 
Nigeria, Total and Unocal in Myanmar, and Talisman in Sudan.  
2 Charges include e.g. child labor in Nike’s supplier facilities in Pakistan; human trafficking in J.C. Penny supply 
factory in American Samoa; child labour on Nestle’s suppliers’ cocoa farms in West Africa. 
3 Yahoo! was alleged of complicity in torture and other human rights abuses by providing user identification 
information to the Chinese authorities. Google, as many other internet companies, has been confronted with severe 
challenges with regard to freedom of expression in face of stringent censorship requirements of the Chinese 
government. 
4 See THE TEN PRINCIPLES, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html 
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rights”5—tracks the human rights performance of over 3000 corporations worldwide in over 180 
countries and across 27 industrial sectors. This shows the significance that human rights issues 
have, as part of the broader CSR agenda, for contemporary business practice. The question, 
however, remains how human rights compliance on part of corporations can be best achieved: 
through legal enforcement or rather corporate self-regulation. Accounting for the differences in 
domestic liability schemes in the United States and Europe, this dissertation will link the 
litigation approach to the issues at hand with theories of behavioral economics, the goal being to 
demonstrate whether legal enforcement, by virtue of litigation, is in fact the most effective way 
to enhance human rights compliance of corporations. 
CSR has evolved in various stages over the last twenty years: ranging from a moral 
responsibility under a ‘social contract’ paradigm, to mandatory compliance under hard law, and 
a ‘social enterprise’ business model that informs a company’s core business choices.6 In the 
early 1990s, a new variable was introduced in the CSR debate: the increasing risk for 
multinational corporations of being subjected to liability suits in domestic courts for their human 
rights performance abroad; up to then, CSR had primarily been left to the realm of corporate 
self-regulation rather than been subject to legal liability. This development has changed the 
premises underlying CSR policies of companies and has required them to adapt their corporate 
policies and strategies. The focus of much research and many scholarly works has been liability 
litigation in the CSR field, mainly in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statute7 (ATS).8 This 
dissertation builds upon experiences with CSR liability litigation in the United States and then 
examines select European jurisdictions with the objective to compare and contrast the different 
                                                 
5 Mary Robinson (Director of the Ethical Globalization Initiative, former United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and President of Ireland) in: Business & Human Rights Resource Center: A Brief Description,  
(London, et al.), 16. 
6 See David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 334-397 (2011).  
7 The ATS, passed by the Congress in 1789, confers on district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350.   
8 Luisa Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law 
before U.S. Federal Courts, 12 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 651-66 (2005); Sandra Coliver, 
Jennie Green, Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. 
Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INTL’L L. REV. 169-72, 207-23 (2005); PETER 
HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 58-59, 72-88, 93-96 (2009). 
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legal approaches to the issues at hand. The differences in liability schemes will provide the basis 
for a critical analysis—informed by behavioral economics—that will test the ‘deterrence theory,’ 
according to which legal punishment deters future crime/non-compliance.9 Whereas this 
deterrence methodology has been proven in the context of atrocity crimes prosecution,10 it has 
not been tested yet for CSR enforcement through domestic courts. This study aims to shed light 
on this and related aspects. 
Major cases against MNCs for involvement in human rights violations committed abroad 
have been brought in both U.S. courts under the ATS and in European courts. The litigation 
against the French corporation Total S.A. (Total) and the U.S.-based Unocal Corp. (Unocal) 
illustrates vividly the significance of this new reality for MNCs. Charges of complicity in human 
rights violations in connection with a joint venture for oil exploitation in Burma (now Myanmar) 
were filed in U.S.,11 French,12 and Belgian courts13 and led to a multitude of lawsuits in different 
legal systems. It is a reality that almost all lawsuits holding corporations accountable for human 
rights violations have been brought in U.S. courts under the ATS.14 Thus, whereas the litigation 
risk has materialized for corporations in U.S. courts, it did not do so to the same extent in 
European courts, despite the fact that effective remedies in fact would be available for victims.15 
However, most recent developments in ATS litigation in U.S. courts, respectively in Kiobel16 
                                                 
9 There exists a broad literature on the deterrence hypothesis, especially in the law and economics field. Among 
others, see: George Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON., 526 (1970); John Harris, On the 
Economics of Law and Order, 78 J. POL. ECON., 165 (1970); I. Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for 
Offences, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 43 (1996). 
10 See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD 
POLITICS (2011).  
11 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2002). 
12  Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre, Mar. 10, 2006 (Fr.), see at 
http://burma.total.com/en/controverse/p_4_2.htm; see also Sarah JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION , 13-13 (2004). 
13 Prosecutor v TotalFinaElf et al., Cour de Cassation, 28 March 2007, AR P.07.0031.F, http://www.cass.be 
(Belg.).; see Total Settles Rights Case, N. Y. TIMES, November 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-total.html 
14 See, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/LegalPortal/Home/Countrywherelawsuitfiled/Americas 
15 See Thompson, Ramasastry, and Taylor, Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business 
Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 894 (2009). 
16 The majority opinion in Kiobel held that no action can be brought against a corporation under the ATS, thus 
challenging two decades of precedents in U.S. federal courts, which had confirmed corporate liability under the 
ATS. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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and Talisman,17 have created uncertainty18 with regard to legal liability of corporate entities for 
their overseas operations; this has made it necessary for victim groups and NGOs to look for 
alternative remedies beyond tort liability under the ATS and even beyond the United States as a 
jurisdictional forum. Not only has the most recent jurisprudence of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit given momentum to careful consideration of judicial remedies available in 
key European markets and jurisdictions for overseas corporate operations; it also prompts the 
question why almost all major litigation against corporations for their overseas human rights 
performance has been brought in U.S. courts under the ATS, rather than in the courts of their 
European counterparts. Furthermore, the decisions in Kiobel and Talisman require examination 
of the wider picture with regard to CSR enforcement; thus, both decisions provide the context 
for critically assessing the effectiveness of litigation with regard to influencing corporate 
behavior. Is what we see really what we get? In other words: does legal liability for violations of 
international law and human rights incentivize corporations in the way intended and induce 
enhanced human rights and social compliance? This question deals with the concept of 
“incentive-compatibility,” namely what is entailed to structure policies and laws in a way that 
“self-interest induces people to behave in the way that the authorities want.”19 
                                                 
17 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Talisman established a “purpose” criterion for aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATS. The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
This has raised the bar from a mere “knowledge” standard, as previously endorsed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (see among others, Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005)) and by several district courts in the 
Second Circuit (see among others, Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 288-294 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re 
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)) to a “purpose” standard that requires that 
the aider and abettor shares intent to commit the crime. This standard is so high that it in fact forecloses any kind of 
litigation against corporations under the ATS; based on the core business mission in their bylaws and the corporate 
objective under the law, the primary objective of a corporation is shareholder value maximization. Almost never 
will a corporation have the intent to commit crimes, but it rather will be indifferent to the means that will help its 
end to increase profits.  
18 There exists a decided circuit split on the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting and corporate liability under 
the ATS. Currently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co. LLC, Flomo v. 
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011)), of the Eleventh Circuit (Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009)), and of the D.C. Circuit (Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. 09-7125,2011 
WL 2652384 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011)) endorse corporate liability under the ATS. Moreover, the Eleventh and D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals endorse a knowledge standard for aiding and abetting under the ATS. The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals is the outlier on both issues. Judgment on both issues is still pending before the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals: Doe 1 v. Nestle, S.A.,748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
19 JOHN BLACK, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2003). 
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This work assesses corporate liability for human rights violations under the ATS or 
equivalents in select European jurisdictions from a behavioral economics perspective, taking a 
comparative law approach. This study aims at filling a critical gap in the literature,20 which (1) 
has taken a high-level rather than a comparative procedural law approach to the civil-criminal 
divide of liability schemes in a cross-country comparison, yielding unspecified results, and (2) 
has missed assessing the field of CSR from a ‘law and economics’ perspective in a way that 
applies a behavioral economics perspective to corporate liability adjudication in the area of 
human rights. However, as this dissertation will show, a cross-disciplinary approach to the 
subject provides valuable lessons and informs a comprehensive treatment of the challenges at 
hand. Telling “a story of law and incentives,” this study has the goal of fostering a comparative 
legal understanding of corporate risk and incentives in relation to human rights liability. It aims 
to develop a framework for legal and intrinsic (i.e. economic or altruistic) incentives that can stir 
corporate behavior in a way that enhances compliance with social standards and furthermore 
intends to determine the ‘incentive compatibility’ of the different endogenous and exogenous 
measures of CSR implementation, including legal liability enforcement. The research goals are 
twofold: (1) to shed light on the prominence of civil litigation under US courts for the issues 
concerned, by examining the implications of the civil or criminal nature of the liability scheme 
for enterprise risk in the context of the respective legal systems, and (2) to assess the ‘incentive 
compatibility’ of the different liability systems and develop a measurefor how legal incentives 
may be effectively complemented by endogenous ones.  
The work starts out with the legal perspective on CSR. Thus, Chapter 2 maps corporate 
liability risks before domestic courts and shows that the ‘incentive compatibility’ depends 
largely on the civil or criminal nature of the liability system as well as the underlying legal 
                                                 
20 See Eric A. Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZENTRUM FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHE RECHTSPOLITIK, ZERP-DISKUSSIONSPAPIER (2005); see also Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A 
Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 
THE YALE J. OF INTL. L., 1-58 (2002); Robert C. Thompson et. al, Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of 
Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTL. L. REV., 
841-902 (2009).  
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culture. For this purpose, it conducts a comparative analysis of civil and criminal liability 
schemes for adjudicating human rights responsibilities of corporations before domestic courts in 
the United States and select European jurisdictions. Looking at human rights redress against 
MNCs at a domestic level, a divergence in civil and criminal remedies can be observed:  
Whereas civil human rights litigation is a phenomenon peculiar to the United States, most 
European jurisdictions provide criminal remedies with the option for the victims to attach civil 
claims to the criminal proceedings.21 Much of the analysis hinges upon the concept of ‘partie 
civile;’ the latter creates a hybrid civil-criminal remedy structure that has important procedural 
law implications and yields complex results with regard to legal risk and the underlying 
‘incentive compatibility’ of the liability rules. Even though the analysis will show that the civil-
criminal divide is often blurred, the results are still distinct. In many instances, the civil(/torts)-
criminal dichotomy translates into a common law-civil law distinction that implicates enterprise 
risk. However, there are also implications derived from the civil or criminal nature of the 
liability scheme that are relevant when determining corporate risk and the extent to which this 
risk incentivizes corporations to comply rather than default. Thus, unlike other scholarship, this 
work argues that the civil or criminal nature of the remedies is not just a non-literal “translation” 
of a “common concept – accountability for human rights abuses - . . . in the legal ‘language’ of 
each domestic legal system,”22 but rather it is contended that procedural differences have a 
profound impact on the substantive scope of human rights responsibilities of MNCs.23  
Chapter 3 examines substantive law concepts, which illustrate this conflated civil-
criminal remedy structure. Apart from touching on imputation principles, this section primarily 
                                                 
21 See Thompson, Ramasastry, and Taylor, Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business 
Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 894 (2009). 
22 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 2, 4 (2002). 
23 Whereas the ATS is quite vague, by providing remedies for a “violation of the law of nations,” European statutes 
prescribe remedies for human rights violations along the lines of the categories of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide. Thus, unlike in European legal systems, where redress is confined to abuses that qualify as 
international crimes, the ATS potentially provides enough flexibility in its terms in order to potentially 
accommodate a broader set of cases involving infringements of labor standards, for example. Moreover, the 
substantive law standards diverge in civil and criminal liability systems inducing different legal demands on MNCs; 
thus, agency liability—as a civil principle of imputation— requires control of the principal over the agent, whereas 
complicity liability—as a criminal law concept— requires actual or reasonable knowledge on part of the MNC. 
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focuses on a discussion of corporate personhood in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United;24 it analyzes how the Supreme Court’s reasoning that corporations 
(as legal persons) can be bearers of rights under the U.S. Constitution, informs the debate about 
the responsibilities and obligations of corporations in a CSR context. A thorough analysis of the 
recent decision in Kiobel,25 where the Second Circuit took on the question whether there is 
corporate (criminal) liability under the ATS, points towards a confusion in civil and criminal 
elements that traces back to the hybrid nature of the acts at issue and that amounts to a tension 
between procedures and substantive law standards. Since the holding in Kiobel in September 
2010, a decided circuit split in the United States federal courts has evolved with the Seventh, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal endorsing corporate liability under the ATS.26 A 
petition for writ of certiorari in Kiobel has been granted and the U.S. Supreme Court has seized 
the case.27  
Chapter 4 takes a behavioral economics perspective to CSR litigation and shows that 
incentives induced by legal liability may be limited and do not necessarily guide corporate 
behavior in the way desired; this is particularly true when monetary incentives are involved.28 
Moreover, the economic perspective on human rights liability of corporations is elaborated; 
particularly, the conceptual identity question of CSR will be addressed, concerning how legal 
liability can be accommodated under the concept of CSR, originally intended as corporate self-
regulation.29   
                                                 
24 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
25 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).  
26 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 
F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. 09-7125,2011 WL 2652384 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 
2011).  
27 The petition for writ of certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiobel on the question of corporate 
liability under the ATS. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3728, No. 10-1491 (Oct. 17, 2011).  
28 Bruno Frey, Motivation crowding theory – a new approach to behavior, in: BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY, 37, 39 (2008). 
29 See Fabrizio Cafaggi on the interdependencies between corporate law and corporate governance models, Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, Fiduciary duties, models of firms, and organizational theories in the context of relational 
interdependencies, in: LEGAL ORDERINGS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, 268-309 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2007); see 
also Lorenzo Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of ‘Extended’ Corporate Governance: an 
Explanation Based on The Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism, in: 
REFRAMING SELF-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006). 
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According to Frey, a prominent scholar in the field, when an external intervention is 
perceived to be “controlling,” intrinsic motivation is substituted by this intervention because 
“the outside intervention is responsible instead.”30 Frey/Bohnet/Huck find that legal rules and 
their enforcement can ’crowd in’ as well as ‘crowd out’ preferences,” such as intrinsic 
motivation and guilt or shame.31 It therefore depends on the characteristics of the respective 
liability system whether there are “hidden ‘costs’”32 that might ultimately achieve the opposite 
of what is expected under the “price effect,” namely that the higher the cost of breaching, the 
more likely compliance will result.33 This study applies the economic theory of the ‘crowding 
out’ effect (that has primarily been applied to the enforcement of contractual relationships in the 
workplace in order to determine how to incentivize employees with rewards or commands)34 to 
a CSR context, with the goal to assess the effectiveness of measures of CSR implementation, 
particularly legal liability across different legal systems and cultures.  
The premise is that in an enforcement environment, behavior cannot only be guided by 
the expected cost of breach but also by intrinsic motivation.35 This dissertation argues that there 
exist key characteristics in domestic liability systems that can trigger a ‘crowding out’ of 
intrinsic motivation, under identifiable conditions, leading to counterintuitive compliance 
results. The two most prominent factors are: (1) the availability of the legal option of out-of-
court settlements, and (2) the availability of corporate human rights liability as opposed to 
liability of corporate officers (in terms of derivative liability). It is a reality that to date most tort 
cases under the ATS, which were about to enter trial phase, were settled out of court by the 
corporate defendants. Accounting for factors such as settlement sum, nature of the settlement, 
                                                 
30 Bruno Frey, Motivation and Human Behavior, in: RISK, TRUST, AND WELFARE, 31, 36 (Peter Taylor-Gooby ed., 
2000). 
31 Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. at 32 (2001); see also Bruno Frey, Motivation crowding theory – 
a new approach to behavior, in: BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY at 39 (2008). 
32 Bruno Frey, Motivation crowding theory – a new approach to behavior, in: BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 37, 42 (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2008).  
33 See Id.  
34 See Id.; see also Bruno Frey et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 
95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV., 131 (2001). 
35 See Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV., at 132 (2001). 
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and motivation to settle, this work finds that out-of-court settlements usually award to the 
victims monetary damages that are rather modest (when compared to the company’s annual 
revenues) but not insignificant in sum, while not setting legal precedent. Under the ‘crowding 
out’ theory this equals a medium level of enforcement, in terms of probability and magnitude of 
fines. The expected payoff for society is so high that, even when non-compliance is anticipated, 
it creates a situation of unconditional trust that ‘crowds out’ trustworthiness and makes 
corporations, which maximize shareholder profits while not complying with CSR standards, 
more successful than the ones that forsake profitable opportunities to comply with CSR 
standards. As a result, intrinsic motivation is ‘crowded out’ leading to suboptimal compliance 
results. 36 This finding is in line with the specifications of the deterrence theory as illustrated by 
Gneezy and Rustichini.37 According to their work, the deterrence theory holds when a fine is 
sufficiently large; however, empirical data has shown that it does not hold when the fine 
imposed is “relatively small, but not insignificant.38” Introducing a modest fine can lead to a 
change in social norms by commodifying human rights and transforming the relationship into a 
market exchange. This changes the rules forever.39   
Past research has shown that there are also factors, such as personal relationships, that 
can ‘crowd in’ intrinsic motivation.40 Currently, most litigation targets corporations as an 
institutional entity rather than individual corporate officers for the wrongs committed in 
overseas operations. As a consequence, intrinsic motivation is ‘crowded out,’ which reduces 
compliance on part of corporations.41 Those and other factors, which will be discussed below, 
inform the conclusion that current liability systems, on various counts, do not live up to their full 
                                                 
36 See Id. 
37 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE J. OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1 (2000). 
38 See Id., at 5. 
39 Id., at 13-14.  
40 Bruno Frey, Motivation and Human Behavior, in: RISK, TRUST, AND WELFARE, 31, 37-38 (Peter Taylor-Gooby 
ed., 2000). 
41 This finding is to be understood from a strictly behavioral economics perspective; from a litigation perspective, 
there might be evidentiary problems when trying to hold corporate officers liable for corporate acts committed ‘on 
their watch.’ 
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potential with regard to incentivizing corporations and rather induce an opposite effect of what is 
intended, i.e. increased compliance.  
Frey/Bohnet/Huck’s work offers an interesting perspective on how to deal with this 
dilemma: in experiments they have shown that in fact “more order [can also be achieved] with 
less law.” Thus, the level of enforcement has a “nonmonotonic effect on behavior” in a way that 
“performance rates are [not only] high when the expected cost of breach is sufficiently large but 
also when it is sufficiently low.”42 Low levels of enforcement through external intervention, that 
is perceived to be “supportive” rather than “controlling,” induces compliance by ‘crowding in’ 
intrinsic motivation.43 Therefore, an environment that provides a framework for corporate self-
regulation and that develops social norms44 might be as or even more effective, from a 
behavioral economics perspective, to induce corporations to comply than the legal liability 
system in its current form and enforcement practice. Another option, under Frey/Bohnet/Huck’s 
framework, to achieve optimal compliance results is to impose very high fines or more severe 
sanctions, for example in form of criminal punishment. 
Concluding the modest--even if not non-existent--role of legal liability in a CSR context, 
the normative content of CSR is examined and it is illustrated how endogenous incentives may 
self-enforce CSR.45 Endogenous incentives can include altruistic motivation or economic self-
interest, ranging from ancillary competitive advantage through reputational benefits to direct 
bottom-line impact through ‘shared value,’ i.e., the intersection between business and social 
                                                 
42 Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV., at 132 (2001). 
43 Frey, Bruno, Motivation crowding theory – a new approach to behavior, in BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY, ROUNDTABLE PROCEEDINGS, 37, 41 (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2008). 
44 See Huang, Peter & Wu, Ho-Mou, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and 
Organizational Cultures, 10 J. OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION 390-406 (1994). 
45 See Lorenzo Sacconi, Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): the Multi-
stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance, in: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES 157-193 (Lorenzo Sacconi et 
al. eds., 2011); Lorenzo Sacconi, A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate 
Governance (II): Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity, 75 J. OF BUSINESS ETHICS, at 77, 83 (2007). Sacconi 
coins the concept of CSR as an “extended model of corporate governance,” where endogenous incentives and 
motivations under a social contract have created extended fiduciary duties that are self-enforcing.  
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value, as promoted in Michael Porter’s most recent work.46 Since liability schemes in their 
current design and structure might not stir corporate behavior as expected under traditional 
economic theory, it is to explore how legal incentives can be effectively complemented with 
economic ones depending on the respective industry sector. There is no “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, but rather the extent to which economic endogenous incentives complement legal 
ones depends on the nature of the liability system, the industry structure, and the respective 
business model. Showcasing Google’s approach to China’s rigorous censorship requirements 
and continuous violations of user privacy,47 lessons can be drawn on how to align business and 
societal interests, thus generating Porter’s “shared value” for other industries beyond the ICT 
sector. Specifically, Google’s open opposition to government censorship in China vividly 
illustrates how freedom of expression ties into Google’s core business to “facilitate access to 
information”48 and how it informs its strategic decision-making.49 Acknowledging that ICT 
companies’ business model intersects with human rights in a unique way, this work argues that 
it also provides valuable lessons beyond the ICT sector that can inform a new way forward for 
companies across all sectors by aligning business and societal values. The ICT sector, where 
protection of freedom of expression is inherently tied to the company’s core business to provide 
broad access to information, can be contrasted to the extractive sector, where legal incentives are 
primarily induced by litigation in a reactionary way, and the consumer product sector where 
                                                 
46 Michael Porter & Mark Kramer, The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value: How to reinvent capitalism—and unleash 
a wave of innovation and growth, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (January-February 2011). 
47 Google announced on its corporate blog on January 12, 2010, that it is “no longer willing to continue censoring 
our results on Google.cn” and that “[w]e recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and 
potentially our offices in China.” (David Drummond, A New Approach to China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 
12, 2010), at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html.) Google’s “new approach to 
China” had been prompted by cyber attacks that targeted Google’s computer system and the system of at least 20 
other companies;  evidence suggested that the attacks primarily aimed to access Gmail accounts of Chinese human 
rights activists and political opponents. For a first assessment of Google’s China strategy, see John Quelch 
& Katherine Jocz, Google in China (A), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, CASE NO. 510071 (January 21, 2010);  
Deborah Compeau, Yulin Fang, and Majela Yin, Google in China (B), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, CASE NO. 
910E11, 1-11 (June 18, 2010). 
48 See Benjamin Edelman & Thomas Eisenmann, Google Inc., HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, CASE NO. 910036, at 
13 (Jan. 28, 2010). 
49 Google announced on its corporate blog on March 22, 2010, that it stopped censoring its search results on its 
China web site Google.cn and  is now redirecting all users from mainland China to Google’s Hong Kong server, 
where they can access uncensored search services in simplified Chinese. David Drummond, A New Approach to 
China: An Update, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010), at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-
approach-to-china-update.html. 
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ancillary economic incentives are mainly induced by reputational risk, since CSR has been 
made an integral part of a company’s brand image.  
The key to assessing the incentive metrics for corporations is a company’s core business 
and how it aligns with societal and human rights concerns; the less the core business mission 
happens to align itself, the more it has to be relied on legal incentives, ancillary economic 
incentives, or simply intrinsic motivation. Thus, whereas Porter’s ‘shared value’ paradigm is the 
most effective and sustainable approach to CSR (due to a so-called ‘market driven staying 
power’), it might not be a ‘natural fit’ across all legal systems and industry sectors where 
business incentives and societal interests cannot be aligned.  
The recent example of Cisco Systems shows that even where interests can be aligned and 
first attempts are made to do so at a high-level managerial level, it is a path full of challenges 
and temptations, to say the least. The leading plaintiffs’ counsel in the most recent law suit 
against the software giant even compared Cisco’s actions to “IBM’s behavior in Nazi 
Germany,”50 where IBM provided data processing technology through a punch card system to 
identify and track prisoners in concentration camps.51 After coining the ‘good for society and 
business’ paradigm in their corporate strategy and organization,52 Cisco now finds itself in the 
halls of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on charges of complicity 
in torture, arbitrary detention, wrongful death and other gross violations of human rights 
committed at the hands of the Chinese government; it is alleged that Cisco customized and 
promoted its products as being capable of facilitating censorship and repression of dissident 
groups in China.53 This illustrates the sad reality that even for corporations where business and 
societal interest intersect and could be successfully aligned, short term profitable opportunities 
                                                 
50 Cited in:  Global Post, Chinese political prisoners sue tech giant Cisco, (August 16, 2011), at 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/110816/chinese-political-prisoners-sue-tech-
giant-cisco. 
51 EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST (2002). 
52 CISCO INC., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/citizenship/index.html  
53 See John Markoff, Suit Claims Cisco Helped China Pursue Falun Gong, N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, available 
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/technology/23cisco.html ; Du Daobin et al. v. Cisco Systems Inc., Thomas 
Law, et al., Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, No. 8:11-CV-0153 (June 6, 2011); Doe et 
al. v. Cisco Systems Inc., John Chambers, et al., Complaint, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California, No. 5:11-CV-02449 (May 19, 2011). 
  
13 
 
still prevail over a long term vision of commercial viability, which is socially responsible and 
respects basic human rights. Among other reasons, this might be the result of a current system 
that considers the advantages from ‘contracting’ (in metaphorical terms under a ‘social contract’ 
paradigm) with corporations greater than not doing so, which leads to trustworthiness being 
‘crowded out,’ in Frey’s terms;54 it will not be demanded and thus not be delivered.  
Has there a regulatory and economic system arisen where trustworthiness is not 
appreciated and thus does not guide corporate behavior? Evidence seems to suggest so: Despite 
the fact that Yahoo! faced a lawsuit before U.S. courts for its policies in China,55 Cisco is 
following Yahoo!’s unfortunate example. Further, a year and a half after Google has transferred 
its search engine from mainland China to Hong Kong to avoid stringent Chinese censorship 
requirements,56 Microsoft is filling the void that Google left. Microsoft is now penetrating the 
Chinese market through a partnership with the Chinese search engine, Baidu.com, thus reaping 
the profits from the world’s largest internet market with 470 million users in return for censoring 
its search results while merely emphasizing “differences of opinion with official content 
management policies.”57 Along similar lines, an executive of another computer giant confirms 
the solely profit-driven mentality that might not cut anymore in a post-2008 era. The Wall Street 
Journal quoted an executive at Hewlett-Packard with reference to the “Chongqing project” (an 
extremely sophisticated and extensive video surveillance system that will “cover a half-million 
intersections, parks and neighborhoods of nearly 400 square miles”): “It’s not my job to really 
understand what they’re going to use it for.”58  
The 2008 financial crisis has shown that trustworthiness on the part of corporations is 
indispensable for the sustainable well-being of society and corporate success alike. The recent 
                                                 
54 See Bruno Frey et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV., 132 (2001). 
55 Xiaoning et al v. Yahoo! Inc., et al., Case No. CO7-02151CW (N.D. Cal 2007). 
56 Miguel Helft et al., Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html. 
57 See David Barboza, Microsoft to Partner with China’s Leading Search Engine, N. Y. TIMES, July 4, 2011, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/technology/05microsoft.html?_r=1&ref=davidbarboza 
58 Loretta Chao & Don Clark, Cisco Poised to Help China Keep an Eye on Its Citizens, Wall Street Journal, July 5, 
2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304778304576377141077267316.html 
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experiences and developments have the potential of being game changers if the international 
business community recognizes them as such; they have vividly illustrated that commercial 
viability and responsibility for the society in which corporations operate are more closely related 
than acknowledged in the past. The latest efforts about transparency and disclosure of non-
financial information (i.e. environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors)59 marks this 
important lesson and shows a new awareness that might enlighten a promising way forward. We 
will have to critically assess the current legal and economic system and the incentives that it 
induces for corporations to ensure that the ‘social contract’ that society has with the corporate 
world is not unconditional anymore, but rather encourages, induces, and eventually rewards 
trustworthiness in a fashion that is responsible with regard to society and businesses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 There have been efforts to include ESG factors in filings to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), most 
prominently spearheaded by the “21st Century Disclosure Initiative,” initiated by Christopher Cox, former chairman 
of the SEC. 14 institutional investors signed on the initiative and call on the SEC to include environmental, social, 
and governance factors as part of its disclosure requirements. See 21ST CENTURY DISCLOSURE INITIATIVE, at 
http://www.sec.gov/disclosureinitiative. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Civil and Criminal Divide in Domestic Liability Schemes: 
The role of procedural rules in extraterritorial cases of corporate human rights 
liability in the United States, France and Belgium 
 
I. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY  
There are many different ways how companies and the international community can 
deliver on Professor John Ruggie’s “Respect, Protect, and Remedy” framework when in the 
realm of corporate human rights compliance.60 Whereas companies have the responsibility to 
conduct due diligence to ensure respect for human rights throughout their business operations 
and corporate structures,61 States have their own responsibility to protect against human rights 
abuses by non-State actors within their territory or jurisdiction and to provide effective remedies 
to victims of abuses.62 Ruggie’s framework is one of complementarity rather than exclusivity, 
thus emphasizing that the aforementioned responsibilities all exist alongside each other and one 
does not preempt the other.63 Thus, many nations have opened their courts, within their 
jurisdictional limitations, to victims of human rights abuses from all over the world. In their 
quest for profit and competitive advantage in a globalized world, MNCs often find themselves in 
situations where they expose themselves to allegations of complicity in human rights violations 
committed in connection with their overseas operations.64 A mere deference to domestic law of 
the host State is not enough on the part of corporations to protect themselves from litigation.65 
Rather, non-compliance with international standards, especially human rights principles, bears 
                                                 
60 John Ruggie’s business and human rights framework consists of three “differentiated but complementary 
responsibilities,” namely “the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business; 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies.” [emphasis 
added.] (PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY: A FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, A/HRC/8/5, at para. 9 (2008)). 
61Id., at para. 56-64. 
62 Id. at para. 18. 
63 Id. at para. 9. 
64 For an overview of corporate case under the ATS, see Katherine Gallagher, Civil Litigation and Transnational 
Business: An Alien Tort Statute Primer, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 745-67 (2010). 
65 Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer states in face of Google’s threat to pull out of China due to the government’s 
stringent censorship requirements: "We've been quite clear that we are going to operate in China, (and) we're going 
to abide by the law," cited in: Tom Krazit, Microsoft on China: We’re Staying, CBSNEWS (Jan. 14, 2010), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/14/tech/cnettechnews/main6098111.shtml. 
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the imminent risk of litigation before the courts of multiple jurisdictions that makes it difficult 
for corporations to appropriately identify their legal risks on a global scale.66  
Knowledge about the legal risks of corporations for non-compliance in the field will 
provide the basis for critically assessing whether the different venues of legal enforcement in 
fact contribute effectively to the objective to deter non-compliance. For such purpose, this 
chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of liability schemes for adjudicating overseas 
human rights violations against corporations before domestic courts in the United States and 
select European jurisdictions. The analysis relies upon a detailed treatment of the French and 
Belgian systems as a counterpoint to the U.S. system.  However, given the similarities between 
the French-Belgian systems and other civil law systems in Europe, I will occasionally simply 
refer to the contrast between the common law (of the United States) and the civil law (of 
continental Europe) for purposes of brevity and simplicity.67  There will always be exceptions to 
any general point raised below when surveying all civil law systems in Europe, but the French-
Belgian model is a very sophisticated and useful comparison to the U.S. model for purposes of 
contrasting the European civil law with the American common law approach to corporate human 
rights liability.  
 
1. Comparative Tort Liability in Criminal Disguise  
It is common among most jurisdictions that both civil and criminal remedies are 
available to hold corporations liable for misconduct within the territory of the sitting 
jurisdiction.68 Certainly, ways of attribution might differ, but the legal concept of civil69 and 
                                                 
66 See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, FAFO, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT, LEGAL REMEDIES 
FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN 
COUNTRIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2006). 
67 Eric Engle confirms this position by pointing out that “the majority of civil law countries in Europe more closely 
follow the French civil law.” Eric Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZERP-
DISKUSSIONSPAPIER, 37-38 (2005). Since, as Engle points out, German civil law shows some basic differences to the 
francophone legal culture, reference will occasionally be mad e to the German legal system as a counterpoint in 
order to illustrate the common, but in some details still diversified, legal tradition and practice in Europe. Id., at 38.  
68 SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, 11 (2004); see also 
FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, 57 (2008). 
69 Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae On Writ of Certiorari at 5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., ___ 
U.S. ___ (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 20 December 2011).   
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criminal liability70 of corporations is well-established across jurisdictions. However, there is 
significant divergence among jurisdictions with regard to corporate liability for human rights 
abuses that occurred abroad, i.e., outside of the sitting jurisdiction’s territory.71 Even though a 
great number of countries joined the fight against impunity by allowing access to their court 
system to remedy human rights abuses that occurred abroad, i.e., outside the territory of the 
sitting jurisdiction, their approach with regard to legal remedies is very different.72 Whereas the 
United States provides for civil human rights liability under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a 
statute that is peculiar to the U.S. legal system,73 European jurisdictions dispose of an inadequate 
civil liability system for these matters, as will be shown below, and thus mainly rely on criminal 
prosecution of corporations and/or their corporate officers with the option for victims to attach 
their civil tort claims to the criminal proceedings (the so-called ‘partie civile’ mechanism).  It is 
a reality that to date most lawsuits of such kind have been brought in the United States, whereas 
in Europe they rarely occur. Specifically, the number of human rights lawsuits filed against 
corporations under the ATS counts “approximately fifty,”74 while in Europe only a handful of 
similar cases were brought under the ‘constitution de partie civile’ mechanism.75 This stark 
                                                 
70 Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in 
International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 871-72 (2009) (13 out of 16 surveyed countries 
indicated that they provide for criminal liability of corporations either de lege or in practice).   
71 See Brief of Ralph G. Steinhardt as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., ___ U.S. ___ (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 13 July 2011).   
72 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 3 (2002). 
73 Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV., 404 (2001). 
74 Based on Beth Stephens’ data analysis in Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush 
Administration, 33 BROOKLYN J. OF INT’L L., 773 (2008). For a break-down of “corporate defendant human rights 
cases” pre- and post-Unocal, see Id. at 813-18.  
75 In Belgium, an ‘action civile’ was brought by citizens of Myanmar (formerly Burma) against TotalFinalElf S.A. 
(henceforth: Total) (a France-based oil company and joint venture partner of Unocal in the Yadana pipeline project 
in Burma that gave rise to litigation before U.S. federal courts) for complicity in crimes against humanity, among 
others, forced displacement and forced labour, in relation with the construction of the pipeline. BRUNO DEMEYERE, 
FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN 
JURISDICTIONS,’ 38 (2006). In France, Myanmar citizens brought similar charges against Total for its involvement 
in the Yadana pipeline project in Burma based on an ‘action civile.’ ABIGAIL HANSEN & WILLIAM BOURDON, 
FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF FRANCE, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN 
JURISDICTIONS,’ 19 (2006); see also Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A 
European Perspective, 6 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 97 (2008). Other ATS-like cases were 
brought under the ‘partie civile’ procedure against the French company Rougier S.A. in 2002 (for illegally cutting 
down forest areas in Cameroon that were the main source of livelihood for local communities) and against DLH 
France in 2009 (for allegedly knowingly buying timber from local companies that were supporting the repressive 
Charles Taylor regime during the Liberian civil war). See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS 
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divergence in litigation volume on the issues at hand prompts the question of what are the 
reasons for this discrepancy. This chapter will explore the reasons for the prominence of 
litigation under the ATS before U.S. courts and shed some light on the reality why similar 
litigation has not been pursued before European courts to the same extent. 
This requires first identifying the key differences between the United States and 
European liability system with regard to such lawsuits. On its face, the difference seems to be 
that the United States is using civil as opposed to criminal proceedings as a vehicle for liability 
litigation in such cases. However, there is more to this. The following chapter will specify the 
actual differences and show its practical implications. The existing scholarship has mainly 
focused on the differences in substantive law as they result from this civil-criminal dichotomy in 
liability adjudication. The following chapter will show that differences between the United 
States and Europe do not only exist with regard to substantive law standards. Rather, the 
different legal culture and underlying societal premises about the role of litigation in the courts 
and, most importantly, differences in procedural rules between human rights litigation under the 
U.S. ATS and European remedy venues76 are key drivers in litigation of such cases and explain 
why the United States may provide a more attractive forum for victims in this regard. The notion 
of ‘American Exceptionalism’ (in terms of the uniqueness of American culture) has been 
commented on for the last century77 and is indicative of unique characteristics of American 
ideology, which are, according to Martin Lipsek, “liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, 
populism, and laissez-faire."78 These unique cultural features, as has been argued by scholars, 
                                                                                                                                                            
OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 5(2006); see also Global 
Witness, International timber company DLH accused of funding Liberian war (November 18, 2009) at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/international-timber-company-dlh-accused-funding-liberian-war.  
76Also, Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 93 (2008) (indicating that one of the reasons why there have not 
been more civil damage cases against corporations before European courts are “procedural laws in Europe [that] are 
less favorable than in the U.S.”) 
77 See e.g. SEYMOUR LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996); Oscar Chase, 
American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure, 50 AMERICAN J. COMP. L,, 277-301 (2002). 
78 SEYMOUR LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, at 33 (1996). 
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explain the litigious character of American society.79 This makes the United States a unique 
jurisdictional forum that is particularly favorable to private litigation.  
It is to be noted, however, that the tort-criminal divide is not clear-cut but is rather 
blurred as the ‘partie civile’ mechanism in France and Belgium vividly illustrates. The ‘partie 
civile’ procedure, also referred to as ‘action civile,’ provides a mechanism by which the victim 
of a crime can attach his civil claim for damages suffered to the criminal case and therefore 
become a (civil) party to the criminal proceedings.80 Attaching a ‘partie civile’ to criminal 
proceedings yields complex results that merge criminal and civil proceedings, thus consolidating 
procedural rules. Also, even though the ATS clearly provides for civil tort liability, such hybrid 
elements are not foreign to ATS litigation either; thus, e.g., U.S. courts mainly have resorted to 
the criminal concept of aiding and abetting liability for imputing abuses to corporate defendants 
instead of the corporate law concepts of agency or joint venture liability. These mixed remedy 
structures in the United States and Europe have important implications for procedural aspects of 
liability litigation and thus influence the practical results for victims and corporations.  
Some scholars have argued that the civil or criminal nature of the remedies is merely a 
non-literal “translation” of a “common concept – accountability for human rights abuses - . . . in 
the legal ‘language’ of each domestic legal system.”81 Unlike this scholarship, the following 
chapter argues that the theoretical similarity between different venues of corporate liability in 
pursuit of the common/unifying goal of promoting accountability for human rights violations 
does not implicate the same practical results for the corporate defendants and the victim 
plaintiffs. Rather, the respective procedural and cultural differences have a profound impact on 
the substantive scope of human rights responsibilities of MNCs. Thus, within the civil law and 
common law culture of the respective legal systems, the tort or criminal nature of the liability 
                                                 
79 See Oscar Chase, American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure, 50 AMERICAN J. COMP. L,, 277-301 
(2002). 
80 See Patrick Campbell, Comparative Study of Victim Compensation Procedures in France and the United States: 
A Modest Proposal, 3 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 323 (1980); see also Eric Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? 
Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZERP-DISKUSSIONSPAPIER, 28 (2005). 
81 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 4 (2002). 
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system and related procedural rules have significant implications for the effectiveness of 
victims’ redress on the one hand and corporate legal risk on the other hand.  
The focus of analysis will be comparing and contrasting corporate tort liabilities for 
overseas human rights violations across different domestic legal systems. The ‘partie civile’ 
mechanism in Europe is crucial for the analysis, as it provides, at least in theory, an effective 
vehicle for tort claims that can be channeled through a main criminal procedure. No legal statute 
exists in Europe that is similar to the ATS in nature and reach. As it will be shown below, 
ordinary tort liability under domestic law falls short for these kind of cases as does tort liability 
on the jurisdictional basis of EU law, in particular the Brussels I Regulation. This has prompted 
scholars and legal experts to consider the ‘constitution de partie civile’ (in the context of 
criminal proceedings) combined with universal82 or passive nationality criminal jurisdiction83 
(preferably with no double-incrimination requirement84 and jurisdictional extension to foreign 
national refugees85) as an (close-to) equivalent to universal civil jurisdiction for human rights 
liability under the ATS. However, as will be shown below, this approximation might be limited 
due to jurisdictional constraints requiring nationality on part of the victim plaintiffs and/or 
double criminality of the offenses under the laws of the home and host country. Moreover, the 
full or broad discretion of the prosecutor to initiate a case also puts limitation on the success of 
tort claims in connection with the criminal act. It needs to be emphasized that the focus of this 
comparative analysis is on the comparison and contrast of tort liability under the ATS and tort 
liability under the ‘partie civile’ mechanism as part of the main criminal proceeding. The mixed 
                                                 
82 INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASKFORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, 128 
(2009). 
83 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, in: GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 59, 101 
(Andrew Morriss ed., 2010).  
84 In France, ‘double criminality’ is not required to assert passive nationality jurisdiction. Then again, unlike 
Belgium, France requires French nationality of the victims what significantly limits access to French courts for 
ATS-like cases. Art. 113-7 French CC; See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United 
States and France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 100. (Translation by Fédération internationale des ligues 
des droits de l'Homme (FIDH)) 
85 This is the case in Belgium for “a grave violation of international humanitarian law” as defined in volume II, title 
Ibis of the Belgian Criminal Code (henceforth: Belgian CC) (i.e. genocide (Art. 136bis), crimes against humanity 
(Art. 136ter), and war crimes (Art. 136quater)), see Art. 10, 1bis Belgian Preliminary Title to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (henceforth: Belgian PTCCP). (Translation by FIDH) 
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civil/criminal nature of the ‘partie civile’ concept has important implications for procedural rules 
and substantive law as applied in the cases concerned and might shed some light on the fact that 
tort claims have almost exclusively been brought before U.S. courts under the ATS, rather than 
before the courts of its European counterparts.  
Legal scholarship has only scarcely focused on the interplay between substantive law 
deterrence and procedural rules, especially with regard to civil claims.86 As pointed out in the 
previous chapter, this dissertation takes an incentives-based approach to human rights 
compliance by corporations. It will be shown that incentives induced by legal adjudication 
cannot only be found in substantive law, but also in procedural rules governing litigation, as 
some scholars have argued. Thus, procedural rules and practicalities of litigation might alter the 
legal deterrence effect envisioned by legal theory.87 Moreover, I argue in Chapter 4 that the civil 
or criminal nature of the respective liability schemes has implications for the incentive-
compatibility of the latter. The following chapters will build upon the scholarship on 
comparative civil procedure,88 tort law incentives,89 and comparative corporate responsibility 
law90 and will be extending the findings on the interplay between procedures and substantive 
                                                 
86 A few scholars have focused on this substantive and procedural interdependence, see Jonathan Molot, How U.S. 
Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 INDIANA L.J., 60 (1997); Jeffrey Parker, Comparative Civil Procedure 
and Transnational “Harmonization”: A Law-and-Economics Perspective, Presented at the 11th Travemunder 
Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Procedural Law, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY LAW AND ECONOMICS 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (2008). 
87 See Jonathan Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 INDIANA L.J. 99-108 (1997). (Arguing 
that the U.S. procedural system alters deterrence incentives in two ways not taken into account by tort theory). 
88 See Scott Dodson & James Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 BOSTON 
COLLEGE INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 1-26 (2011); Oscar G. Chase et al., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
(2007) (Conducting a comparative approach to the civil procedure of various legal systems while addressing the 
divide between common and civil law systems and delineating the implications of transnational civil litigation in 
those systems.); Ernst Stiefel & James Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States-Opportunity for 
Learning from 'Civilized' European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW  147-62 (1994); JAMES MAXEINER, PHILIP HOWARD, GOYOOHO LEE, AND ARMIN WEBER, 
FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2011).  
89 Some scholars have critically assessed whether tort law in fact achieves the deterrence effect that is envisaged by 
legal theory.  Jonathan Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 INDIANA L.J. 60-117; John E. 
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 
966-67 (1984); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 
UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87 (1994). 
90 See MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY – A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2009); Anna Triponel, 
Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 59-
158; Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated 
in International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 841-902 (2009); Beth Stephens, Translating 
Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights 
Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 2-57 (2002). 
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law deterrence to corporate tort liability for violations of international law, especially human 
rights standards.  
By comparing and contrasting relevant procedural rules at the pre-trial and trial phase, 
differences among the United States and Europe will be identified that implicate the corporate 
risk of litigation and effectiveness of victims’ redress and therefore directly influence the 
substantive scope of corporate responsibilities and victims rights.  The differences trace back to 
both (1) the civil law and common law culture of the respective jurisdictions and (2) the torts or 
criminal nature of the liability schemes. Furthermore, an analysis of the substantive law 
principles relating to jurisdictional prescription and corporate liability aims to reinforce the 
differences and complements the understanding why most victims resort to the U.S. system for 
relief. The following analysis will shed light on the existing preferences of forum when it comes 
to litigating ATS-like cases but will also yield some results that might seem counter-intuitive at 
first sight, as will be seen below.  Moreover, one must emphasize that the comparison between 
the United States and Europe is not perfectly bi-polar; rather, despite many commonalities, there 
are some minor, but significant differences among the select European countries’ approaches to 
human rights adjudication targeted at corporations.  To understand these differences among 
European jurisdictions will demonstrate the diversified legal character of Europe. The sooner we 
recognize the diversified character of Europe with regard human rights redress, the better can we 
distill characteristics of legal liability schemes and their adjudication that are most compatible 
with the desired incentives under the law, namely to deter violations and improve compliance.  
 
2. Rationale for Selection of Country Case Studies  
This work aims to conduct a comparative legal analysis of civil and criminal remedies 
for corporate human rights cases in the U.S. common law system and France and Belgium, 
representative of Continental civil law systems. The United States is unique in its concept and 
practice of providing for human rights redress under the ATS and can be viewed to be the 
  
23 
 
standard against which other legal systems will be compared.91 Eric Engle confirms the choice 
of European legal systems by stating that “the majority of civil law countries in Europe more 
closely follow French civil law.”92 France has been one of the first countries in Europe to 
introduce corporate criminal liability in its criminal code in 1994;93 this makes it an interesting 
legal system to look at with regard to corporate human rights violations. Concerning Belgium, it 
is to be noted that even though Belgium follows the French legal tradition,94 it still made its own 
mark, for example with its broad universal jurisdiction in absentia (the most far-reaching 
jurisdiction in Europe until 2003)95 and its granting recognized refugees the same protection as 
Belgian nationals with regard to international crimes.96 These and other features of the Belgian 
legal system particularly in extraterritorial cases, has made Belgium a unique litigation forum 
for extraterritorial human rights cases. The intention of this work is, by choosing France and 
Belgium as the European counterparts in the analysis, to illustrate that differences between those 
two European civil law systems might not be as stark as between others (such as Germany), but 
they can be decisive and have a needle-moving impact with regard to access to courts for human 
rights plaintiffs and thus with regard to (substantive law) deterrence of corporations. 
Occasionally, the French and Belgian approach will be contrasted with the German one since, on 
many counts, Germany can be considered the “odd-man out” among the majority of European 
legal systems following the French legal tradition; those rather stark differences between 
                                                 
91 See Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 404 (2001). 
92 Eric A. Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZERP-DISKUSSIONSPAPIER, 37-
38  (2005). 
93 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 73-74. France has been a strong advocate during the Rome negotiations to make legal persons, 
in addition to natural persons, subject to jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Kai  Ambos, Art. 25: 
Individual Criminal Responsibility, in: COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, para. 4 (Triffterer ed., 1999). 
94 Belgium has been influenced significantly by the French legal system; Hubert Bocken and Walter De Bondt 
explain that “during most of the nineteenth century, independence of the [Belgian] legal system was further away 
than ever. … There were few changes to French codes. Most attempts at revising them failed.” HUBERT BOCKEN & 
WALTER DE BONDT, INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW, 11 (2001) [internal citation omitted]. Even though “Belgian 
law has still ties with French law” (Id., at 13 [international citation omitted]), Belgium has developed a common 
“Belgian attitude toward law,” what is characterized by pragmatism and a willingness to look to international law 
and other legal systems. (Id., at 21).  
95 See id., at 26.  
96 See Art. 10 1bis Belgian PTTP. 
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Germany and countries following the French civil culture can prove helpful to get a broader 
understanding of the ‘European’ approach to corporate human rights litigation, since many 
countries in Eastern Europe have successfully exported the German legal system.97 
Another reason for structuring the comparative legal analysis around the United States 
on the one side and Belgium and France on the other hand is an important common feature 
between France and Belgium. Both legal systems are spearheading the ‘partie civile’ procedure 
as an option for civil parties to criminal proceedings.98 The ‘partie civile’ procedure is of 
strategic importance, especially in corporate human rights cases, and trumps municipal tort 
actions under the Brussels I Regulation as a viable option for litigating those issues, as will be 
shown below. Scholars have considered the ‘partie civile’ procedure to be a competitive venue 
for redress under the ATS.99  
Finally, the comparative analysis of the ‘partie civile’ procedure in Belgium and France 
will also allow drawing conclusions with regard to the effectiveness of corporate human rights 
redress in other jurisdictions in Europe and beyond. Thus, a survey conducted among 16 
jurisdictions about private sector remedies for grave violations of human rights showed that 
among the 8 jurisdictions of the sample group that have endorsed the principle of prosecutorial 
discretion, the majority (i.e. six jurisdictions) still provided for some kind of “mechanisms for 
individuals or organizations to initiate and/or participate in criminal proceedings” and four 
jurisdictions provided for an ‘action civile’ mechanism.100  
 
                                                 
97 See Eric A. Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? Human Rights and Tort in European Law, ZERP-DISKUSSIONSPAPIER, 
38 (2005). 
98 Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in 
International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 882(2009); Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, 
Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, 
para. 97 (2008) (Pointing out cases against French company Total brought for their operations in Burma (now 
Myanmar) before French and Belgian courts under the ‘partie civile’ procedure.) 
99 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies 
for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 19 (2002); Eric A. Engle, Alien Torts in Europe? 
Human Rights and Tort in European Law, 1/20 ZERP-DISKUSSIONSPAPIER, 21 (2005) (arguing that the empirical 
evidence of partie civile procedures or equivalent across most civil jurisdictions “proves that […] the Alien Tort 
Statute is not idiosyncratic.”) 
100 Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in 
International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 882 (2009). 
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II. AVAILABLE TORT REMEDIES IN EUROPE: THE BRUSSELS I 
REGULATION AND ITS LIMITS 
Apart from tort liability under the ATS and criminal liability with the option to attach 
civil claims under European criminal codes, there also are other remedies available both in the 
United States and Europe. However, the latter do not bear the same litigious potential for the 
reasons set out below.101 Thus, ordinary tort liability actually is a viable option for victims to 
hold corporations accountable before European courts.102 However, there are various reasons 
why those tort venues, despite being available in theory, in fact have not been resorted to by 
litigious parties to the same extent as the ATS or the European ‘partie civile’ procedure. Jan 
Wouters has pointed to the future potential of the Brussels I Regulation after the European 
Courts of Justice’s decision in Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson,103 where the Court declared the 
forum non conveniens doctrine as inapplicable in cases under the Brussels I Regulation and thus 
lifted an important procedural hurdle for ATS-like cases in Europe.   This change in legal 
practice might turn out to be a decisive advantage over litigation under the ATS, which is often 
challenged and dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens.104 
It is a generally accepted view both in countries with a common law tradition and those 
with a civil law tradition that the violation of a criminal standard which aims to protect a 
particular individual, entails tort liability for the damage suffered.105 Under common law, this 
doctrine is referred to as ‘negligence per se,’ meaning that the violation of a criminal provision 
                                                 
101 The first successful tort action for complicity in crimes against humanity has only been granted by a French 
administrative court in its June 2006 landmark decision in the “Lipietz” case. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, 
Gobalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 THE AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 363-401 (2008).  See also Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights 
Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 93 (2008) (asking the 
question “why, if the Brussels I Regulation can be a useful tool for European civil damages claims against European 
corporations for human rights abuses abroad, have there not been more cases?”).  
102 See Bahareh Mostajelean, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Success (or its Failure?) of 
Bringing Civil Suits Against Multinational Corporations that Commit Human Rights Violations, 40 THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 512-13 (2008); Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and 
International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 
31-32 (discussing the possibility to use municipal torts as an alternate cause of action under domestic law to address 
human rights violations.); Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European 
Perspective, 6 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, 5 (2008). 
103 Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, Case C-281/02, 2005 E.C.R. O.J. (C 106). 
104 Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, 299 (2008). 
105 See GEORGE FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 57-58 (2008). 
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triggers tort liability in negligence.106 This rule does not only apply to violations of criminal 
standards but any protective laws that create individual rights. Thus, in the United States, the 
Bivens principle creates a tort based on violation of a right under the Constitution.107 Therefore, 
no matter whether the cause of action is derived from a ‘violation of the law of nations’ under 
the ATS or a violation of a criminal standard, ordinary tort liability is available as redress for 
victims of human rights abuses attributable to a corporation.  
In the United States, there is no need for victims to resort to ordinary tort remedies, as 
the ATS provides a special statutory basis for extraterritorial violations of the law of nations 
against aliens. In Europe, however, using regular torts law, as opposed to the ‘partie civile’ 
mechanism in connection with a criminal proceeding, offers a serious alternate route for redress. 
The question remains, however, why in fact ordinary tort liability is not resorted to by victims 
and their plaintiffs in Europe. There are various reasons that make regular torts law less 
attractive for victims’ redress than the ATS and the ‘partie civile’ mechanism. In brief, the main 
reasons are jurisdictional limitations for tort liability and rules of international private law that 
produce sub-optimal results for the fact situation at hand.  
First and foremost, there exists no equivalent to universal civil jurisdiction, as prescribed 
under the ATS, in any other legal system.108 This limits the access to tort remedies in Europe 
significantly. Universal civil jurisdiction is a highly controversial concept under international 
law, which according to Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal of the International Court 
of Justice “has not attracted the approbation of States generally.”109 In Europe, the jurisdiction of 
civil courts over misconduct that occurred abroad is determined by the European Council 
Regulation No 44/2001 of December 22, 2000, on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
                                                 
106 See Restatement of the Law (Third), Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, § 14 ‘Statutory Violations as Negligence 
Per Se’ (2010). 
107 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
108 See Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 404 (2001). 
109 Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. Reports 63, at para. 48. 
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enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (co-called Brussels I Regulation).110 
The Brussels I Regulation establishes civil jurisdiction of European courts based on the domicile 
of the defendant. Therefore, French and Belgium courts, e.g., have jurisdiction over civil cases 
involving corporate acts which have taken place outside of the EU as long as the defendant 
company is “domiciled” in the forum jurisdiction,111 even if the damage is sustained in third 
countries112 and irrespective of the nationality and domicile of the victim.113 
According to Art. 60 of the Brussels I Regulation, a company is considered to be 
“domiciled” where it has its “(a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or (c) principal 
place of business.” Prof. Olivier de Schutter has claimed that the Brussels I Regulation 
constitutes the European equivalent to the ATS.114 However, compared to the civil jurisdiction 
under the ATS, which does not require any link with the United States aside from establishing 
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant,115 the Brussels I Regulation does not 
extend to the misconduct of foreign corporations, i.e., corporations that are not “domiciled” 
within the EU; for the very least a company must have its principal place of business within 
the EU. This, it is argued, diminishes its impact and importance of the Brussels framework for 
extraterritorial civil human rights litigation in Europe.116  
                                                 
110 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. (L 12/1) (“Brussels I Regulation”). The Brussels I Regulation 
succeeds the 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
Convention (EC) of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 1968 [1972] O.J. L (299) 32.  
111 Art. 2(1) Brussels I Regulation. 
112 See Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 80 (2008). 
113 Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v. Universal General Insurance Company (UGIC), Case C-412/98, 2000 
E.C.R. I-5925, at para. 45.  
114 Olivier de Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law, in 
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 227 (P. Alston ed., 2005).  
115 See section C on “Comparative Jurisdictional Reach” below (p. 34-51); Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate 
Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 109.    
116 Bahareh Mostajelean, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Success (or is it failure?) of 
Bringing Civil Suits Against Multinational Corporations that Commit Human Rights Violations, 40 THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV. at 507 (2008).  
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For foreign companies (i.e., those outside of the EU), jurisdiction cannot be based on the 
Brussels I Regulation, but must be established under domestic law.117 Thus, e.g., Belgian civil 
courts can assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over torts of foreign (i.e. outside of the EU) 
companies within the scope of Art. 96 or Art. 11 of the 2004 Belgian Code on Private 
International Law (henceforth: Belgian PIL Code).118 Even though Art. 96 provides a special 
ground for tort liability, the plaintiff can decide which ground he wants to rely on for 
jurisdiction.119 Both Art. 96 and Art. 11 of the Belgian PIL Code pose challenges to the victim 
plaintiffs.  
Art. 96(2) Belgian PIL Code120 grants jurisdiction to a Belgian civil judge to hear a case 
involving obligations resulting from a tort “(a) when the event giving rise to the obligation has 
arisen or threaten to arise, in all or in part, in Belgium,” or “(b) if and to the extent [emphasis 
added] that the harm [in terms of damage121] has been suffered or threaten to be suffered in 
Belgium.”122 Whereas option (a) focuses on the tortfeasor as a determining factor for 
jurisdiction, option (b) focuses on the (impact on the) victim. Option (a) enables a claim for 
compensation for the entire damage (irrespective whether it occurred in Belgium or abroad), 
provided that “one of the constituting elements of the event giving rise to the damage” be 
located on Belgian territory.123  However, considering the advanced compartimentalization of 
                                                 
117 Art. 2 of the Belgian Code on International Private Law prescribes that international treaties or acts of the 
European Union regulating non-contractual obligations are considered lex specialis to the provisions of the IPL 
Code. See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND 
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 62-63, 69 (2006) (emphasizing that Art. 96 Belgian PIL Code 
only applies to defendants “living outside of the European Union.”). 
118Loi portant le Code de droit international privé (July 16, 2004) [Belgian Code on Private International Law]. 
119 Id.,at 69. 
120 Art. 96 (2) Belgian PIL Code mirrors Art. 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation and thus interestingly applies the 
same standard to tort liability of corporations domiciled within the European Union and the ones domiciled outside 
of the EU. See ARNAUD NUYTS, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF “RESIDUAL JURISDICTION” IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
DISPUTE IN THE EU, NATIONAL REPORT FOR BELGIUM, 3(2006), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_belgium_en.pdf  
121 Translation by: BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND 
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 70 (2006). 
122 See Arnaud Nuyts, Comparative Study of “Residual Jurisdiction” in Civil and Commercial Dispute in the EU, 
National Report for Belgium,  7 (2006), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_resid_jurisd_belgium_en.pdf. 
123 Id.  
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MNCs into a net of legally independent subsidiaries,124 it might not be an easy task for the 
victims of overseas human rights violations to link the ‘act creating the damage’ back to 
Belgium. Especially considering the only very limited instances when courts are willing to 
‘pierce the corporate veil,’125 imputing abuses that occurred overseas in the larger context a 
company’s business operations, puts a burden on the victim plaintiffs and also exposes them to a 
situation of legal uncertainty concerning interpretation by the domestic courts, in this case 
Belgium, about when an “act creating the damage” has (at least in part) occurred in Belgium.  
Option (b) on the other hand, also proves to be useful only in a limited way; most 
likely, option (b) will lead to a situation where a Belgian judge has jurisdiction over a plaintiff 
who lives in Belgium, since damage usually occurs where the plaintiff has its assets, which 
often intersects with his place of living.126 Applying this hypothesis to human rights-related 
torts in connection with a company’s overseas operations, victims will only be able to have a 
Belgian judge assess their civil claims if they reside in Belgium, either on a refugee status or 
otherwise. This limits the impact and usefulness for victims from developing countries and 
emerging markets where MNCs conduct their business operations and where related torts 
occur. Moreover, Art. 96 (2)b Belgian PIL Code contains an important restriction: a Belgian 
judge can only assert jurisdiction over the part of the claim that aims to redeem compensation 
for the damage that occurred in Belgium , unless the event giving rise to the damage occurred 
(at least in part) in Belgium (Art. 96 (2)a Belgian PIL Code). Thus, if damage has occurred in 
                                                 
124 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011 version) define multinational enterprise as follows: 
“They usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they 
may coordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a 
significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely 
from one multinational enterprise to another.” Concepts and Principles I.4. (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf ; see also Peter Muchlinski, The Company Law Review and 
Multinational Corporate Groups, in: THE REFORM OF UNITED KINGDOM COMPANY LAW 249, 251 (John de Lacy 
ed., 2002) [Cited in: Wells, Celia & Elias, Juanita, Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the 
International Stage, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 141, 148-49 (Philip Alston ed., 2005)]. 
125 SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, 129-32 (2004); already the 
first European Company Law Directive from March 1968 required member States to “ensure certainty in the law as 
regards relations between the company and third parties, and also between members, to limit the cases in which 
nullity can arise and the retroactive effect of a declaration of nullity,” thus limiting the instances where the 
corporate form can be disregarded. First Council Directive 68/151/EEC (9 March 1968); See also KAREN 
VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL: A TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH (2007). 
126 See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND  
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 69 (2006). 
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more than one jurisdiction—which is very likely in cases of corporate-led human rights 
violations, considering that the primary damage has occurred in the host country—Belgian 
courts will only assume jurisdiction over the part that are linked to Belgium.127 In line with the 
European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on Art. 5(3) Brussels I Regulation,128 Arnaud 
Nuyts, a prominent Belgian law scholar, has argued that “the place where the harm is 
suffered” under Art. 96(2) Belgian PIL is considered to be the “’place of impact’ of the tort, 
irrespective of the place where the consequences of the damage are felt;” it is not sufficient 
that mere economic damage to the plaintiffs assets was felt in the forum jurisdiction.129  
As mentioned above, the victim plaintiff can also rely on Art. 11 of the Belgian PIL 
Code on “exceptional attribution of international jurisdiction” as a ground for jurisdiction. Thus, 
Belgian courts can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for cases that “ha[ve] narrow links with 
Belgium and [emphasis added] when proceedings abroad seem to be impossible or when it 
would be unreasonable to request that the proceedings are initiated abroad.” 130 Proceedings 
abroad are deemed impossible or unreasonable when a fair trial might not be guaranteed.131 This 
“exceptional” international jurisdiction, however, does not institute a universal jurisdiction 
ground in civil matters. However, commentaries have indicated that the required link should not 
be construed too narrowly and certainly does not require Belgian nationality on part of the 
plaintiff or the defendant.132 Thus, whereas Art. 11 Belgian PIL Code provides a more general 
ground for jurisdiction and might capture cases that preempt the limitations of Art. 96 Belgian 
PIL Code, as discussed above, it also puts a significant burden on the plaintiffs to prove that all 
                                                 
127 See id., at 70. 
128 Marinari v. Lloyds Bank et al., 1995 C-364/93, ECR I-2719. 
129 ARNAUD NUYTS, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF “RESIDUAL JURISDICTION” IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL DISPUTE IN 
THE EU, NATIONAL REPORT FOR BELGIUM, 7 (2006). 
130 Art. 11 is an implementation of Art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (right to access to courts) 
into Belgian law. see BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME 
AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 67(2006).  
131 See id., at 68 (2006). [Citing: Arnaud Nuyts, Article 11, in: HET WETBOEK INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 
BECOMMENTARIEERD, 67 (J. Erauw et al, eds., 2006)] (Discussing whether impossibility in law or fact is covered 
from Art. 11 Belgian PIL.) 
132 Id. at 68 [Citing: Arnaud Nuyts, Article 11, in: HET WETBOEK INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 
BECOMMENTARIEERD, 68-69 (J. Erauw et al, eds., 2006)]. 
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conditions of Art. 11 Belgian PIL Code are met.133 Considering that this requires sensitive inside 
knowledge about foreign court systems and access to documentation showing the effective 
access to a fair trial is not ensured abroad, Art. 11 Belgian PIL Code proves only partly useful 
for human rights victims. This limitation is amplified by the significant legal uncertainty that is 
associated with the interpretation of ‘narrow links with Belgium’ by the courts. Taking into 
account that in Europe the loser in a civil lawsuit pays not only for his own legal costs but also 
the legal expenses of the defendant,134 victim plaintiffs will not easily take the risk to prove 
jurisdictional grounds that bear legal uncertainty or that lack clear interpretational guidance by 
the courts. Belgium provides an example of how European jurisdictions regulate tort claims 
dealing with foreign corporations; furthermore, Belgium is known to be rather excessive when 
asserting its jurisdiction135 and is therefore emblematic of an approach that might come closest 
to the reach of the ATS. Still, this analysis of Belgium’s jurisdictional reach suggests the 
conclusion that access to European civil courts for victims of overseas human rights violations is 
limited and clearly falls short of the universal civil jurisdiction prescription of the ATS.  
Aside from a more narrow scope of jurisdiction over torts committed abroad, another 
major disincentive for human rights litigation in Europe is that the law applicable to 
extraterritorial torts is less favorable for victims of overseas human rights abuses than the ATS 
or criminal proceedings before European courts. The reason is that the Brussels I Regulation is 
merely adjudicative in nature. The latter merely lays out rules for identifying which courts are 
competent to hear the claims.136 The ATS on the other hand, establishes both jurisdiction and 
prescribes the cause of action and thus the applicable law, i.e., the “law of nations,” as defined 
                                                 
133 See id. at 68-69 (2006).  
134 See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States the “Odd 
Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZONA J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L., 400 (1999). 
135 BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND  
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 69 (2006). [Citing: Thalia Kruger, Art. 96, in HET WETBOEK 
INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT BECOMMENTARIEERD, 490 (J. Erauw et al. eds., 2006)].  
136 Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 83 (2008).  
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by federal common law.137 In Europe, however, once jurisdiction is established on the basis of 
the Brussels I Regulation, international private law has to be consulted to determine the 
applicable substantive law.138 In Europe, the principle of ‘lex loci deliti’ prevails, as codified in 
the European Council Regulation of July 11, 2007 No. 864/2007 on the law applicable to 
noncontractual obligations (so-called the Rome II Regulation).139 Thus, the non-contractual 
obligation based on a tort/delict is governed by the “law of the country in which the damage 
occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred [. . . ]” 
(Art. 4 para. 1 Rome II Regulation); it is irrelevant whether the applicable law is the law of a 
non-EU member State. (Art. 3 Rome II Regulation) This leads to a situation where the law of the 
host State is applied to human rights litigation before domestic European courts. This deference 
to the principle of ‘lex loci delicti,’ diminishes the practical relevance of the Brussels I 
Regulation in the context of human rights litigation.140 Host states for international business will 
usually be developing countries or emerging markets with often repressive regimes (e.g., China) 
or with a strong urge to compete in a globalized economy which leads to a ‘race to the 
bottom.’141 In both instances, host States might apply less stringent standards to corporate 
conduct and fall short of international human rights standards. De Schutter points out, for 
example, that the law of the host State may be “unsufficiently protective of the victims” or grant 
amnesties to the perpetrators.142 The effectiveness of victim redress under European tort law 
                                                 
137 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (“Although we agree the statute is in terms only 
jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very 
limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”). 
138 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 115; see Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European 
Perspective, 6 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 83 (2008). 
139 Art. 4 (1) Council Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations, O.J. 2007 (L199/40) (“Rome II Regulation”); see Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate 
Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 116. 
140 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 118. It is to be noted that the applicable law before European courts for torts committed abroad 
by a foreign company (i.e. registered or domiciled outside of the European Union) would be the same as under the 
Rome II Regulation, i.e. usually the law of the host State. (See f.ex. Art. 99 of the Belgian PIL Code).  
141 See Wells and Elias, Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International Stage, in 
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 141, 143 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
142 Olivier de Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law, 
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE WORKING PAPER, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, at 
41(2004), available at http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/s04deschutter.pdf [reprinted in: NON-STATE 
ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 227-314 (P. Alston ed., 2005)]. 
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would be enhanced if, as e.g., Art. 96 of the Belgian PIL Code does for jurisdictional purposes, 
it was not decisive where the damage occurred but rather where the tort act creating the damage 
has occurred, since, within the complex, multi-layered structure of MNCs, an even indirect 
involvement of the European company presence might be able to link the tort act back to a 
European jurisdictional forum.  
The reasons outlined above, as well as European procedural rules143 that will be 
discussed in detail below and that most prominently include fee shifting rules, which confer the 
burden of paying the winning party’s legal fees on the losing one and the unavailability of 
contingency arrangements,144 could explain why (regular) tort liability has not been the primary 
recourse against corporations in European courts. These elaborations shed some light on why 
victims in Europe, if at all, rather resort to the ‘partie civil’ mechanism when pursuing their 
private claims. As will be shown below, attaching a civil claim to the main criminal proceeding 
has important advantages for the victims’ plaintiffs and the effectiveness of redress.  Just to 
name a few, considering the high standard of proof in civil cases in Western jurisdictions with a 
civil law tradition145 and a less liberal discovery process ,146 the ‘partie civile’ mechanism 
enables the private party to benefit from the investigation and evidence production by the 
prosecutor. Moreover, it is common in the select European jurisdictions that the civil case will 
be suspended as long the criminal proceedings are underway;147 thus, it is more efficient for 
victims to merge and streamline the civil and criminal proceedings from the outset. 
The focus of comparison, moving forward, will be the corporate risk related to civil human 
rights redress under the ATS as compared to the European primarily criminal remedy redress by 
                                                 
143See Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 
NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, para. 93 (2008); see also Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate 
Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 113. 
144 See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States the “Odd 
Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZONA J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L., 381, 403-04 (1999). 
145 Kevin Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, 245 (2002). (The reasonable-doubt standard in civil cases prevails in Europe and beyond, thus 
leading Clermont to refer to a “common-law exception” with regard to the standard of proof.) 
146 See Oscar Chase, American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure, 50 AMERICAN J. COMP. L, 293-94 
(2002). 
147Bahareh Mostajelean, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Success (or is it failure?) of 
Bringing Civil Suits Against Multinational Corporations that Commit Human Rights Violations, 40 THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV. at 511; see also Art. 4 French Code of Criminal Procedure and Art. 4 Belgian PTCCP. 
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virtue of a ‘partie civile’ complaint (also referred to as ‘action civile). Municipal tort law actions 
in the select European jurisdictions, namely Belgium and France, will not be discussed further, 
due to their limits in these cases as stated above. Therefore, the following section will compare 
and contrast tort liability under the ATS in the context of U.S. civil litigation and tort liability 
under the French and Belgian ‘constitution de partie civile’ procedure in the context of the 
underlying criminal proceedings. Special attention will be given to the dynamics and specific 
parameters and implications of the ‘action civile,’ as it bridges prosecution in the public interest 
with the interests of affected private parties and secures those parties a significant influence on 
and role in the primary criminal proceeding.  
 
III. COMPARATIVE JURISDICTIONAL REACH 
Before assessing how procedural rules implicate substantive law and deterrence 
thereunder, it is indispensable to take a comparative look at extraterritorial jurisdictional reach in 
the selected jurisdictions, since it directly implicates corporate litigation risk and informs the 
strategy choice of forum by victim plaintiffs to sue and by corporations to structure/design their 
global presence and operations. Specifically, domestic jurisdictional prescriptions implicate 
corporate risk factors that induce legal incentives on corporations to comply in the respective 
forum; one of these decisive factors is the (non-)applicability of the ‘double criminality’ 
requirement for different bases of jurisdiction. Moreover, a comparative understanding of 
jurisdictional prescriptions informs conclusions about the availability of the ‘partie civile’ 
procedure. Together with procedural rules and legal culture, jurisdictional bases in the selected 
jurisdictions shed light on why proceedings against corporations for overseas human rights 
violations have been brought almost exclusively in the United States as opposed to Europe; the 
comparative legal findings will help to show the impact of legal procedures and culture on 
substantive law deterrence in the field. 
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Finally, the following section will compare and contrast the extraterritorial jurisdictional 
reach of the ATS on the one hand and French and Belgian criminal law on the other. There are 
good reasons to compare civil jurisdiction under the ATS with extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction under the select European jurisdictions. First and foremost, litigation under the ATS 
features a mixed civil/criminal approach in practice, resorting to criminal law concept such as 
aiding and abetting liability, despite the tort nature of the cause of action. On the other side, the 
civil complaint procedure under the ‘constitution de partie civile’ piggybacks the underlying 
criminal proceedings which constitute the main proceeding148 (thus following mainly criminal 
rules)149 to which the civil claim is merely attached. Since the ATS is somewhat criminal in 
elements of its adjudication and, most importantly, since the civil claims under ‘constitution de 
partie civile’ is driven by the primary criminal proceedings,150 a comparison of civil jurisdiction 
under the ATS and criminal jurisdiction in select European jurisdictions is warranted.  
The following elaborations on the materiae personae aim to draw the contours of the 
jurisdictional reach over eligible parties to civil proceedings under the ATS and to similar cases 
under criminal proceedings in European jurisdictions. It will focus on key comparative aspects 
between the United States and France and Belgium (as representative examples of European 
legal systems) as they inform (1) the legal risk that corporations encounter for their overseas 
operations under the respective legal system; and (2) the rights enforcement by victim plaintiffs. 
The aspect of extraterritorial reach of jurisdiction and law is a decisive one with regard to the 
scope of the human rights of victims and the liability of corporations. The jurisdictional reach 
                                                 
148 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies 
for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 19 (2002) (Describing the ‘action civile’ 
mechanism as a procedural vehicle that allows “the victim of a crime [to] join the criminal prosecution as a partie 
civile, becoming a party to the case with the right to access to the proceedings …”). 
149 See Jean Larguier, Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39 TUL. L. REV., 698 (1965) 
(Outlining the “consequences of a civil action brought before criminal judges,” thus implying that the criminal 
proceeding is the principal and thus dominant one. This is confirmed by Larguier’s statement emphasizing that 
“[t]he civil action always makes the victim a party to the consequences.”) 
150 Arnaud Nuyts is stressing that “the court seized of a criminal proceedings can … entertain the civil claim 
brought by the victim.” ARNAUD NUYTS, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF “RESIDUAL JURISDICTION” IN CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE IN THE EU, NATIONAL REPORT FOR BELGIUM, 7 (2006). 
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under the ATS diverges significantly in magnitude and the prescriptive base from European 
jurisdiction, namely for the purpose of this study, Belgium and France.  
The ATS confers (subject matter) jurisdiction on U.S. courts for “any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States;”151 therefore, for what concerns personal jurisdiction, no link to the United States is 
required with regard to the nationality of the perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or the 
‘loci deliti.’ As will be shown below, the ATS is unique and unprecedented in its broad 
jurisdictional reach and in the fact that it institutes a base for “universal civil” jurisdiction, a 
concept whose legitimacy under international law has been much debated.152 As pointed out 
above, European countries, such as France and Belgium, rather rely on criminal law than tort 
liability to hold corporations accountable for their overseas operations. Universal jurisdiction 
prescriptions are commonly found in criminal law enforcement and, even though there is no 
obligation for States under international law to exercise universal jurisdiction for violations of 
fundamental norms of international law, it certainly is possible for States to do so.153  
Granted that the subject matter jurisdiction is very different in nature comparing the ATS 
and corresponding European criminal code provisions, it might be hard to say that one has a 
more extensive reach than the other. This is particularly true since the broad subject-matter 
scope of ‘violations of the law nations’ under the ATS has been significantly restricted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, so as to “require [that] any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms 
[this Court] ha[s] recognized.” 154 The differences are starker when comparing the personal 
jurisdictional reach; these differences then inform plaintiffs’ litigation preferences and corporate 
risk profiles, as they diverge between the U.S. and European legal systems.  
                                                 
151 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  
152 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 109. 
153 Id., at 108-09. 
154 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
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In the United States, the personal jurisdictional reach of the ATS is very broad; thus, it is 
not only allowed for, but even required, that the victim plaintiff invoking the ATS is an “alien.” 
Moreover, it has been common jurisprudence across various Circuits that the ATS extends also 
to foreign corporate defendants.155  With no further requirements, the ATS provides for a quasi-
universal reach of jurisdiction, as long as the defendant has “minimum contacts” to the U.S. 
forum.156 Following the principle of “doing business” jurisdiction, U.S. courts assert personal 
jurisdiction on the mere basis that a corporation engages in substantial activity in the United 
States, without requiring any nexus of the dispute and the defendant’s conduct to the forum.157 It 
is possible in the United States to establish jurisdiction over non-resident units of MNCs, 
provided that there are “sufficient factors connecting that defendant with the forum.”158 Usually, 
the presence of an affiliate enterprise within the forum jurisdiction will establish personal 
jurisdiction over the non-resident entity. First and foremost, the necessary connection to the 
forum jurisdiction can be found through ownership and control of the non-resident parent 
company over the resident local entity.159 However, according to U.S. case law mere ownership 
of shares in the local subsidiary is not sufficient for U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over a non-
resident parent company; a further connector is necessary.160 To assess whether such connection 
exists, “an analysis of fact will have to be undertaken which is not dissimilar to a ‘lifting the 
corporate veil’” in order to establish the liability of the parent company over the acts of its 
subsidiary.161 The plaintiff bears the burden to show that the subsidiary is an ‘alter ego’162 or 
                                                 
155 See e.g. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , 226 F.3d 88, 94-95(2nd Cir. 2000); Ntsebeza v. Daimler A.G. (In 
Re South African Apartheid Litigation), 2009 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 34572617 at 46-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 919-31 (9th Cir. 2011). 
156 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S.  310, 316  (1945) (Holding that a nonresident defendant can be sued 
in a foreign forum  if the defendant  maintains  minimum  contacts  to the forum and the lawsuit does  not  unfairly  
burden  the defendant.) For an overview of personal jurisdiction rules in the U.S. and other countries, see PETER 
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 140-53 (2007). 
157 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 109.  
158 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 140 (2007).  
159 Id., at 140-41. 
160 See e.g. Cannon Manufacturing Co v. Cudahy Packing Co, 267 US 333 (1925); Harris Rutsky and Co. Insurance 
Services Inc. v Bell and Clements Ltd., 328 F 3d 1122 (9th Cir., 2003).  
161 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 143 (2007).  
162 The ‘alter ego’ test sets the bar very high, requiring the plaintiffs to show “(1) that there is such unity of interest 
and ownership that the separate personalities [of the two entities] no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard 
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acting as an ‘agent’ of the parent company.163 For that purpose, the degree of economic 
integration between the resident subsidiary and non-resident parent company is decisive.164  
U.S. courts have been rather liberal in establishing this necessary link. Thus, the Court of 
Appeals of the Second Circuit exercised personal jurisdiction over the two non-resident holding 
companies: Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (incorporated in the Netherlands) and Shell 
Transport and Trading Co. (incorporated in the UK).165  The court found a sufficient relationship 
with the United States based on the fact that an Investor Relations Office in New York was 
“facilitating the relations of the parent holding companies with the investment community,”166 
even though the Investors Relations Office was “nominally part of Shell Oil Company,” which 
is owned by Shell’s U.S subsidiary,167 and is thus part of a legal entity that is separate from the 
parent company.168  
The recent decision on personal jurisdiction issues by the Court of Appeals of the Ninth 
Circuit in Bauman vs. Daimler follows this liberal approach, confirming the District Court’s 
decision to extend the jurisdictional reach even more by reformulating the agency test as a 
means to impute U.S. jurisdiction to the non-resident parent company.169 Thus, it is sufficient to 
show that the subsidiary’s activities are “important to [the parent] [in a manner] that they would 
almost certainly be performed by other means if [the subsidiary] did not exist.”170 In his dissent, 
Judge O’Scannlain accuses the majority to “drastically expand[ing] the reach of personal 
jurisdiction beyond all constitutional bounds” and “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s warnings 
that the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] permits ‘defendants to structure 
                                                                                                                                                            
[their separate identities] would result in fraud or injustice.” Doe v.Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
163 See id.; Dole Food Company v. Watts, 303 F 3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002). 
164 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 143 (2007).  
165 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94-95(2nd Cir. 2000).  The two holding companies “jointly 
control and operate the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, a vast, international [. . .] network of affiliated but formally 
independent oil and gas companies.” Id. at 92. 
166 Id. at 93.  
167 All shares of the Shell Oil Company are held by Shell Petroleum Inc., the U.S. subsidiary company of the parent 
holding companies. Id. at 93. 
168 Id. at 93, 96-98. 
169 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011). 
170 Id., at 922. 
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their primary conduct with some minimum as to where that conduct will and will not render 
them liable to suit.’’171  
Certainly, the Ninth Circuit is pushing the envelope with regard to extraterritorial reach 
of U.S. jurisdiction and it in fact might challenge, to some extent, the long-standing principle of 
“corporate separateness,”172 as a “principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our economic 
and legal systems.”173 This principle has been subject to much controversy in legal scholarship, 
though. Some scholars have argued that “with the development [. . . ] of the holding company 
with its unlimited number of subsidiary and the formation of corporate groups,” entity law 
reinforced by the concept of limited liability has “bec[o]me largely dysfunctional when applied 
to multi-tiered corporate groups,” by unduly “atomiz[ing]” it into many separate corporations for 
legal purposes.174 Blumberg argues that the law fails to recognize that the traditional legal 
objective of limited liability granted with incorporation has been to shield shareholders from the 
liabilities of the corporation, not to shield the parent company from the conduct of its 
subsidiaries.175  
Kerr/Janda/Pitts echoe Blumberg’s concerns but looks at the issue from a social contract 
perspective arguing, that the privilege of incorporation (and thus limited liability) has 
traditionally been granted in exchange for the corporation to pursue a public purpose with its 
business activities.176 Thus, the Ninth Circuit might spearhead a new legal trend that defies the 
technicality of legal separation of corporate entities under some circumstances, accounting for 
the complex group structure of modern-day MNCs.177 It is to be noted, though, that the 
reservations of the dissent in Bauman vs. Daimler seem to resonate with Justice Breyer’s 
concurrent opinion in Sosa, where he points out that concerns with international comity do arise 
                                                 
171 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). 
172 Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22612, 11 (9th Cir. 2011) (Judge O’Scannlain 
concurring.) 
173 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998). 
174 Phillip Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under United States Law: 
Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AMERICAN J. OF COMP. L., 528 (2002). 
175 Id., at 529. 
176 See MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY – A LEGAL ANALYSIS, 57 (2009). 
177 See id, at 147.  
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when foreign conduct is concerned that does not involve own nationals of the country that 
provides the cause of action.178  
Thus, even though, as mentioned above, courts across various Circuits have a long 
history of asserting jurisdiction under the ATS over foreign defendants, over-extending the 
jurisdictional scope in this regard might trigger the “comity concerns” raised by Justice 
Breyer.179 This is particularly true when the only temporary presence of officers of the non-
resident unit on U.S. territory is deemed sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction.180 Whereas 
the Supreme Court has upheld this approach in a non-commercial case,181 it might be in tension 
with the Courts standard in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, where it held 
that a foreign corporation can only be subject to jurisdiction if its contacts with the forum are “so 
continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”182  
In Europe, particularly in Belgium and France, there are only limited instances where 
personal jurisdiction can be asserted when a foreign victim is involved or the perpetrator is a 
non-national of the forum jurisdiction and even then it is usually required for the defendant to be 
present on the forum’s territory before criminal proceedings can be initiated.183 In general, issues 
of imputation and piercing the corporate veil can be expected to be similar. However, as has 
been pointed out by the Court in Bauman vs. Daimler, many European countries are more 
                                                 
178 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004). 
179 See id.  
180 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 149 (2007) [Citing: Amusement Equipment 
v. Mordelt, 779F 2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985)].  
181 Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, (1990). 
182 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).  
183 See Art. 12 Belgian PTCCP (Prescribing that as a general rule, criminal proceedings can only be initiated when 
the suspect is “found in Belgium.” Especially, universal jurisdiction in absentia is not provided for anymore in 
Belgium. Exceptions from the presence requirement are available for certain international crimes under active 
nationality jurisdiction (Art. 6 Belgian PTCCP) and under passive nationality jurisdiction (Art. 10, 1bis Belgian 
PTCCP)) (See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND 
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 55-57, 61 (2006)] See Article 689-1 of the French CCP 
(Requiring that the suspect needs to “be found” in France before launching any criminal proceedings on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction for the international crimes prescribed by Art. 689-11 of the French CCP. Unlike Belgium, 
extended and privileged active and passive nationality jurisdiction are not available for international crimes. 
However, a judicial exception from the presence requirement is available for torture. (See JURISDICTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE LAWS AND PRACTICE IN THE 27 MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
REDRESS/FIDH, 131-32(2010)). 
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reluctant to impute jurisdiction than the United States.184 The European approach to 
jurisdictional reach imputed from an EU-based subsidiary to non-EU based parent company is 
not coherent. Thus, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice apply an 
‘enterprise entity test’185 in antitrust cases that in fact renders the mere existence of a parent-
subsidiary relationship sufficient in order to establish jurisdiction over the non-EU based parent 
company.186 Antitrust law might inform and cross-stimulate the European approach to imputing 
jurisdiction also in other areas of law, such as corporate criminal liability. 
Looking at France and Belgium, as examples of European civil law systems, the 
following points of comparison are prominent and distinct from the U.S. system. France and 
Belgium use nationality (on part of the perpetrator or the victim) or territoriality as a base for 
jurisdiction, rather than the more extended jurisdictional reach of US courts, as discussed 
above.187  This limits opportunities for litigation against corporations in the European forum in 
significant part, because of the narrow jurisdictional reach of the French and Belgian courts.   
The active personality principle is one base for jurisdiction in France and Belgium. Both 
in France188 and Belgium,189 jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator is prescribed 
for any felony and misdemeanor190 committed by a French/Belgian national outside of their 
national territory. It is argued that the justification for this broad concept of active personality 
jurisdiction under French law derives from “the fact that France does not extradite her 
                                                 
184 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22612, 16 (9th Cir. 2011) (Judge O’Scannlain 
concurring) [Citing: Brussels I Regulation]. 
185  Re Cartel in Aniline Dyestuffs, Commission Decision 69/243 (24 July 1969), CMLR D23. Upheld in Case 
48/69, ICI v. Commission, 1972 ECR 619, [1972] CMLR 557. 
186 See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 145 (2007).  
187 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 100, 105-07; see BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, 
‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 56-58 (2006); see ABIGAIL HANSEN & 
WILLIAM BOURDON, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF FRANCE, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A 
SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ FAFO AIS, 24 (2006). 
188 Art. 113-6 French CC. 
189 Art. 7 Belgian PTCCP; see lex specialis in Art. 6, 1bis PTCCP for “a grave violation of international 
humanitarian law defined in volume II, title Ibis, of the Criminal Code.” (Translation in: EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE LAWS AND PRACTICE IN THE 27 MEMBER STATES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, REDRESS/FIDH, 85(2010)). 
190 As a general rule, the offense has to be criminalized under Belgian/French law and the law of the country where 
the act took place, see Belgium, Art. 7 PTCCP; France, Art. 113-6 CC.  
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nationals.”191 However, the concept of active personality jurisdiction is significantly broader in 
its reach in Belgium in a different regard; while France only asserts jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by “French national[s]”, Belgium extends its jurisdiction beyond its own nationals to 
include individuals having their “main residence in Belgium.”192 According to the legislative 
will, “main residence” is intended as the “place where the […] [individual] usually lives.”193  
It remains to be seen how this concept of “main residence” would be translated into the 
corporate sphere and whether for MNCs and their complex corporate network of corporate 
entities it is to be relied on the principal place of business, the administrative seat, of the place of 
incorporation. De Schutter has argued that ‘active personality’ is deemed to be “particularly 
justified“ to hold corporations accountable for their overseas conduct.194 However, problems are 
likely to arise when determining the ‘nationality’ of a highly decentralized MNC disposing of a 
complex network of legally independent subsidiaries. In fact, foreign subsidiaries are not 
considered to be of the same nationality as the parent company, since they are legally 
independent under the domestic legal system where they are located; there is no derivative 
nationality allocation based on a corporate group identity.195  
In theory, the contrast between the U.S. and European systems is not as stark in this 
regard. The further the disaggregation of the corporate structure between the jurisdiction of 
incorporation and the jurisdiction of the conduct, the more difficult it becomes under the U.S. 
and European legal systems to frame a plausible cause of action.  However, the nationality of a 
European MNC appears to be a more important factor in civil law systems than the nationality 
of a corporation with U.S. connections in lawsuits before U.S. courts.  Whereas France has 
                                                 
191ABIGAIL HANSEN & WILLIAM BOURDON, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF FRANCE, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME 
AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 23 (2006). 
192 Art. 6, 7 Belgian CC.   
193 See DE KAMER, SESSION 2003, DOC. 51 – 0103/001, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL, EXPLANATION OF  
MOTIVES, 22 July 2003, at 4.  
194 OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 24 (2006), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSG-re-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf (Arguing that the 
main reason why ‘active personality’ jurisdiction is a particularly justified basis for corporate human rights cases is 
that traditionally nationals may not be extradited; thus, ‘active personality’ jurisdiction ensures that crimes do not 
go unpunished.) 
195 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 103.   
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embraced the ‘active nationality’ principle not only for criminal (as is the case in Belgium) but 
also for civil proceedings,196 the United States has exercised jurisdiction on the base of the 
defendant’s nationality only in a very limited number of instances that do not resemble ATS-like 
cases.197 In specific, a tort claim for extraterritorial “violations of the law of nations” does not 
require that the corporate defendant be a U.S.-incorporated company, but, according to a 
longstanding jurisprudence across several Circuits, applies to foreign corporations as well.198 
The passive nationality principle is of limited usefulness in ATS-like cases, since it only 
confers jurisdiction on domestic courts199 for extraterritorial offenses200 where the victim is a 
national of the forum jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator.201 In contrast, 
the framework of the ATS is entirely based on a denial of passive nationality, namely that the 
victim must be an alien of the forum jurisdiction (i.e., the United States).202  In France, the 
victim must be a French national at the moment of the facts.203  In Belgium, the victim must be 
either (1) a Belgian national,204 or (2) for certain crimes under international law, including the 
three crimes under the Rome Statute,205 an individual having had “effective,” “usual” and 
“legal” residence in Belgium for at least three years, or alternatively an individual recognized as 
a refugee and with his habitual residence in Belgium.206  Therefore, the adjudication of certain 
crimes under international law is clearly privileged under Belgian law, as nationality is not an 
                                                 
196 See id, at 102. 
197 These limited cases include issues relating military service and trading with the enemy. Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States para. 402, reporters note 1.  
198 See e.g. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , 226 F.3d 88, 94-95(2nd Cir. 2000); Ntsebeza v. Daimler A.G. (In 
Re South African Apartheid Litigation), 2009 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 34572617 at 46-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 919-31 (9th Cir. 2011). 
199For Belgium, see Art. 10 (5) Belgian PTCCP; for France, see Art. 113-7 French CC.  
200 In France, the ratione materiae covers all felonies and misdemeanours punished by imprisonment, see Art. 113-7 
FCC, while Belgium only asserts jurisdiction based on passive nationality “if the law of the place where the 
crime[s] ha[ve] been committed […] criminalizes the act with a punishment above 5 years of imprisonment,” see 
Art. 10 (5) Belgian PTCCP [translation by: BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, 
‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 57 (2006)]. 
201 See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND  
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 57 (2006); see ABIGAIL HANSEN & WILLIAM BOURDON, FAFO 
AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF FRANCE, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN 
JURISDICTIONS,’ 24 (2006). 
202 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
203 Art. 113-7 French CC; See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and 
France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 100.  
204 Art. 10(5) Belgian PTCCP.  
205 Belgian CC , Book II, Title Ibis.  
206 Art. 10, 1bis Belgian PTCCP in conjunction with amended Criminal Code, Book II, Title Ibis.  
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indispensable requirement to bring a claim before Belgian courts. However it is to be noted that 
illegal residence will bar the victim plaintiffs from bring their claims as a ‘partie civile,’ unless 
they have a recognized refugee status in Belgium.207 Even though France and Belgium are 
emblematic of the application of the passive nationality principle in criminal proceedings in 
Europe, Belgium has a significantly more far reaching prescription that has proven favorable to 
plaintiffs in human rights cases. Thus, the charges against Total, a French corporation, could not 
only be brought in France as the country of Total’s incorporation, but also in Belgium courts by 
victims who held an official refugee status in Belgium.208  
One potential hurdle for victim plaintiffs when seeking redress for extraterritorial 
corporate misconduct before European courts is that they might be required to show ‘double 
criminality,’ i.e., that the conduct is punishable under the law of the State where it occurred and 
under the law of the sitting jurisdiction.209 This might prove particularly difficult for victims of 
overseas human rights violations, considering that the legal protections in the country of 
conduct—often times emerging markets with repressive regimes, such as e.g. in China—fall 
short of international human rights standards.210 As a rule, ‘double criminality’ is a mandatory 
requirement to assert jurisdiction based on active and passive nationality in Belgium; 211 French 
criminal law on the other hand does not feature a ‘double criminality’ requirement for 
jurisdiction based on the (French) nationality of the victim212 and puts forward a qualified rule in 
Art. 113-6 CC for jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator, according to which 
‘double criminality’ is a mandatory requirement only for overseas misconduct by French 
nationals that constitutes misdemeanors. Acknowledging that French rules seem less stringent 
with regard to ‘double criminality,’ it still needs to be noted that, as Anna Triponel states, most 
                                                 
207 See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND  
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 58 (2006). 
208 Prosecutor v TotalFinaElf et al., Cour de cassation de Belgique, Arrêt, 28 March 2007 No. P.07.0031.F. 
209 See, e.g., Art. 113-6, paragraph 2 French CC.  
210 See David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 383 (2011).  
211 Art. 7 and Art. 10(5) Belgian PTCCP.  
212 Art. 113-7 French CC; see also Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and 
France for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 101.  
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cases involving human rights litigation in France courts were classified as misdemeanors,213 
with the consequence that Art. 113-7 CC can be a real impediment for plaintiffs claims based on 
extraterritorial human rights violations.  
Moreover, Belgium has significantly lowered the threshold to establish jurisdiction for 
certain crimes under international law. The Belgian legal system clearly privileges the 
adjudication of the core international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes when asserting jurisdiction based on the active or passive nationality principle; therefore, 
‘double criminality’ is not required, i.e. victim plaintiffs only have to show that the offense is 
criminalized under Belgium law and do not have to show that the offense is equally criminally 
punishable in the State where it has been committed.214 France, on the other hand, requires 
‘double criminality’ for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, if the State where 
the crimes were committed or the State of nationality of the suspect is not a signatory to the 
Rome Statute.215 In the United States, victim plaintiffs do not have to overcome the hurdle of 
showing that the offense in question is also punishable under the law of the host State, but rather 
show that the misconduct constitutes a “violation of the law of nation.” 
Aside from asserting jurisdiction on the base of nationality, both France and Belgium 
extend their domestic jurisdiction extraterritorially in a narrow set of instances. France exerts 
jurisdiction over “any person who has committed one of the crimes […] outside of the territory 
of the French Republic” based on certain international treaty obligations of France.216 As part of 
France’s treaty obligations, French courts have jurisdiction over torture,217 among others, and 
the crimes under the limited ratione materiae, temporis and loci of Security Council Resolution 
827 (of 25 May 1993) and 955 (of 8 November 1994), setting up the ad hoc tribunals for 
                                                 
213 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 101. 
214 Art. 6, 1bis Belgian PTCCP, Art. 10, 1bis, Belgian PTCCP.  
215 Art. 698-11 CCP (Introduced by a 2010 law implementing the crimes under the Rome Statute and thus 
delivering on France’s obligation as a state party.)  
216 Art. 689-1 French CCP. 
217 Art. 689-2 French CCP. For other crimes over which French courts can exercise universal jurisdiction, see Art. 
689-3-10 CCP. 
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Rwanda and Yugoslavia.218 On August 9, 2010, a new basis for universal jurisdiction was 
introduced into the French Code of Criminal Procedure (henceforth: French CCP)219 with Art. 
689-11, implementing the Rome Statute (to which France is a State party) at a domestic level.220 
Even though this recent law has expanded the jurisdictional reach of French courts significantly, 
it also establishes a rigid set of conditions for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over genocide 
and crimes against humanity; specifically, those requirements include presence of the suspect 
and ‘double criminality.’221 As a matter of fact, already before its adoption, the draft bill gave 
rise to criticism not only by advocates of universal jurisdiction but also by France’s legislative 
branch. The Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly emphasized that the 
bill would in fact render universal criminal jurisdiction (for the three core international crimes) 
meaningless in France, considering the high threshold of ‘double criminality’ and the monopoly 
of the prosecutor to initiate proceedings.222 These requirements restricts extraterritorial human 
rights litigation against corporations, since jurisdiction of French courts is limited to 
corporations that have a business presence in France and to misconduct that is also criminalized 
under the law of the host State, which is often times not the case, as pointed out above.  
Conversely, under Belgian law the adjudication of the three core international crimes is 
privileged in the regard that not only the ‘double criminality’ requirement is waived, as 
mentioned above, but also that an exception is granted from the general rule (Art. 12 Belgian 
Preliminary Title to the Code of Criminal Procedure (henceforth: Belgian PTCCP))223 that the 
                                                 
218See PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTS TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL 
ON THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, AT/sec No. 214 (27 April 2010), 
para. 3, available at  http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/France_E.pdf 
219 Code  pénale français [French Criminal Code] (version consolidée au 29 mars 2012), (English translation by 
John Rason Spencer, French Criminal Code (last updated Oct. 12, 2005), available at 
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33&r=3618).  
220 Law no. 2010-930 of 9 August 2010, amending the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure on the 
Adaptation of the French Criminal Law to the Rome Statute. 
221 Art. 689-11 French  CCP.  
222 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 111 [Citing: Nicole Ameline on behalf of Foreign Affairs Commission of (French) National 
Assembly]. 
223 Loi contenant le titre préliminaire du code de  procédure pénale belge (April 17, 1878) [Preliminary Title of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure], available at http://www.droitbelge.be/codes.asp#pen. 
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suspect must be “found in Belgium” for extraterritorial jurisdiction to be exercised.224 Despite 
the privileged access to Belgian courts for claims concerning the three crimes under the Rome 
Statute, Belgium has significantly scaled back on exercising jurisdiction based on the principle 
of universality (i.e., regardless of the country where the offenses where committed and 
regardless of the nationality or the perpetrator or victim). In the past, Belgium has experimented 
with ‘true’ universal criminal jurisdiction and experienced the risks and uncertainties of broad 
universal jurisdiction and through that experience legislated a narrower jurisdictional reach in 
2003. According to the amended Art. 12bis Belgian PTCCP, Belgian courts only have criminal 
jurisdiction over offenses that have been committed outside of Belgium violating “a rule of 
international treaty- or customary law,” provided that Belgium is required under these rules of 
international law to extend its criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially. The Cour de Cassation has 
provided its judicial interpretation of Art. 12bis of the Belgian PTCCP in a 2004 decision, in 
which the court held that no international legal norm obliges Belgium at this point to exercise 
“universal jurisdiction” based on Art. 12bis Belgian PTCCP. According to the court, this 
includes the Rome Statute and the 1984 Torture Convention.225 It has been argued that the court 
“erroneously” concluded that no international legal norm mandates Belgium to exercise 
universal jurisdiction.226 In fact, it has been stated in a State survey submitted by Belgium as 
part of a cross-country data collection project 227and later confirmed in Belgium’s reply to the 
United Nations Secretary-General on the scope of its universal jurisdiction,228 that Belgian 
courts have jurisdiction based on ‘universality’ for torture. Moreover, the Belgian government 
has also confirmed that “there are also customary obligations which require States to incorporate 
                                                 
224 Art. 12bis Belgian PTCCP (Codifying that there is no presence requirement where international law requires 
jurisdiction in absentia), Art. 6,1bis Belgian PTCCP, Art. 10, 1bis Belgian PTCCP; see also EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE LAWS AND PRACTICE IN THE 27 MEMBER STATES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, REDRESS/FIDH, 79-80 (2010).  
225 Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], AR P.04.0352.F (19 May 2004) (Belg.). 
226 THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, REPLY BY BELGIUM, UN Doc. 
A/65/181, at para.11 (April 27, 2010), available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri.shtml 
227 BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND  
CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 61 (2006).  
228 THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, REPLY BY BELGIUM, UN Doc. 
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rules of universal jurisdiction in their domestic law in order to try persons suspected of crimes of 
such seriousness that they threaten the international community as a whole […].”229 Clarifying 
and rectifying the judicial interpretation of the Cour de Cassation, Belgium has, in its reply to 
the SG, pointed to the Rome Statute as evidence of Belgium’s obligation to prosecute especially 
crimes against humanity.230 Universal jurisdiction over foreign corporations involving 
extraterritorial conduct against non-Belgium nationals is de jure provided for in Belgium. But it 
is contingent upon the evolving status of international law. Therefore, a realistic possibility 
exists that Belgium’s jurisdictional reach might expand in the future alongside changes in 
international treaty or customary law. This situation provides legal uncertainty for the victims, 
since they bear the burden to show that international law in fact requires Belgium to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Overall, even though Belgium’s jurisdictional reach has been 
construed increasingly more broadly since 2004, it still falls short of the French reach after the 
statutory amendments based on the 2010 law, implementing the Rome Statute. 
It is important to emphasize that unlike the ATS’s alleged universal civil jurisdiction,231 
extraterritorial jurisdictional prescriptions in France and Belgium are not truly ‘universal.’ Even 
though often referred to as “universal,”232 France’s jurisdiction in these instances should be 
rather characterized as “quasi-universal,” the reason being that it requires the defendant is 
present in France in order for proceedings to be initiated.233 The same is true in Belgium.234 One 
decisive difference in this regard between France and Belgium is that while Belgium (post-2003) 
                                                 
229 Id., at 11.  
230 Id.  
231 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
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does not allow for universal jurisdiction in absentia anymore235 (at least under the current state 
of international law),236 France is one of the few countries that allows for trials in absentia. The 
Cour de Cassation ruled that for universal jurisdiction cases involving torture, Belgian 
authorities are entitled to conduct a judicial investigation without the suspect being present in 
France. The court held that the suspect only needs to present on French territory at the time of 
filing of the complaint in order to trigger jurisdiction.237 What the presence requirement 
specifically entails for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide under the new Art. 
689-11 French CCP and whether the time of the filing of the compliant is decisive or the 
conducting of the judicial investigation, is still open to for interpretation by French courts.238 
The possibility to conduct judicial investigation without the suspect being present, resembles the 
liberal U.S. approach, where jurisdiction can be imputed to a non-resident corporate entity and 
the mere temporary presence of corporate officers can trigger personal jurisdiction.239 The 
French caveat to conduct a trial in absentia is of significant importance when prosecuting 
individual officers (as opposed to the corporate legal person itself), thus establishing jurisdiction 
over companies without a permanent France presence.  
France heavily resorts to yet another basis for jurisdiction that can prove a very resource-
full option for the litigation of ATS-like cases in Europe. According to the territoriality principle 
enshrined in Art. 113-2 CC, French courts have jurisdiction where one of the constituent 
elements of the offense was committed or reputed to have been committed on French territory. 
This provision directly implicates the risk profile of MNCs if the harmful act can be traced back 
to France. A territorial link can be established where the accomplice act to a foreign offense was 
                                                 
235 With the exception of cases concerning crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, Art. 6, 1bis Belgian 
PTCCP, Art. 10, 1bis, Belgian PTCCP.  
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237 See decision of the Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], n° 07-86.412 (9 April 2008) (Fr.); see also Cour de 
Cassation [Supreme Court], n°07-88.330 (21 January 2009) (Fr.). [Cited in: EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN 
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(or was reputed to have been) committed in France, or where the principal act to a foreign 
accomplice was (or was reputed to have been) committed in France.240 France’s willingness to 
resort to an extended territoriality principle to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial (principal 
or accomplice) act, is of strategic importance for victims human rights redress against 
corporations, since usually these types of cases involve complicity on part of the corporation.241 
Yet, Art. 113-5 French Criminal Code (henceforth: French CC)242 restricts the application of 
French criminal law to hold the accomplice accountable. Art. 113-5 provides that French 
criminal law only applies to a “person who, on the territory of the French Republic, is guilty as 
an accomplice to a felony or misdemeanor committed abroad if the felony or misdemeanor is 
punishable both by French law and the foreign law, and if it was established by a final decision 
of the foreign court.” [emphasis added]. This ‘double criminality’ requirement for accomplice 
liability, where a constituent act can be traced back to France and the requirement of a final 
decision with regard to the principal’s liability, set the bar very high for victim plaintiffs.243 The 
Rougier case before French courts vividly illustrates the challenges when establishing corporate 
liability based on the territoriality principle.244 
In sum, acknowledging Belgium’s future potential for a more extended jurisdictional 
reach, Belgium and France clearly fall short of the jurisdictional reach of the ATS. This reality 
restricts the possibility of victim redress in European jurisdictions as opposed to the United 
States. There are certainly some feasible venues available in Europe to establish criminal 
jurisdiction over corporations extraterritorially, as was shown by the example of France and 
                                                 
240 See ABIGAIL HANSEN & WILLIAM BOURDON, FAFOAIS SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF FRANCE, ‘COMMERCE, 
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Belgium. However, all bases of jurisdiction in the European legal systems analyzed require a 
link with the forum jurisdiction either based on the traditional notions of nationality of the 
corporate defendant or the victim, or the principle of territoriality. Extraterritorial jurisdictional 
prescriptions beyond these principles and extending to foreign defendants and foreign victims 
with the offense occurring abroad are very limited in both France and Belgium, which are 
representative of most European systems. The ‘door is still ajar’ for litigation of those cases 
where a ‘business presence’ of the corporate defendant can be shown in the forum jurisdiction, 
or where the victim has a recognized refugee status (Belgium), or where a constituent element of 
the offense can be traced back to France.  
 
IV. COMPARATIVE PROCEDURES 
Differences in procedural rules and how they implicate litigation preferences on part of 
plaintiffs and substantive law deterrence on part of corporate defendants will be developed along 
two lines of comparative analysis: first, decisive differences in procedural rules will be 
discussed with regard to litigation in the context of U.S. common law tradition and European 
civil law tradition. Second, the divide in primarily civil vs. criminal remedies will be examined 
and it will be shown how the primary nature of the proceedings matters and has crucial 
implications for access by victims and (substantive) law deterrence on part of corporate 
defendants.  The goal is to shed light on why the United States is currently the prominent forum 
of choice for corporate human rights litigation, but also to closely examine the litigation culture 
and practice in both systems. This will provide the (legal) basis for the behavioral economics 
analysis of different (exogenous) measures of CSR implementation in Chapter 4 and will help to 
identify leverage points that might enhance the incentive-compatibility of liability litigation as a 
means of CSR enforcement.  
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1. Common Law – Civil Law Divide 
(a) Class Actions 
The availability of class action lawsuits in civil matters is another unique feature of the 
U.S. legal system that facilitates the effective human rights redress against corporations and that 
makes the United States an attractive forum to adjudicate those issues. The American class 
action lawsuit is “exceptional” in its concept and finds no counterpart in any other 
jurisdiction.245 Class action as a litigation vehicle allows a few plaintiffs, referred to as “class 
representatives,” to file a suit on behalf of all who have substantially similar claims by sharing 
“[common] questions of law or fact” against the same defendant.246 Joint litigation of similar 
issues is argued to ensure judicial efficiency.247 Consolidating the victims’ claims on behalf of a 
class representing possibly millions of victims, such as in the case of “Agent Orange,” provides 
a litigation vehicle that is particularly suited for human rights claims, since it enables claims that 
would have been “too small to be economically litigated alone.”248 This is particularly true for 
local victims of overseas corporate human rights abuses, with often no or little financial 
resources, who confront MNCs of overwhelming economic power and resources to litigate for 
years to come. Class action lawsuits in the United States are a powerful tool for victims’ 
plaintiffs, since the aggregate of all individual damages makes it economically attractive for 
attorneys to front the costs of litigation under contingency fee arrangements, which will be 
discussed below. Historically, class action lawsuits in the United States have been considered to 
provide a vehicle for social change,249 capitalizing on “group strength” vs. “individual 
powerlessness.”250 This understanding and purpose of class litigation aligns itself neatly with the 
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needs of human rights victims seeking legal redress and thereby facilitates the effectiveness of 
victim redress in U.S. courts.  
It needs to be emphasized that the concept of class actions is unique to the United States 
and “nothing worth mention is being done in Europe to offer procedural civil justice in cases of 
mass victimization.”251 By 2008, over half of the European Union member States did not 
provide for any collective redress mechanism in their domestic law.252 Opt-out collective redress 
similar to the U.S. model (known as ‘actio popularis’) is the exception in Europe and is only 
provided for in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal.253 An increasing number of European 
countries have allowed for some kind of collective redress mechanisms, traditionally and most 
commonly in the context of consumer protection (for example, Germany, France, Italy (in 
2009), and Finland (in 2007)) and more recently also with regard to shareholder and/or investor 
litigation (for example, Germany and France).254 However, unlike in the United States, these 
collective redress mechanisms in Europe aim at injunctive relief rather than compensation to the 
class members.255 
Belgium does not allow for any form of ‘actio popularis;’ according to Art. 17 Belgian 
Code of Civil Procedure, proceedings will be dismissed “if the plaintiff does not dispose of [. . .] 
an interest in introducing the proceedings.”256 The interest to initiate proceedings needs to be 
current, i.e. “acquired already and [. . .] and immediate,”257 in other words, the damage needs to 
have been suffered already.258 Most importantly, the interest needs to be “personal and direct to 
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the plaintiff.” This is the key distinguishing factor from the U.S. class action system and 
constitutes a requirement that is construed strictly by Belgian courts.259 A general interest is not 
enough and clearly would shut down the option of class action-like suits. Even a legal person 
whose statutory objective is to promote a general interest for a specific cause cannot file a claim 
in protection of this general interest.260 Thus, no circumvention of the direct and personal 
damage prerequisite is permissible in Belgium. This poses a high threshold to victims, since they 
cannot rely on the efficiencies of consolidating their claims in class action lawsuits, as discussed 
above.261 The requirement of an immediate and personal damage on part of the plaintiff also 
applies to a ‘constitution de partie civile’ before criminal courts. Thus, according to Art. 3 of the 
PTCCP, the ‘partie civile’ action is limited in its standing to sue to a party “which has suffered 
damage.”262  
In France, as in Belgium, the general rule is that a civil party needs to have a personal 
interest in order to have standing to sue.263 However, there has been some softening of this rule 
in France. Thus, unlike in Belgium, Arts. 2-4 of the French CCP allows for associations to bring 
civil actions in accordance with and in pursuance of their “constitution[al]” objective  if the 
latter is “to combat crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to defend the moral interest and 
the honour of the Resistance.”264 Therefore, civil society organizations can exercise the rights 
granted to civil parties, which can be a significant opportunity for individual victims, since 
human rights organizations organize and champion efforts to hold MNCs accountable for their 
responsibilities to the local communities in which the operate. Moreover, in a decision as early 
as 1982, the ‘Cour de Cassation’ has construed the concept of ‘individual harm’ in light of a 
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modern understanding of international criminal law, by holding that it is admissible for an 
individual victim plaintiff to bring a civil suit for crimes against humanity; the Court confirmed 
standing to sue in these instances holding that the “nature of a crime against a collectivity [. . . ] 
does not have the effect of excluding the possibility of individual harm.”265  
Class remedies for mass human rights cases have been received both favorably and 
unfavorably by human rights experts. Whereas some scholars argue that class actions are 
particularly suited to address corporate misconduct in the human rights sphere against local 
communities, indigenous peoples, and cultural groups,266 Professor Ralph Steinhardt, a 
prominent scholar who has been involved on the plaintiffs’ side in landmark cases such as 
against Unocal, has a critical view of class litigation in human rights cases.  He argues that class 
representation for mass human rights violations compromises the autonomy of the victims.267 
Yet, despite conceptual reservations as put forward by Steinhardt, class action lawsuits can have 
great potential and impact to achieve increased corporate compliance with social and human 
rights norms by effect of deterrence based on the size of class remedies268 and, even more 
importantly, the threat of reputational damage associated with mass human rights litigation 
against big consumer brands such as Yahoo!, Nike, or Royal Dutch Petroleum.  
Boyd also raises an interesting issue with regard to class litigation in human rights cases 
when he suggests that the application of class certification under Rule 23 F. R. C. P. has an 
immediate effect on the development of the “substantive human rights asserted,” especially of 
collective rights in form of cultural and economic rights of groups. By defining the validity of 
the class status, courts have to identify the rights holders, a process which contributes to the 
interpretation and eventual manifestation of group rights.269 Even though one might argue that 
this argument illegitimately blurs the line between rights holders and substantive rights, Boyd 
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explains an important aspect, that has been pointed to by several scholars before,270 namely that 
procedural rules have substantive law consequences in human rights litigation.  
(b) Fee Structure 
A unique fee structure is another defining element that sets the U.S. civil litigation 
system apart from most other civil and common law systems alike. Unlike most other legal 
systems around the world, the United States does not follow a ‘loser pays’ system of attorneys 
fees, but rather requires each party to bear its own legal costs irrespective of the meritorious 
outcome of the case.271 Thus, in the United States, while the losing party usually has to bear the 
prevailing party’s court costs,272 the losing party must only in narrow exceptional circumstances 
cover the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees. As a general rule, there is no reimbursement for 
attorneys’ fees available in the U.S. system.273 In contrast, most European legal systems have 
adopted a fee-shifting rule in civil litigation, according to which the prevailing party can recover 
its attorney’s fees from the losing party;274 this is also the case in France275 and Belgium.276 The 
rationale behind fee-shifting is to “link the expected cost of litigation to the merits of the case” 
and therefore to encourage plaintiffs only to litigate strong and meritorious cases.277  The 
purpose of the no-indemnity practice, as endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court, is to promote 
broad access to courts. The U.S. Supreme Court elaborates: “[T] he poor might be unjustly 
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discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their right if the penalty for losing included the 
fees of their opponents’ counsel.”278  
The no-indemnity practice of attorneys’ fees is a unique feature of the U.S. legal system, 
which has become known as the ‘American Rule;’279 it is, however, not indicative of common 
law tradition in general. Thus, e.g., even the English common law system provides for indemnity 
of attorney fees by virtue of court order and within the discretion of the court; even though 
unlike in civil law systems, the indemnification is not imposed automatically by virtue of statute 
law but rather cost allocation is at the discretion of the court.  Fee-shifting has been the norm in 
the English system as “the costs ‘follow the event.’”280 The ‘loser pays’ system is also referred 
to as the ‘English Rule,’ as opposed to the ‘American Rule,’ even though two-way fee shifting 
rules are used in many civil law systems, including France and Belgium.281  
The respective fee system has, by concept, important implications for the litigation risk 
of the parties involved. As mentioned above, the goal of fee-shifting in many civil law countries 
is to fully compensate winners, deter frivolous lawsuits, and encourage settlements.282  The risk 
of litigation is primarily on the losing party, since literally the ‘loser pays;’ the winner on the 
other hand will be reimbursed for its legal costs. In the United States, however, the plaintiffs 
bear a much less significant risk of failure in civil litigation since, even in case of losing, the 
legal costs of the opposing party do not have to be reimbursed. The underlying rationale for the 
‘American Rule’ is that “it is not in the public interest to hinder an impecunious plaintiff from 
bringing a valid but difficult claim by making him run the risk of having to pay the attorney's fee 
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of his opponent.”283 It is to be noted that there is a significant number of statutory exceptions to 
the no-indemnity rule;284 however, even where those exceptions are provided under U.S. federal 
and State statutes, the rationale is not to restrain litigation and reduce litigation to the most 
meritorious and strongest cases, but rather the opposite. Statutory exceptions for the most part 
aim to further encourage litigation in areas of public interest, such as civil rights, consumer 
protection, employment and environmental protection,285 thus incentivizing plaintiffs to act as 
“private attorney general[s]” helping to enforce public policy concerns.286 Fee-shifting rules 
under U.S. federal and State law mainly employ a one-way fee shifting, i.e.,  only the successful 
plaintiffs can recover attorney fees, as opposed to a two-way fee shifting that is prevailing in 
most civil law countries, according to which the loser, whether plaintiff or defendant, pays all 
his own and his opponent’s legal fees.287 Therefore, rather than restraining litigation, most 
statutory fee-shifting provisions in the United States further encourage the filing of lawsuits, 
since plaintiffs have “no downside risks and, therefore, no reason not to sue.”288 Some of these 
fee-shifting rules might be employed in favor of victim plaintiffs in ATS litigation and thus 
further minimize their financial litigation risk and strengthen their bargaining power in 
settlement negotiations. 
Following the cost and thus risk allocation, the different fee systems also have crucial 
implications on the effectiveness of human rights redress, especially against MNCs.  On its face, 
it seems to be reasonable and fair to link the cost allocation to the merits of the case, as is the 
case under a fee-shifting regime. However, in practice the risk of bearing all legal fees may 
result in a situation where risk-averse parties or parties with limited financial resources forgo a 
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meritorious lawsuit or settle early at a low recovery rate, since the cost of losing is 
overwhelming. 289 Particularly in human rights litigation against corporate defendants, plaintiffs 
are often financially under-sourced representing local communities (see litigation against 
Talisman, Unocal, Royal Dutch Petroleum, among others), or political opponents from the host 
State (see litigation against Yahoo!) that have suffered human rights abuses facilitated by the 
complicity of MNCs. Thus, unlike the European fee system, the U.S. no-indemnity approach 
provides effective access to courts to victim plaintiffs that dispose of scarce financial resources 
as is often the situation in ATS-like cases.  
Moreover, the low financial risk of failure inherent in the U.S. fee system encourages the 
filing of valid but difficult private claims,290 thus providing the procedural environment for 
creative lawyering that promotes dynamic civil litigation that puts forward innovative legal 
theories and statutory interpretations. Europe’s fee-shifting system on the other hand follows a 
very different premise; it aims to incentivize strong lawsuits and not creative legal arguments.291 
The fee-shifting rule in Europe is in line with and emblematic of a legal culture where “civil 
liability is no longer oriented toward influencing socially undesirable behavior, but [primarily] 
toward compensation,” as was stated by the European Commission.292 Unlike in the United 
States,293 civil litigation does not have a social change function in Europe. Civil courts in Europe 
are designated to decide private claims, not to implement public policy,294 whereas in the United 
States “[t]he subject matter of the lawsuit is not [primarily] a dispute between private individuals 
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about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.”295 The designated role 
of (civil) litigation, implemented by procedural rules, implicates the effectiveness of human 
rights redress in the respective forum jurisdiction. According to Prof. Beth Stephens, a 
prominent scholar on the comparative aspects of domestic litigation of corporate human rights 
responsibilities, “given this legal culture, the use of civil litigation as a means of impacting 
human rights policies is a natural development in the U.S. legal system,”296 that is 
unprecedented among European civil law jurisdictions. Indeed, without an environment in favor 
of  creative lawsuits and with a low-risk fee structure, victim plaintiffs would probably not have 
pursued a landmark case such as Filartiga297 that has shaped the modern-day application of the 
ATS as a litigation vehicle for effective corporate compliance; rather, the ATS would probably 
have remained an obscure statute from 1784 that was adopted to remedy a narrow set of 
‘violations of the law of nations,’ namely “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights 
of ambassadors, and piracy,”298 and that has only scarcely been employed in the two centuries 
following its adoption.299 Stephens, a prominent scholar on the ATS and foreign alternatives, 
even argues that “[n]one of the U.S. human rights plaintiffs could have risked filing their claims 
if they had faced the possibility of paying the legal fees of the defendants.”300 
To conclude, the no-fee shifting system in the United States creates a viable environment 
for dynamic civil litigation that is unique and provides great advantages for ATS-like claims on 
two major counts. However, the no-indemnity rule does not only have significant upsides for 
victim plaintiffs, but also potential downsides. The lack of a fee-shifting mechanism can inhibit 
under-sourced plaintiffs to file a meritorious suit or rush into settlements since, even in case that 
they prevail in court, they would not be able to recover their attorneys’ fees from the losing 
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party.301 The ‘American Rule’ reimburses neither the loser nor the winner.302 As an article in the 
New York Times correctly stated with regard to the ‘American Rule:’ “You Win But You 
Lose;” this is not only true for defendants who successfully defend themselves but also for 
plaintiffs who successfully prove their case.303 To address this pitfall of the American Rule and 
reinforce the overall goal of encouraging private litigation, some scholars have argued that the 
remedy structure in the United States has developed accordingly.304 Thus, unlike in most civil 
law jurisdictions, U.S. courts often provide for generous award for pain and suffering in personal 
injury cases and punitive damages that in fact enable the plaintiff to recover his attorney fees and 
still gain compensation for his damage.305 
Apart from a fee structure that is favorable to plaintiffs and generous damage awards, 
there are also other aspects that shape the unique economics that drive the proactive civil 
litigation before U.S. courts, which is unparalleled in an international comparison. One is the 
availability of punitive damages. Aside from the United States, only a handful of other legal 
systems provide for punitive damages.   Most legal systems merely allow the plaintiff to recover 
compensation for the loss suffered.306 In the United States, punitive damages can be granted in 
tort cases involving reckless conduct (or reckless disregard), instead of mere negligence.307 
Multi-million dollar awards for punitive damages are not uncommon in the United States. For 
example, Exxon Oil Corporation was ordered to pay $507.5 million on top of $3.4 billion in 
cleanup costs, compensatory payments and other fines for the Valdez oil tanker spill offshore 
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Alaska.308 Also of major importance is the availability of contingency fees as a means for 
plaintiffs to finance their litigation without having to pay a retainer fee or hourly bills upfront 
and before any verdict or settlement.309 The option of entering into an arrangement according to 
which the attorney will receive a percentage share in the recovery (either through judgment or 
settlement) as compensation for his services significantly minimizes the plaintiffs’ risk even 
further. Payment of the lawyer is contingent on a positive outcome for the plaintiff. If the 
plaintiff loses, the attorney will receive no payment.310 Thus, the plaintiffs can shift their 
financial risk to their lawyers, who in turn can diversify the risk across a portfolio of cases.311 As 
is the case with the no-indemnity practice, the United States is also unique in its wide use of 
contingency fees.312 In the vast majority of civil and common law countries around the world, 
contingency fees are considered “intrinsically evil”313 and champertous, what has lead 
contingency fees being considered “illegal, unethical, or both in virtually all countries outside 
the United States.” 314In most countries, including in Europe, giving lawyers a direct stake in the 
result of a case is considered most likely to stir unethical practices in litigation.315 Yet, the 
availability of contingency fees is decisive in providing broad access to courts especially for 
marginalized local communities in overseas’ human rights litigation; it also resonates and 
reinforces the American understanding of the role of litigation to “cure societal problems,” 
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promote social policies, and provide effective incentives to change social behavior, as elaborated 
above.316 
It is to be noted that most civil law countries, including France, Germany and Belgium, 
have found their own ways to ensure access to the courts for low income private plaintiffs. First 
of all, civil litigation is usually significantly less expensive than in the United States, one reason 
being the existence of statutory tariffs for lawyers that can be exceeded only in very limited 
instances. One prominent example is Germany, where a ‘basic fee’ is determined by statute 
based on the amount in controversy (Gegenstandswert) with the percentage share being 
retrogressive, thus being low when the amount in controversy is high and vice versa.317 Despite 
a regulatory environment that keeps legal costs modest, the financial risk can be quite high 
because of the ‘loser pays’ paradigm that prevails in most countries outside of the United States. 
To alleviate the burden on the low income-indigent plaintiffs, most civil law countries offer 
government-sponsored legal aid that is derived from the right to legal counsel that, unlike in the 
United States, is prescribed in many civil law countries for both civil and criminal cases.318 
Unlike the English legal aid system, most civil law countries, including Germany and France, do 
not provide for a free choice of the attorney by the client.319 This certainly has to be considered a 
significant inhibiting factor for low income plaintiffs, particularly when it comes to the litigation 
of human rights issues that often times require a proactive, dynamic, and creative lawyering 
approach. Freedom of selection is crucial for victim plaintiffs to ensure effective remedy 
adjudication on their behalf. The levels of compensation under the different legal aid systems 
diverge widely, ranging from market-level compensation in England and compensation that is 
“not overly generous, [but] by no means at charity levels” in Germany, to rather modest 
                                                 
316 David Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” 
and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 594 (2005). Granting access to courts and being considered an 
expression of commercial and political speech, contingency fees have been attributed high value by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the Prince 
of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV., 38 (1989). 
317 See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States the “Odd 
Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZONA J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L., 384-85 (1999). 
318 See id., at 385-86. 
319 See id., at 385-87.  
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compensation under the French system.320 Even assuming fair and competitive compensation 
under European legal aid systems, the U.S. contingency fee system enables a unique 
entrepreneurial law practice where lawyers, enticed by the prospect of a very lucrative payoff 
(particularly in class actions suits) and the ability to diversify their risk through a “portfolio” of 
different lawsuits, are “less risk averse than their clients and are willing to proceed [. . . ] in 
many cases that plaintiffs would otherwise forego” litigation.321 This unique entrepreneurial 
approach to litigation creates a vibrant litigation ‘industry’ that is unparalleled outside of the 
United States and is often perceived to be a  vehicle for an unethical pursuit of justice from the 
perspective of Continental legal systems:  
“To a German lawyer a[n American] trial by jury can be quite breathtaking. After all, the 
attorney who stands to win fifty per cent of the proceeds will “go after it, gunning for 
justice.”322 
 
Finally, it is to be noted that if private plaintiffs opt for the ‘partie civile’ procedure, as 
will be shown below, they will benefit from the investigative resources of the prosecutor, both 
in professional and financial terms. This mitigates some of the procedural hurdles of the 
Continental fee system in favor of the victim plaintiffs. Still, overall, one must be concluded 
that despite serious attempts to ensure access to courts for low income plaintiffs in Europe, the 
U.S. procedural environment is uniquely favorable, especially for human rights plaintiffs.  
 
Another aspect pertaining to the fee structure in the United States, which is uniquely 
favorable to human rights litigation, is a very liberal discovery process323 that enables the victim 
plaintiffs to request document production from the defendant while “not shit[ing] the costs of 
compliance to the party requesting discovery.”324 This fee structure is particularly favorable for 
plaintiffs against institutional defendant such as a corporation, since complying with a request 
for document production is much more costly for MNCs with their complex network of local 
                                                 
320 Id., at 386-387. 
321 Jonathan Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J., 82 (1997). 
322 BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 67 (1990). 
323 See below section 2 (a) on “Discovery Process.” 
324 Fed. R. Ci. P. 26-37; See Jonathan Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J., 82 
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subsidiaries and plants than for victim plaintiffs in human rights cases, which are often times 
local communities or representatives thereof.  
According to Jonathan Molot, the United State’s liberal discovery system, together with 
non-fee shifting and the availability of contingent arrangements, leads to over-deterrence beyond 
substantive law merits.325 Molot argues that nonmerits factors in the form of procedural rules 
overshadow the merits of a case when plaintiffs decide to file and parties decide to settle. 
Accordingly, procedural litigation rules pertaining to the fee structure encourage plaintiffs to file 
lawsuits and increase their bargaining power in settlement negotiations, thus ensuring that suits 
are not settled for less than the merits warrant.326 While Molot’s first observation is universally 
applicable, his second one needs to be specified with regard to human rights litigation: Looking 
at the power balance through the prism of victim plaintiffs, it is to be agreed that non-fee 
shifting and liberal discovery process (without the option of reimbursement) certainly produces 
“high litigation costs that are beyond [the defendant’s] control, and that [defendants] must bear 
regardless of the merits.”327 However, when determining who has a greater bargaining power it 
is not merely decisive how the financial risk is allocated under procedural rules, but also which 
party is in fact in a position to effectively shoulder this risk. Especially, victim human rights 
litigation against MNCs is emblematic of a consistent power asymmetry, cementing a ‘David v. 
Golliath’ paradigm. It therefore is not a surprise that, despite the favorable litigation 
environment in the United States., victims have usually settled ATS cases against corporations 
outside of court for amounts that would be probably often be considered to fall short of what the 
merits warrant.328  
 
 
 
                                                 
325 Jonathan Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J., 62 (1997) (“When the three sets 
of rules are considered together, it becomes clear that defendants’ total tort payments exceed what they would pay 
under substantive law alone.”) 
326 See id., at 81-86. 
327 Id., at 62. 
328 See Ingrid Wuerth, Wiwa v. Shell: The $15.5 Million Settlement, ASIL INSIGHTS, at 
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major settlements in corporate ATS litigation.  
  
66 
 
 
2. Torts – Criminal Law Divide 
(a) Discovery Process: Procedural Implications of the ‘Constitution de Partie 
Civile’ 
A claim for damages resulting from a criminal act can be filed as a tort action before a 
civil court or concurrently with the criminal proceedings before criminal court under the 
‘constitution de partie civile’ procedure.329 As pointed out in section B above, there are major 
hurdles to bringing an independent claim under domestic torts law for the purposes of holding 
corporations accountable for their overseas misconduct related to human rights.  It is against this 
backdrop that the following section explores the ‘partie civile’ procedure before criminal courts 
as an attractive alternative to bring ATS-like cases before domestic European courts. The 
primary goal is to compare and contrast procedural differences between civil redress before 
criminal courts in Europe (i.e. ‘consitution de partie civile’) with tort redress before U.S. district 
courts under the ATS. To better understand the unique characteristics of the ‘partie civile’ 
procedure with regard to human rights litigation against corporations, reference will also be 
made to the respective procedural advantages of attaching a civil claim to criminal proceedings, 
as opposed to filing a separate tort action before civil courts.  
The ‘constitution de partie civile’ procedure enables an independent civil action for 
damages to be attached to criminal proceedings when the injury was caused by a criminal act.330 
It is available in a fair number of civil law jurisdictions331 and has been considered the closest of 
and ATS-equivalent in Europe, aside from the Brussels I Regulation discussed above.332 The 
                                                 
329 See Bahareh Mostajelean, Foreign Alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Success (or its Failure?) of 
Bringing Civil Suits Against Multinational Corporations that Commit Human Rights Violations, 40 THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 511 (2008); Art. 4 Belgian PTCCP; Art. 3 French CCP. 
330 Matti Joutsen, Listening to the Victim: The Victim’s Role in European Criminal Justice Systems, THE WAYNE L. 
REV., 115 (1987). 
331 Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in 
International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 885-86 (2009). 
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‘action civile’ is unprecedented in modern-day common law jurisdictions.333 Considering that 
even in many continental law countries the principle of prosecutorial discretion is prevailing,334 
the ‘partie civile’ mechanism is a powerful tool for victims’ plaintiffs.335 Whereas, some legal 
systems (among others Germany and Italy) follow the “legality principle,” laying out an 
obligation of the prosecutor to commence a criminal investigation for any alleged offense, many 
countries (among them France, Belgium and the United States) leave it to the full discretion of 
the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings and file charges.336  
As a general rule, the victim has no control over decision-making once a case is in the 
criminal justice system; rather “most decisions are made by the agents of the criminal justice 
process.”337 The ‘constitution de partie civile,’ however, allows the victim to initiate criminal 
proceedings if the prosecutor declines to do so. In this case, the victim does not only initiate an 
independent private action (thus becoming a party to the criminal proceedings), but ipso facto 
also sets in motion the public proceedings.338 If the prosecutor has used his discretion to initiate 
criminal proceedings, the ‘constitution de partie civile’ has the effect of attaching the civil claim 
to the criminal proceedings and thus making the victim a party to the pending proceedings.339 In 
France and Belgium, victims cannot themselves trigger prosecution of their case, but the 
                                                 
333 C. Howard, Compensation in French Criminal Procedure, 21THE MODERN L. REV., 387 (1958). “Historically, 
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‘constitution de partie civile’ enables them to directly seize an investigative judge without the 
need of the prosecutor.340 Still, the prosecutor remains the principal party in the criminal 
proceedings, to which the civil party merely attaches its civil claim.341 This can be a great 
advantage for the private party, since it can benefit from the investigatory prerogative and 
powers of the prosecutor and the investigating judge.342 It is to be noted that the ‘constitution de 
partie civile’ initiates an independent civil action that is based on the Belgian/French Civil 
Code.343 As a consequence, the civil party bears the burden of proof to show the tort elements, 
namely all components of the offense, causality, and damage,344 whereas the prosecutor bears 
the burden of proof in the criminal case.345 In practice, however, the lines are rather blurred and 
there is significant overlap where the civil party can benefit from evidence obtained in 
connection with the underlying criminal investigation.346 This involvement of the prosecutor on 
behalf of private party claims is crucial for the effectiveness of victims’ redress considering that, 
compared to the United States, procedural rules in European legal systems are less favorable for 
the civil party on many counts, as shown below. Scholars have identified the procedural 
advantages of using criminal proceedings for civil claims as being “faster, easier, and less 
expensive than initiating a separate civil proceeding.”347  
By attaching the civil claim to criminal proceedings, the ‘partie civile’ procedure 
mitigates some of the procedural pitfalls for litigants in civil proceedings in Continental legal 
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systems,348 in particular an almost non-existent pre-trial discovery, paired with limited rights of 
civil parties to request evidence from their opponents.349 Whereas in the United States plaintiffs 
play an active role in evidence production in civil proceedings and can themselves compel 
witness testimony and request access to the defendant’s files, civil law jurisdictions take a less 
adversarial approach. There, evidence production is considered a government function and can 
only be mandated by the court, not by the plaintiffs.350 Therefore, the prosecutor’s investigation 
and evidence collection into the issue is indispensable for victim plaintiffs, especially at the pre-
trial stage. This is particularly true since the pleading standard in European civil law systems, 
including France and Germany, sets a significant bar, requiring the plaintiffs to produce 
“substantial factual allegations;” mere notice pleading like in the United States is not 
sufficient.351 Even at the trial phase, however the discovery process in many civil law 
jurisdictions is less liberal than in the US. Thus, not only do civil parties have to rely on the 
judge to issue requests for document production, but these request much also be specific in 
identity of the document and its relevance to the case, rather than the more liberal standard of 
categorical identification of document requests in the U.S. legal system.352 Also, some 
continental legal systems, such as France and Germany, grant strong privacy rights to 
corporations in both civil discovery and criminal proceedings, which shields corporations from 
liability in a way not available in the United States.353 Certainly, one could argue from a 
Continental view point that it benefits the plaintiffs that the “judge takes on much of 
                                                 
348 See Jean Larguier, Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39 TUL. L. REV., 687 (1965) 
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investigative labor” and therefore also the costs of evidence production.354 Grosswald has 
confirmed this important aspect stating that: 
“Under the current French legal system, the absence of contingency fees favors wealthier 
plaintiffs in civil suits, whereas a partie civile in a criminal law case […] benefits from 
the state’s investigative resources, both financially and professionally.”355 
 
Even though this can in general be considered an advantage over the U.S. system, where 
the discovery process in ATS cases is not only “party-driven” but also “party-paid,”356 with the 
financially burdensome discovery requests by the opposing party due to a non-fee shifting rule 
for discovery costs,357 U.S. procedurals rules still provide an environment that is particularly 
favorable to human rights claims against corporate defendants. First, mandatory pre-trial 
discovery tools that are available to the litigants help "’level[s] the playing field’ in that [it] 
gives an economically weaker party the means to make a deserving case that would otherwise be 
hidden in the files of a wrong-doer,” thus, eliminating information asymmetries.358 Second, fees 
rules for the U.S. pre-trial discovery process rather disfavor the party with more extensive 
records and a more complex structure, such as MNCs; thus discovery costs are not a major 
inhibitor for human rights plaintiffs in the United States, especially considering also the 
availability of contingent arrangements.  In fact, the existing cost structure might work in the 
plaintiffs’ favor and induce an attractive settlement.359 Moreover, the French regulations on 
judicial costs in criminal procedures do curtail some of the cost benefits for plaintiffs who 
constitute themselves as civil parties to the criminal proceedings. Thus, a financial security 
deposit in the amount of the estimated trial costs is required if the criminal proceedings have not 
been pending before the civil party filing. 360Finally, the U.S. procedural landscape gives civil 
parties (and their attorneys) the autonomy to “pursue a discovery program tailored by their own 
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assessment of the best way to proceed in the particular case, without much judicial 
supervision.”361 This “individualism”362 is a driving force in human rights redress, adjudicated 
against corporations, since these claims often require creative lawyering under the ATS as a 
statute that has just recently, i.e. in the last 20 years, been applied actively against corporations. 
“Private litigation [in the United States] is for the most part controlled by the litigants, who 
provide its impetus, its direction and often, its ultimate resolution.” 363 According to Oscar 
Chase, this is to be considered as a key feature of the American way of dispute settlement and is 
linked to the underlying American values of “individualism” and “laissez-faire.”364  
While the ‘constitution de partie civile’ initiates an independent civil action based on the 
respective civil code,365 the latter civil claim for damages that is brought before criminal courts 
follows the respective rules on criminal procedure.366 This hybrid system of a civil cause of 
action litigated under criminal procedure rules have pivotal implications on the effectiveness of 
victims’ redress. Thus, as mentioned above, the criminal investigation instigated by the 
prosecutor can help civil parties to overcome the lack of pre-trial discovery and meet their 
pleading standard for the civil case. Also, in case of defeat, the civil plaintiffs who attached their 
claim to the criminal proceedings under the ‘partie civile’ mechanism will not have to bear the 
costs of the proceedings, since the latter are born by the public prosecutor and thus the state.367 
This certainly constitutes an advantage of the ‘partie civile’ procedure over the option to pursue 
a private claim before civil court, where the rule of ‘the loser pays’ all his attorney fees and the 
costs of the opposing party.368 While the advantages of attaching civil claims to criminal 
proceedings weigh heavily, there are also disadvantages to the procedure, one being that the 
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consolidation of the procedure conflates the role of the victim in court. Thus, the victim “often 
has two faces,” as Larguier put it. “He may be a violent accuser” pressing for criminal charges 
and “a calculating accuser” asking for civil damages.369 This points towards a major issue, 
namely the question whether “torts fit the [international] crime” at all.370 Another disadvantage 
is raised by Thompson; as he points out, the fate of the ‘partie civile’ will be tied to the 
prosecutor’s availability of resources (or lack thereof); a prosecutor lacking sufficient resources 
to even prosecute all serious domestic crimes will encounter difficulties effectively investigating 
cases involving crimes committed abroad as there prosecution is far more time- and cost-
consuming than purely domestic cases.371 Finally, despite the advantages for the plaintiff, 
instituting a civil claim before criminal courts has some other procedural implications that might 
not always work in favor of the private plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff cannot rely on court-
mandated request for information from the opposing party, since the private claim is handled 
under criminal procedure rules, according to which the defendant has “no duty to collaborate to 
proving the facts held against him” due to the assumption of innocence.372 Moreover, the private 
party may no longer be a witness to the proceedings.373 Overall, acknowledging that there are 
important advantages for the victim plaintiffs to bring their private claim in conjunction with the 
criminal proceedings, the ‘partie civile’ option still falls short of the effectiveness of human 
rights redress under the ATS, one major reason being that the procedural rules in the U.S. civil 
liability proceedings are more favorable to the plaintiffs, particularly in cases against MNCs, 
where there is an asymmetry in economic resources, where there are information asymmetries 
due to complex corporate structures, and where there is a group of plaintiffs that would benefit 
from a class certification as available in the United States. Moreover, despite the great potential 
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that the ‘partie civile’ concept may have for human rights redress against corporations for their 
overseas activities, there are still a significant number of instances in, for example, Belgium and 
France, where the ‘partie civile’ procedure is not available to the plaintiffs and the prosecutor 
has full discretion whether to initiate proceedings or not. The exceptions  from ‘partie civile’ 
rule inhibit victims’ redress in ATS-like cases before European courts, since those exceptions 
extend particularly to extraterritorial offenses that amount to international crimes.  
The ‘partie civile’ mechanism is significantly restricted in both France and Belgium for 
the three core atrocity crimes committed extraterritorially. This is of considerable importance 
with regard to the effectiveness of victims’ redress, since the three core international crimes 
under the Rome Statute can be considered as the baseline requirement for corporate compliance 
under a ‘do no harm’ paradigm in terms of John Ruggie’s corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights.374  In Belgium, unless the accused is of Belgian nationality or has his ‘main 
residence’ in Belgium,375 the decision whether to initiate a criminal investigation or proceedings 
is at the full discretion of the federal prosecutor; a ‘constitution de partie civile’ is not 
possible,376 i.e., the alleged victim can file a complaint with the prosecutor but this will not 
initiate an investigation or criminal proceedings.377 The possibility for private parties to lodge a 
‘constitution de partie civile’ for the three crimes of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war 
crimes had been significantly limited in 2003,378 after Belgium had encountered increasing 
diplomatic difficulties due to many ill-founded complaints under the ‘constitution de partie 
civile’ mechanism between 1999 and 2003, that were aiming at making a political statement 
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rather than achieving legal redress. The abuse of the partie civile mechanism was amplified 
during that time by the availability of Belgium’s broad notion of universal jurisdiction.379  
In France, the ‘constitution de partie civile’ option for the three core international crimes 
was restricted as part of the legislation of 2010 implementing the Rome Statute into the French 
CC.380 This development creates a paradox: France has extended the extraterritorial reach of its 
courts by introducing a new basis for universal jurisdiction for the three crimes under the Rome 
Statute into the French CC, but at the same time trading-off legislatively as the autonomy of 
victims to lodge a ‘constitution de partie civile’ and thus initiate criminal proceedings is 
abolished in these instances. This approach seems to suggest that France wanted to avoid similar 
problems that other jurisdictions such as Belgium had faced when it opened itself up to severe 
international criticism381 for providing a broad jurisdictional basis for their domestic courts 
without establishing additional safeguards to prevent abuse of procedures for purely political 
purposes.  
Access to the ‘partie civile’ option is further diminished in Belgium. A victim that is of 
Belgian nationality (or has his legal residence in Belgium) is barred from filing a ‘constitution 
de partie civile’ for these three international crimes if committed abroad by a foreigner or 
foreign entity.382 This significant caveat in effective victims’ redress under the ‘partie civile’ 
mechanism for atrocity crimes is not mirrored in France. There, a lege exclusion of ‘constitution 
de partie civile’ does not exist for atrocity crimes in cases where jurisdiction is established based 
on the principle of passive nationality. Rather, victims of French nationality (unlike in Belgium, 
legal residence is not sufficient) can lodge a ‘constitution de partie civile’ for all felonies; 
according to Art. 113-8 CCP merely “the prosecution of misdemeanors may only be instigated at 
                                                 
379  BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A 
SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 89-90(2006). Already in 1958 Howard pointed to the problem of abuse of the 
‘partie civile’ mechanism, indicating that it puts the victim of a criminal offense in a “very strong position,” in fact 
“too strong.” C. Howard, Compensation in French Criminal Procedure, 21THE MODERN L. REV., 393 (1958). 
380 Law no. 2010-930 of 9 August 2010 amending the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to adapt 
to the Rome Statute. See EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE LAWS AND 
PRACTICE IN THE 27 MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, REDRESS/FIDH, 131-32 (2010). 
381 See Verhaeghe, The Political Funeral Procession for the Belgian UJ Statute, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES, at 141, Fn. 2 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. eds., 2007). 
382 Art. 10. 1 bis Belgian PTTP. 
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the behest of the public Prosecutor.” As Triponel has noted, however, even this caveat has 
proven detrimental for the plaintiff’s claim in human rights cases before French courts.383 Thus, 
in the first legal action brought against the French company Rougier SA and its foreign 
subsidiary for its overseas abuses, the human rights complained framed the charges as criminal 
misdemenours under French law.384 This triggered Art. 113-8 French CC and in fact led to the 
prosecutor exercising his discretion under the provision to decide not to initiate criminal 
proceedings for the misconduct.385 According to Triponel, “most cases relating to human rights 
violations thus far,” have qualified the alleged acts as misdemenours rather than felonies.386 
Belgium’s and France’s approach to forestall abuse of the ‘partie civile’ procedure has 
been very different. Belgium came up with a sophisticated system of checks and balances on the 
prosecutorial discretion when it concerns cases involving the three core international crimes. 
According to the law of 22 May 2006,387 the “federal prosecutor” (a new position introduced by 
the law of 5 August 2003) has to request an investigating judge to look into the complaint unless  
1.  « the complaint is manifestly ill-founded » or   
2. « the facts mentioned in the complaint do not correspond with a legal      
qualification of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or war  
crimes » or  
3. « the complaint cannot result in an admissible criminal proceeding » or  
4. « the specific circumstances of the case indicate that, in the interests of  
a good administration of justice and in conformity  with Belgium’s international 
obligations, the case should be brought either before the international courts, or 
before a court of the place where the facts occurred, or before a court of the State 
of which the perpetrator is a citizen, or before a court of the place where the 
perpertrator can be found, and this to the extent that the said court has the 
features  of independence, impartiality and fairness, what can result, among 
                                                 
383 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 65. 
384 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 71. 
385 DOSSIER DE PRESSE, LES AMIS DE LA TERRE, LA PLAINTE DEPOSEE PAR 7 CAMEROUNAIS ET LES AMIS DE LA 
TERRE CONTRE LE GROUPE ROUGIER DEVANT LES TRIBUNAUX FRANCAIS, JUGEE PROVISOIREMENT IRRECEVABLE 4 
(Feb. 19, 2004), available at www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/dossier_presse_rougier_190204.pdf 
386 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 101. 
387 Published in Belgisch Staatsblad / Moniteur belge of 7 July 2006. 
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other things, from the relevant international commitments binding upon Belgium 
and upon that  
State » (Art. 10 1bis, Art. 12 bis Belgian PTTP) 
 
In France, on the other hand, victim plaintiffs are totally deferential to the prosecutor’s 
discretion to initiate proceedings for the three core international crimes. Then again, France only 
excludes the ‘partie civile’ procedure in cases based on universal jurisdiction and not, as in 
Belgium, also in cases of passive nationality jurisdiction. This shows that even though France 
and Belgium are similar in their availability of a ‘partie civile’ procedure, there are some 
decisive differences that might directly impact the effectiveness of victims’ redress and the 
suitability of the forum jurisdiction for human rights litigation.  
(b) Legal Culture: Do ‘Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?’388 
The question whether ‘tort remedies fit the crime’389 divides the United States and 
Europe. From a victim’s perspective, Beth Stephens argues that “human rights victims might 
view private civil litigation as an inappropriate response to the abuses they suffered, even as a 
trivialization of the grossly criminal abuses inflicted on them.”390 Vivian Grosswald confirms 
this point from a broader societal perspective.   With reference to the Lipietz case, as the first 
tort law case before French courts for complicity in crimes against humanity (dealing with 
events during World War II), Grosswald points out that the victim plaintiffs faced severe 
criticism for allegedly “having demeaned historically important issues in an allegedly greedy 
question for monetary damages, and for bringing a legal action concerning historically important 
issues that was filed and managed by a plaintiffs’ lawyer rather than by the state.”391   
These perceptions are a reflection of underlying legal traditions, which inform the choice 
of legal venue to address human rights issues. Thus, Oscar Chase posits that the way states settle 
disputes traces back to underlying cultural values.   He argues, however, that the differences in 
                                                 
388 Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?,60 
ALBANY L. REV., 579 (1997).  
389 Id.   
390 Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV., 412 (2001). 
391 Vivian Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: the Lipietz Case, 56 
AMERICAN J. OF COMP. L., 364-65 (2008). 
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litigation between countries “are not wholly, or even predominantly, a matter of ‘legal culture’ 
as opposed to a national culture, i.e., a set of values and understandings generally shared by the 
population that constitutes the nation.”392 It is a matter of cultural values (both legal and 
otherwise) and preferences about the role of private litigation in society. In most legal systems, 
civil litigation is merely conceived as settling a private dispute in individualistic situations. In 
the United States, on the other hand, the role of private litigation extends beyond solving a 
specific dispute to providing a grievance mechanism over an underlying public policy matter.393 
Grosswald confirms this observation for civil (i.e., tort) human rights remedies in France. She 
argues that through the lens of an Anglo-American perception of the role of litigation “being 
engaged in a quest for financial profit, plaintiffs were bringing their action … of tort suits that 
go against the current … law and that welcome ‘justice as a struggle’ for the sake of the 
‘supremacy of principle.’”394 
Another reason why European civil law countries, unlike the United States, deal with 
human rights issues primarily in criminal as opposed to civil proceedings is that a strict 
distinction between the private and public sphere is observed in the European jurisdictions.395 
Thus, punishment and the expression of moral judgment are in the public interest, which is 
effectuated merely by the criminal process.396 In the United States, on the other hand, the 
private-public distinction is more blurred as mentioned above. Therefore, the civil/criminal 
divide between the United States and Europe on how to hold corporations accountable for 
human rights violations is not only the result of different procedural rules but also of different 
cultural values.  
 
                                                 
392 Oscar Chase, American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure, 50 AMERICAN J. COMP. L, 295 (2002). 
393 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARVARD L. REV., 1284 (1976). 
394 Vivian Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: the Lipietz Case, 56 
AMERICAN J. OF COMP. L., 366 (2008) [citations omitted].  
395 See id., at 366. 
396 See Richard Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMPLE INT’L & 
COMPARATIVE L. J., 260-70 (1992).  
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V. THE ‘FOREIGN POLICY BIAS’ IN DOMESTIC ADJUCATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
The discussion on the ‘partie civile’ procedure has shown that, the civil-criminal divide 
with regard to corporate human rights remedies is rather blurred. In fact, it seems, as Beth 
Stephens has suggested, that the foreign policy objective to fight impunity for human rights 
violations supersedes strict procedural deference.397 However, this does not deny the practical 
results of litigating a civil action under the ATS and a civil action under the ‘partie civile’ 
mechanism and the fact that they are dissimilar from each other. Rather, the analysis in this 
chapter has confirmed that decisive differences prevail under a common law–civil law and a 
torts–criminal law dichotomy. Those differences in procedural rules have implications for 
substantive law deterrence with respect to corporations. In particular, procedural rules have 
important implications for settlement dynamics. The extent of access to the legal option of out-
of-court settlements has significant implications for the incentive-compatibility’ of the 
respective liability schemes, as they induce a ‘crowding out’ effect of intrinsic motivation on the 
part of corporations.398 
Beyond decisive differences in procedural rules and legal culture, a comparative look at 
relevant substantive law concepts (particularly corporate personhood) in the next chapter will 
further confirm the blurred civil-criminal distinction between the United States and Continental 
legal systems, albeit, here as well, the civil and criminal nature of the liability scheme has 
decisive implications for the ‘incentive-compatibility’ of the respective liability venue. 
Specifically, it is argued that a stricter deference to the civil or criminal nature of the 
proceedings might be warranted.399  
Thus, this chapter has launched the examination of the overarching hypothesis of this 
dissertation, namely that the distinction between civil and criminal actions matters both from a 
risk assessment and, most importantly, from a behavioral economics perspective on corporate 
                                                 
397 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 4 (2002). 
398 See chapter 3 for this analysis.  
399 See chapter 4 for this analysis. 
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human rights liability. The criminal/civil divide might not be as “dismantled” as Beth Stephens 
has suggested.400  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
400 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 44 (2002). 
  
80 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Conflated Civil/Criminal Remedy Structures: Confusion in the Courts 
—The Example of Corporate Personhood— 
 
 
 
Beyond decisive differences in procedural rules and legal culture, a comparative look at 
relevant substantive law concepts (particularly corporate personhood) in the following chapter 
will further confirm the blurred civil/criminal law distinction. The civil and criminal nature of 
the liability scheme has decisive implications for the outcomes of the cases. As will be shown in 
Chapter 5, such outcomes impact the ‘incentive-compatibility’ of the respective liability scheme. 
The following chapter is part of the overall theme and argument that a more strict deference to 
the civil or criminal nature of the proceedings might be warranted in order to ensure optimal law 
deterrence and compliance results.  
In particular, a comparative analysis of the concept of corporate liability in the United 
States, Belgium, and France shows that corporate criminal liability is a much more ambiguous 
concept in principle and practice than corporate civil liability. It will be shown that across 
common and civil law jurisdictions criminal liability of legal persons poses unique challenges 
that are addressed quite differently in the United States and Continental Europe. It therefore 
matters how international law norms are enforced at the domestic level; in particular, the results 
turn on whether the remedy structure is primarily criminal or civil in nature.  
This chapter will focus on the landmark case in Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum,401 
which deals with the question of corporate liability for violations of international law under a 
tort action based on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  The case was adjudicated by the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit and has been argued, as of this writing, before the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  (The case is being reargued in the 2013 term of the Supreme Court.)  The following 
chapter will uncover the multiple confusions in the Second Circuit’s reasoning, i.e., where to 
draw the line between the substantive cause of action and ancillary aspects of liability, between 
                                                 
401 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. at 3, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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international law and federal common law as the appropriate source of law, and how those 
choices implicate the results depending on a civil or criminal law treatment of the liability 
questions involved. The issue of corporate liability in Kiobel will be analyzed in the context of 
corporate personhood as delineated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United in 
2010.402 The conflated civil and criminal law treatment of overseas corporate criminal offenses 
is no less prevalent in Europe, as has been illustrated by the ‘partie civile’ mechanism as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
I. THE BLURRED CIVIL/CRIMINAL DISTINCTION  
Even though the Alien Tort Statute provides a tort remedy for violations of the law of 
nations, courts across various U.S. Circuits have regularly applied criminal law principles when 
determining liability under the ATS. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an 
unexpected request for expert views on the issue “(1) whether the violations of customary 
international law for which the ATS provides jurisdiction can encompass non-criminal conduct, 
and (2) what sources of international law evince with respect to whether customary international 
law recognizes corporate criminal liability.”403 This clearly demonstrates the struggle of courts 
to distinguish the nature of the international law norm (as a base of ATS claims) and the 
domestic remedy that enforces the international norm.404 Especially with regard to modes of 
imputation of misconduct to the corporate entity, courts in several Circuits have regularly 
resorted to the criminal law concept of aiding and abetting liability and the criminal law 
requirements of actus reus and mens rea when determining corporate tort liability under the 
                                                 
402 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
403 David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 358 (2011) [Citing: Letter issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation (Dec. 4, 2009)]. 
404 See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 16, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
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ATS.405 Both the Ninth and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as the courts that have been 
spearheading a modern day interpretation of the ATS,406 have consistently been pointing out that 
norms of customary international law have “been developed largely in the context of criminal 
prosecutions rather than civil proceedings.”407 Thus, the relevant case law “has consistently 
relied on criminal law norms” in ATS cases.408 Judge Scheindlin’s statement In Re South 
African Apartheid Litigation makes the inherent tension in this approach apparent when she 
notes that “the ATCA [ATS] provides an alternative civil remedy for violations of customary 
international law that are traditionally addressed as crimes.”409 As a group of prominent 
international law scholars has established, this blended criminal approach in the context of a 
(civil) tort statute leads to a situation where a “sufficient condition” that the conduct in question 
be criminal is taken for a “necessary one,” which “amounts to a judicial rewriting of the 
statute.”410 Judge McKeown correctly argues in her concurring opinion in Sarei v. Rio Tinto that 
torts and criminal law are overlapping.411  However, even if acknowledging this common place 
in legal doctrine, it still does not justify applying civil and criminal concepts of liability inter-
changeably, particularly without considering the implications that this hybrid or conflated 
approach, which lacks clear deference to civil or criminal law, has for the scope of the ATS. For 
example, it is incoherent for the plaintiffs’ counsel in Talisman, on the one hand, to argue the 
                                                 
405 See, for example, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
406 The landmark decisions in Filartiga (Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)) and Kadic (Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)) that interpreted the ATS in a modern setting and made it a viable litigation 
vehicle for human rights victims, came out of the Second Circuit. One of the early corporate cases under the ATS 
was argued before the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Unocal Corp. with a decision that had been cited extensively in the 
scholarship and referred to by other case law, since it was the first to provide guidance on the requirements of 
corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS even though the decision was eventually vacated due to an 
out-of-court settlement by the parties. (Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002)) 
407 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002). 
408 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 270, n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J., concurring). 
409 Ntsebeza v. Daimler A.G. (In Re South African Apartheid Litigation), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34572617 at 53 n. 
144 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
410 Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees at 9-10, Balintulo v. Daimler 
AG. No. 09-2778-CV (2d Cir. 2009). 
411 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21515, at *137 n. 17 (October25, 2011) (McKeown J., 
concurring) (internal citations omitted).  
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mens rea requirement under an aiding and abetting paradigm as a criminal law concept,412 but 
on the other hand to argue in Kiobel that whether a corporation can be sued under the ATS is 
informed by a corporate civil liability paradigm.413 This civil/criminal convergence, or one could 
argue ‘confusion’ of the criminal and civil form of liability in a way that conflates civil and 
criminal liability elements, seems discretionary at times.  It suggests an outcome-sensitive 
approach that is informed by a law and economics perspective.  One is compelled to take into 
account implications for the effective access to justice and effective deterrence of future non-
compliance.  
Beth Stephens correctly pointed out that “the lines between torts and crimes [are] 
blurred” citing Friedman who charted the classification of torts and crimes across different legal 
systems and has concluded that “there is no natural category of tort or crimes and thus no 
essential distinction.”414 This observation is certainly correct with regard to the concepts of torts 
and crimes. However, one has to be aware of the different implications that come with 
“dismantling the Criminal/Civil Divide.”415 As the previous chapter has shown, there are 
decisive procedural differences inherent in the civil/criminal distinction (aside from 
considerations of legal tradition) that are decisive in corporate human rights cases in terms of 
who controls the proceedings, the discovery process, the cost structure, and the burden of proof. 
The following chapter will illustrate that, particularly in corporate human rights cases, the 
blurred civil/criminal distinction in ATS case law has game-changing implications also as far as 
substantive law concepts are concerned.  
                                                 
412 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2009) (April 15, 2010). It is to be noted that the leading counsel for the plaintiffs is the same in Talisman and 
Kiobel, namely civil right litigator Paul Hofmann.  
413 See Paul Hoffman, Brief for Petitioners at 41, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011) (Stating that “[c]orporate liability for torts of 
the kind involved in this case is a general principle of international law common to all legal systems. Including 
corporations within the universe of ATS defendants is fully consistent with the way in which all legal systems treat 
corporations for civil liability purposes.” [emphasis added]).  
414 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 45  (2002) [Citing: David Friedman, Beyond the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 108-09 (1996)]. 
415 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 44 (2002). 
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Thus, the practical results in litigation under the ATS might be very different depending 
on the civil or criminal form of imputing acts to the (parent) company. Third-party liability can 
either be established directly pursuant to the criminal law concept of corporate complicity in the 
abuses or indirectly, i.e., intermediated through the local subsidiary operating under the 
corporate law concept of principal-agent liability.416 Conceptually the two principles are clearly 
distinct from one another.  Aiding and abetting liability is “derivative” in nature, meaning that it 
is contingent upon the principal’s offense, while the liability attaches due to the accomplice’s 
own action of facilitating the principal crime.417 Agency liability, in contrast, is vicarious in 
nature and imposes liability on the corporation for the acts of its agents—the actual tortfeasor 
(for example, subsidiaries and subcontractors)—simply because of the principal-agent 
relationship. 418 This relationship can be hard to establish in court and sets a high bar, requiring 
that the principal dominates and controls the agent in a way that renders the agent an ‘alter ego’ 
or ‘mere instrumentality’ of the parent company. Only when this test is met can the corporate 
form be disregarded.419 However, once an agency relationship has been shown, no further 
requirements have to be met. No actus reus or mens rea need to be proven with regard to the 
parent company. Complicity liability, on the other hand, requires an actus reus and mens rea on 
the part of the accomplice.    
The mens rea standard for complicity liability under the ATS is highly contested.  There 
is a decided circuit split between the Second Circuit, requiring ‘shared intent’420 with the 
principal perpetuator, and the Eleventh421 and D.C.422 Circuits, holding that mere knowledge 
                                                 
416 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 964-69 (9th Cir. 2002). 
417 Tarek Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 39 NYU J. INT’L L. AND POLITICS, 44, n. 34 (2006) [Citing: Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, 
Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 336-37 (1985) (Noting that “the 
term “derivative” as used here merely means that her liability is dependent on the principal violating the law.”)]. 
418 Tarek Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 39 NYU J. Int’l L. and Politics, 44 (2006); see also Inés Tófalo, Overt and Hidden 
Accomplices: Transnational Corporations' Range of Complicity for Human Rights Violations, in Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights, 335, 342 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2006).  
419 Dewitt Truck Brothers v. W. Ray. Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F. 2d 681 (1976); see also Antoinette Lopez, The 
Alter Ego Doctrine: Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 UCLA L. Rev., 129 (1982). 
420 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
421 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009). 
422 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. 09-7125, 2011 WL 2652384 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011). 
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suffices. Knowledge and even more so intent of the accomplice (parent) company are difficult to 
prove by victim plaintiffs in human rights cases due to the complex and decentralized corporate 
structure of MNCs.  
This example illustrates that, even though torts and crimes overlap conceptually, caution is 
warranted when resorting to criminal law elements in the context of tort liability and vice versa. 
A blurred civil/criminal approach in corporate human rights cases is indicative of the mixed 
nature of the offenses in question.   International law violations, which often amount to 
(international) crimes perpetrated by a corporation, also are governed by corporate law 
principles. Still, this work will show that despite the “common international law foundation [of 
accountability] underlying the Filartiga doctrine and its procedural cousins around the world,”423 
the differences in how international norms are enforced domestically are real, decisive, and 
cannot be ignored when assessing the effectiveness of legal liability as a means of CSR 
implementation.  
  
II. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF LIABILITY OF LEGAL PERSONS 
A state’s duty to protect against corporate human rights abuses by third parties within its 
jurisdiction includes the responsibility to hold corporations accountable for misconduct.424 
However, international law does not prescribe how states are obliged to deliver on this premise.   
It remains up to the respective state to choose the venue (either criminal or civil) that they see fit 
within its domestic legal system.425 As has become apparent in the Second Circuit’s decision in 
                                                 
423 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 4  (2002). 
424 John G. Ruggie, United Nations Human Rights Council, 4th Session, Addendum: State responsibilities to 
regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human rights treaties: an overview of 
treaty body commentaries UN Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.1, at 3 (19 Feb 2007). 
425See Bert Swart, International Trends towards Establishing Some Form of Punishment for Corporations, 6 J. 
INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 949 (2008).  (Citing 17 international instruments which include provisions on corporate 
criminal liability which leave it to each state’s discretion what kind of sanctions to impose on corporations at the 
domestic level, i.e. criminal or otherwise.) Joanna Kyriakakis, Prosecuting Corporations for International Crimes, 
in: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, 108-138  (Larry May & Zachary Hoskins eds., 
2010) (Citing the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Arts. 2, 3(2), 4 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
Arts. 26 and 42 (entered into force December 14, 2005), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Arts. 2(14) and 9 (entered into force May 5, 1992) as 
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Kiobel, civil and criminal liability elements are often conflated even within one domestic legal 
system.   No strict deference to civil or criminal liability is observed.426 This is true despite the 
fact that the availability and scope of civil and criminal liability of legal persons diverges 
significantly.   Therefore, the civil or criminal nature of liability (elements) directly implicates 
practical litigation results.  
Civil liability of legal persons is commonly accepted across virtually all jurisdictions.427 
Civil liabilities for contractual obligations, among others, is a concept inherently linked to the 
nature of the corporation as an actor of a modern market economy, as well as to the corporate 
objective of doing business itself.428 When it comes to criminal liability of corporations as 
artificial entities or ‘legal fictions,’ however, the situation is far less clear among even Western 
legal systems. For a long time, the legal doctrine of societas delinquere non potest prevailed, 
especially in European civil law countries.  It was the commonly accepted notion that abstract 
entities are incapable of committing a crime, since they lack a physical form to actually commit 
an actus reus and a mind to establish a mens rea, both elements which are necessary for criminal 
conviction.429  Even though European civil law jurisdictions have increasingly followed the 
American lead to provide for criminal liability of legal persons,430 many legal systems still 
struggle with practical challenges, such as to identify the appropriate sanctions that can be 
imposed on legal entities as opposed to natural persons in a way that reflects the punishment 
                                                                                                                                                            
examples of international agreements governing transnational crimes with regard to businesses; all those 
instruments leave it to each state to determine the appropriate remedy within their respective domestic legal 
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GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 548 (2005). 
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character of international law. France has been the first civil law jurisdiction in Europe to adopt 
corporate criminal liability in 1994 and to elaborate a comprehensive catalogue of sanctions 
tailored specifically to when a legal person is the criminal perpetrator; French law considers nine 
different deprivations of corporate rights as suitable penalties, including dissolution of the 
corporation, ‘judicial surveillance,’ public display and distribution of the sentence, confiscation 
of assets, and closure of one or more of the firm’s establishments.431 As John Coffee has put it in 
his landmark article, the conceptual challenge is to punish corporations in a criminal sense as 
they have “no soul to damn [and] no body to be kicked.”432 
 
1. The Rome Legacy  
An important milestone was the negotiations for the Rome Statute to establish the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); during the drafting process (1995 – 1998), the question 
whether to include the liability of legal persons in the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction was 
discussed at some length. Despite efforts, particularly by the French delegation, to link corporate 
liability to “individual criminal responsibility of a leading member of a corporation who was in a 
position of control and who committed the crime acting on behalf of and with the explicit 
consent of the corporation and in the course of its activities,” the concept of criminal liability of 
legal persons under the Statute could not prevail in the end.433 It might seem surprising that more 
than four decades after the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg acknowledged 
the criminal responsibility of organizations and, to some extent of corporations, the international 
community was not able to find consensus on the issue of criminal liability of legal persons. 
Despite not having jurisdiction over corporations as such, the cases against employees and 
industrialists of I.G. Farben and the Krupp firm showed the early acceptance of the notion that 
                                                 
431 Andrew Kirsch, Criminal Liability for Corporate Bodies in French Law, EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW, 41 
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the corporation as such was often the real perpetrator of the war crimes charged and its directors 
were convicted due to their affiliation with the corporation.434 
The reasons and implications of not extending the jurisdictional reach of the ICC to 
corporations have been subject to much discussion and speculation. The exclusion of legal 
persons from the jurisdiction of the ICC has often been put forward as an argument against 
corporate liability for international crimes.435 However, Amb. David Scheffer, who was the U.S. 
chief negotiator for the Rome Statute, rebuts this line of argument by stating that “no conclusion 
should be drawn regarding the exclusion of corporations for the jurisdiction of the Rome Statue 
other than that no political consensus could be reached to use the particular treaty-based court 
governed by the Rome Statute […].”436 The Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference show that there was “a deep divergence of views as to the advisability of including 
criminal responsibility of legal persons in the Statute.”437 The chairman of the working group on 
the subject confirmed that “[r]egarding … the criminal responsibility of juridical persons, all 
delegations had recognized the great merits of the relevant proposal, but some had felt that it 
would perhaps be premature to introduce this notion”438  and he later emphasized again that “the 
inclusion [of legal persons] gradually became acceptable to a wider group of countries, probably 
                                                 
434It is to be noted however that no corporation was officially declared a “criminal organization” by the IMT under 
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2010) (Majority opinion).  
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a relatively broad majority, [but] [t]ime was running out.”439 Andrew Clapham, a prominent 
international law scholar, also concludes that the final rejection of draft Art. 23 of the Rome 
Statute (a provision setting out the possibility to of trying legal persons, except for states) was 
not a sign of general conceptual rejection of the subjectivity of corporations under international 
law, but rather the result of practical problems on the penalty structure under the Statute and 
procedural issues.440 Furthermore, the ICC would have faced tremendous evidentiary problems 
with regard to the criminal liability of organizations.   At that point no recognized common 
standards existed in this area. The structural differences among the different legal systems of the 
signatory states and the fact that some member jurisdictions lacked any prescription for 
corporate criminal liability would have put at risk the practicability of the system of 
complementary as provided under Art. 17 Rome Statute.441 As a group of international law 
scholars confirmed in a 2009 amicus brief in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, “deferring to national 
courts […] requires corresponding criminal codes at the national level.”442 This was the breaking 
point in 1998 at the conclusion of the treaty negotiations.  
 
2. Developments After Rome 
The legal landscape has changed significantly since Rome.  A former international 
criminal judge and distinguished scholar in the field, Bert Swart, argues that much has happened 
in the ten years since the failed attempt to include a corporate liability provision in the Rome 
Statute.  Specifically, he talks about the “striking phenomenon” that a great number (Swart cites 
17) of international instruments have been adopted, all of which feature provisions on corporate 
criminal liability whereas before 1997 none existed at all.443 In 2008, the Trial Chamber of the 
                                                 
439 Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF 
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443 Bert Swart, Discussion: International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form of Punishment for Corporations, 
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ICC in its decision on victims’ participation in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo444 
made reference to the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law”, a UN resolution “identify[ing] mechanisms, modalities, 
procedures and methods” for victim reparations in implementation of (existing) international law 
and human rights obligations;445 the Principles and Guidelines provide for “equal and effective 
access to justice […] irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the 
violation (principle 3c). Principle 15 explicitly prescribes the liability of non-state actors by 
requiring states to provide for reparation “[i]n cases where a person, a legal person, or other 
entity is found liable.” This vividly illustrates that state practice has changed since 1998 with 
regard to corporate liability.   Moreover, the fact that the Rome Statute is silent about liability of 
legal persons does not preclude such liability at the domestic level.  
Whereas in the United States, criminal liability of corporations has been a long-
established concept that has been confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1909, a 
tentative shift towards corporate criminal liability occurred in Europe when the Council of 
Europe in 1988 urged member states to consider changing their criminal codes to include 
corporate criminal liability.446 According to a 2006 survey covering 16 countries from different 
regions of the world, 11 of those countries apply criminal liability to legal persons.447 During the 
last decades civil law nations have increasingly introduced corporate criminal liability schemes 
in their domestic criminal codes, including in Europe.448 Most recently, Spain (June 2010)449 and 
                                                 
444 Decision on victims’ participation in the case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 
(January 18, 2008).  
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Luxembourg (March 2010)450 have joined their European neighbors and now recognize criminal 
liability for legal entities. The increasing number of domestic laws prescribing liability of 
corporations for international crimes has been attributed to the increase in international and 
regional agreements relating to transnational crimes that mandate states to adjust their domestic 
legal systems accordingly and adopt provisions for corporate liability for certain crimes.451 
Despite this overall regulatory trend to implement corporate liability in domestic legal systems, 
there are still important outliers, such as Germany in Continental Europe. Germany remains a 
‘bastion’ of the traditional principle societas delinquere non potest, with the result that under the 
German legal system a corporation as a legal person cannot be held criminally liable. Instead, 
the prosecutor must identify the individuals responsible and only prosecute those, a task that can 
prove significantly difficult when dealing with complex corporate structures of modern-day 
MNCs.452 The case of Germany also illustrates another important point, namely that resistance 
against providing for criminal liability of legal persons is not necessarily rooted in conceptual 
doubts but rather in the practical difficulties of corporate criminal liability. Thus, the German 
Federal Court of Justice has explicitly emphasized that corporations in concept can be found 
criminally liable, but that (criminal) penalties against corporations are contradictory to the 
history of criminal law in Germany.453  
 
3. A Comparative Look at the United States,  France, and Belgium 
When one examines the U.S. common law system and the French and Belgian civil law 
systems, there is an increasingly overall convergence with regard to the question whether 
corporations themselves can be indicted and convicted in criminal proceedings. However, there 
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are still important differences that can prove decisive in corporate human rights liability cases. 
The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed as early as 1909 that federal criminal statutes applying to 
“persons” also extend to corporations.454 Accordingly, Title 1 of the United States Code § 1 lays 
down the rule of construction that in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless 
the context indicates otherwise-- the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.” The U.S. approach to holding corporations (as legal persons) criminally liable has 
been pioneering and far ahead of its time with almost a century before European jurisdictions 
followed. This early commitment traces back to American criminal procedure, which, according 
to Edward Diskant, “imposes unique difficulties on American investigators and prosecutors 
seeking to root out individual white-collar criminals.”455  Primarily attributed to that fact is the 
reality that in the United States a corporate attorney-client privilege exists “shield[ing] virtually 
any conversation between in-house counsel and employees related to their work.”456 Therefore, 
the possibility of indicting and prosecuting the corporation itself gives American prosecutors 
much needed leverage over the corporation to cooperate, as part of a plea bargain, in the attempt 
to indict and convict individual employees and directors.   Such cooperation on the part of the 
corporation, for example, can take the form of waiving the attorney-client privilege or 
conducting internal investigations.457 Still, as a general rule, corporate liability needs to be 
specifically provided for under the respective criminal statute.458  Today, corporate liability is 
well-established under both federal and state criminal laws.   In fact, a corporation can be held 
liable in the United States for almost any crime.459 However, unlike many signatory states to the 
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Rome Statute,460 the United States does not extend liability under federal criminal statutes 
covering genocide (18 U.S.C. § 1091), war crimes (18 U.S.C. § 2441), and torture (18 U.S.C. § 
2340A) to legal persons.461 Moreover, whereas a lot of European countries are signatories to the 
Rome Statute and most have implemented all three core international crimes under the Rome 
Statute in their domestic laws,462 the United States as a non-party to the Rome Statute has not 
yet adopted a domestic cause of action for crimes against humanity.463 This significantly limits 
criminal liability options for corporate human rights cases in the United States.  
France has been a strong advocate for corporate criminal liability among its European 
neighbors and rallied hard during the treaty negotiations to include corporations under the 
jurisdictions of the International Criminal Court.464 Like in the United States, France’s criminal 
liability of corporations used to be determined on the base of the ‘specialty principle,’ 
prescribing that a corporation can only be liable for offenses that explicitly state that they apply 
to legal persons as well. This piece-meal approach to corporate criminal liability led to a 
legislative change with Act 2004-204,465 which removed the phrase “in cases provided for by 
state and regulation” from Art. 121-2 French CC. With effect of January 1, 2006, France thus 
codified the ‘generality principle.’   This implied that legal entities can be held liable for all 
criminal offenses in the French Criminal Code without the requirement of express reference to 
corporate liability in the respective criminal provisions.466 Like France, many other countries 
                                                                                                                                                            
offenses.)” See also § 8A1.1 cmt., stating that “’[o]rganization’ means ‘a person other than an individual.’18 U.S.C. 
§ 18.” 
460 See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, FAFO, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT, LEGAL 
REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN 
COUNTRIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 16 (2006). 
461 See THOMPSON, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF THE UNITED STATED STATES OF AMERICA, 
‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 13 (2006).  
462 See Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities 
Implicated in International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 852 (2009).  
463 See ROBERT THOMPSON, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
‘COMMERCE, CRIMES, AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS,’ 12 (2006). 
464 Kai  Ambos, "Art. 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility " in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court ed. Triffterer (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1999), para. 4. 
465 Law of 9 March 2004. 
466 See MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATION MISSION, MEMORANDUM RE: 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE LAW LEGAL ENTITIES UNDER FRENCH LAW AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE 
LAWS APPLICABLE TO THEM: REVIEW OF THE SITUATION AND DISCUSSION OF ISSUES, section 2 (June 5, 2006), 
available at www.lancs.ac.uk/.../Criminalliabilityoflegalentities050606_000.doc; see also Anna Triponel, 
  
94 
 
also do not distinguish between natural and legal persons for purposes of corporate liability in 
their domestic criminal codes and therefore extend corporate liability to all statutory crimes, 
including international crimes.467  It is to be noted, that even though the results in the United 
States and France are very similar as to a broad regulatory coverage of corporate criminal 
liability, the approach is however very different. These differences in conceptualization, namely 
specific as opposed to general extension of criminal laws to legal persons, reflect differences in 
legal traditions with regard to corporate criminal liability. Thus, America’s broad regulatory 
coverage of corporate crimes, while still requiring specific statutory authorization, leaves 
questions open as to the general notion and status/place of corporate personhood in the U.S. 
legal system. This was demonstrated in the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Citizens 
United. The Court ruled that corporations can be rights holders.  In the Supreme Court’s pending 
proceedings in Kiobel, the Court will decide the question whether corporations can be 
considered obligation holders as well with regard to human rights responsibilities. Had the 
notion of treating corporations as persons been a general one that extended to all areas of law 
without any distinction whatsoever between corporations (as legal persons) and individuals (as 
natural persons), the Supreme Court most likely would not have to decide about the issue of 
corporate personhood before it at the time of this writing. The fact that the Supreme Court feels 
the need to delineate the contours of corporate personhood in more than one landmark case 
within the last few years, shows that the concept of criminal liability of corporations is not as 
settled and unambiguous in context despite that fact that most federal and states criminal laws 
today apply to corporations as well.468  
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Belgium introduced criminal liability for legal persons with an act of May 4, 1999 
(entered into force on July 2, 1999),469 by inserting a new Art. 5 in the Belgian CC prescribing 
as a general rule that legal persons and economic actors as stipulated in Art. 5 para. 3 Belgian 
CC can be held liable for all criminal offenses under Belgian law. Until then, Belgian law did 
not prescribe criminal responsibility of legal persons, but rather followed the traditional 
principle societas delinquere non potest.470 Art. 5 para. 3 establishes legal liability under the Art. 
5 para. 1 also for a limited set of organizational structures without legal personality.  Among 
them are joint ventures and companies in the process of being established.471 Belgium therefore 
follows a liberal approach that is similar to the United States, where corporate criminal 
responsibility is conferred to different kind of groups irrespective of their incorporation under 
the law.472 In France, on the other hand, the relevant Art. 121-2 French CC provides for liability 
only for “legal persons.”  Under French statutory law, a group can only obtain legal personality 
upon recognition under the law, i.e., upon registration.473 The different approaches to the scope 
of criminal liability of entities are endemic of the deference that the respective legal system 
gives to the corporate form. The United States and Belgium do not make corporate liability 
contingent on incorporation and thus prevent corporations from escaping liability simply by 
conducting their business through alternate business forms. As in France, criminal liability of 
legal persons constitutes a general principle that applies to all crimes, including international 
crimes.  Art. 5 Belgian CC does not contain any restriction as to the scope of crimes it applies 
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to.474 Of particular relevance with respect to criminal liability of corporations is Art. 136 ter 
point 3 Belgian CC, that incriminates slavery as a crime against humanity in accordance with 
Art. 7 para. 1 (c) Rome Statute.475  
A comparative look at different jurisdictions shows that corporate criminal liability has 
become much more common in the last two decades.   But it is still far from being unambiguous 
in concept and in practice even among fairly homogenous legal cultures and traditions in 
Europe.  France, Belgium, Spain, and Italy, embrace the concept, whereas Germany still opposes 
it severely. As pointed out above, civil liability of legal persons is a well-established concept 
that is shared by most jurisdictions even across different legal traditions.  
Despite convergence between an increasing number of civil and common law legal 
systems implementing the principle of corporate criminal liability in their domestic criminal 
codes, there is still a great divergence on how criminal liability of legal persons is established, 
particularly with regard to the required actus reus and mens rea on part of the corporation. These 
differences are a reflection of the view that respective legal systems have on the nature of the 
corporation and its responsibilities. Moreover, the different approaches in attributing the 
criminal offense and the guilty mind to a corporation might implicate different results with 
regard to the incentive-compatibility of the respective liability scheme. As will be discussed in 
chapter 4, according to Frey’s economic theory, personal relationships can ‘crowd in’ intrinsic 
motivation.476 Thus, looking to individuals to shape the compliance performance of a 
corporation rather than the corporation as an abstract legal entity might actually enhance 
corporate compliance and deter future non-compliance more effectively.  
                                                 
474 See Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities 
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It is a common place among legal systems that a corporation can only act through its 
natural persons.477 However, taking a look at the United States, France, and Belgium it becomes 
obvious just how stark the differences are. Both in the United States and France, criminal 
liability of corporations is engaged by acts of individuals or groups of individuals either on 
behalf of the company (in France) or within the scope of employment (in the United States).  
France’s approach to attribute acts to the corporation itself is, however, much more narrow and 
stringent than in the United States: Art. 121-2 French CC provides that a corporation is liable for 
“offenses committed on their account by their organs or representatives.” Therefore, only an 
offense by either a company’s organ, designated by the law or the corporate statute or bylaws, or 
a representative with delegation of power from the organ, can be attributed to the corporate 
entity as such.478 In the United States, however, corporations may be held criminally liable for 
the acts of any, even a low-level, employee, as long as the acts are intended to benefit the 
company.479 Among others, the fact that “[i]n the United States, corporations—as entities—can 
be criminally tried and convicted for crimes committed by […] even low-level employees” 
makes the United States “relatively unique” in an international comparison, according to 
Diskant.480 It is not undisputed among scholars, however, if this respondeat superior rule, which 
is originally a civil rule, is in fact the appropriate standard to apply in a criminal context, due to 
the absence of congressional guidance on the issue.481 Again, it is interesting that civil law and 
criminal law are not necessarily as strictly separated in the United States as in some European 
                                                 
477 See Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 77 (Andrew Morriss ed., 2010). 
478 See id., at 78.  
479 This rule of attribution has been confirmed by the jurisprudence of U.S. courts. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 
369, 379 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943); United States v. Gold, 734 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Automatic Med. Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Cristina De Maglie, Models of 
Corporate Criminal Liability in Comparative Law, 4 WHASINGTON UNIV. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 553-54 (2005). 
However, in U.S. states that have adopted the Model Penal Code, corporate criminal liability is limited to “where a 
corporate director or a high managerial agent authorized, commanded, performed, solicited, or recklessly tolerated 
an offense by a corporate employee or agent;” thus, those U.S. states feature a similar rule to France. See § 2.07(1) 
Model Penal Code (1962).  
480 Edward Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine  
Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 THE YALE L. J., 128-29 (2008). 
481 See Gregory L. Diskant, Time to Rethink Corporate Criminal Liability, 238 NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (2007), 
available at http://www.pbwt.com/files/Publication/9e54eb96-e971-46df-9971-
0021d32f08a7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fab00938-b506-4237-b2b0-
038f4bc7b53e/Diskant%20NYLJ.pdf 
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countries, such as Germany, but rather informs one another with cross-applying substantive 
standards and rules. As will be shown below, this conflating of civil and criminal law concepts 
becomes apparent in the case of Kiobel as well, which is currently pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
Compared to the United States and France, the principle of criminal liability of legal 
persons in Belgium is further abstracted and focused on the corporation itself as the perpetrator 
of the actus reus, rather than deriving corporate liability from a natural person’s liability. 
Therefore, in order to criminally convict a legal person, no evidence needs to be established that 
an individual natural person within the organization has committed an offense that can be 
attributed to the corporation. Criminal liability of business entities is structured to be 
“autonomous” under Belgian law;482 this is reflected in the fact that no provisions were enacted 
specifying how to attribute the actions and responsibility of the individual to the legal person.483 
It is left to the judge to determine on a case-by-case basis the criminal liability of the legal 
person by looking primarily at the behavior of the legal person’s organs rather than the 
misconduct of individuals within the entity. 484 As a general rule, a legal person can be liable for 
all types of criminal offenses, provided that the offense has “an intrinsic link with the legal 
person’s goal or with guarding its interests” or that “according to the specific circumstances, [it] 
ha[s] been committed on its behalf.”485 The Cour de Cassation applied a broad interpretation 
when defining the intrinsic link with the “legal person’s goal.”  It held that it is not necessary 
that “the statutory goal needs to be directed towards offences.”   That would limit the scope of 
the provision in fact to “criminal organizations” as defined by the Charter of the International 
                                                 
482 BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A 
SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 15 (2006).  
483 Id., at 13.  
484 See OECD, Belgium: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, 8. 
485 Art. 5 para. 1 Belgian CC; see also BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, 
‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 12 (2006).  
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Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.486 Rather, the Cour de Cassation held that it is sufficient that 
the offences had been committed while pursuing the statutory goal of the entity.487  
With regard to how to attribute a state of mind to corporations as part of establishing 
guilt and intent, the U.S. and the Belgian approach is more similar in requiring a corporate mens 
rea.  In contrast, France follows through on its overall stringent standards to establish corporate 
liability by relying on an entirely vicarious liability model. In France, “corporate 
blameworthiness” is irrelevant in order to establish corporate liability.488 Rather, the mens rea 
needs to be attributed to the individual. Then, in a second step, merely the proof of causality in 
terms of “the cause and effect …” leads to criminal liability attaching to the corporation.489 This 
approach is a reflection of the prevailing notion in France that corporations lack minds and thus 
a corporation can only be guilty intermediated through its individuals within the entity.490 The 
practical implication is that all elements of the offense need to be found in one individual what 
has been referred to as a “single-agent approach.”491 In the United States, on the other hand, 
corporate guilt (in terms of corporate blameworthiness) needs to be established.  This is done on 
the basis of the ‘collective knowledge’ similar or ‘aggregation theory.’ U.S. courts apply a 
‘collective knowledge’ standard when attributing to a corporation the criminal acts of its agents 
under the federal doctrine of ‘respondeat superior.’492 Since corporations have been recognized 
as aggregate bodies, it is no longer deemed necessary to prove which or whether any employee 
indeed had knowledge or intent. Rather, the totality of the knowledge of all employees acquired 
within the scope of their employment is imputed to the corporation.493 Like the Belgian 
approach discussed below, this points clearly towards criminal responsibility of the corporation 
                                                 
486 Art. 9 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945). 
487 Cour de Cassation, February 16, 2005 [Cited in: BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF 
BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 12 (2006)]. 
488 Cristina De Maglie, Models of Corporate Criminal Liability in Comparative Law, 4 WHASINGTON UNIV. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 555 (2005). 
489 Id., at 556.  
490 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 80 (Andrew Morriss ed., 2010).  
491 Id. 
492 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987); see also CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 118 (1993). 
493 CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 118 (1993). 
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as an organizational entity, rather than mere vicarious responsibility derived from the 
employees’ acts and knowledge. Thus, as Anna Triponel has correctly stated, in the United 
States, “companies that compartmentalize negative information in bad faith can be found liable 
even in the absence of one wrongdoer.”494 The same is true for Belgium, where the legislature 
opted for a system that requires corporate guilt.495  It needs to be proven that the offense resulted 
from a deliberate decision taken within the organizational structure of the legal person or from 
“negligence at the level of the legal person.”496 Corporate intent is lacking if there is a formal 
and instant objection to the criminal behavior of the individual by the legal person’s organs.497 
Eventually, it is up to the judge to decide under the specific circumstances of the case, whether 
corporate intent is established. It remains to be seen in future jurisprudence whether a general 
‘no crime’ policy of a corporation or an effective monitoring scheme of a corporation’s 
employees is sufficient.498 It is crucial, however, to keep in mind that the presumption of 
innocence is also applied in favor of legal persons, as was emphasized also by the Cour de 
Cassation.499 
 
III. CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
NORMS: THE CASE OF KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. 
1. Civil-Criminal ‘Confusion’ in the Courts 
The decision in Kiobel by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came as a surprise to 
many, as it deviated from more than a decade of (including its own) jurisprudence that operated 
                                                 
494 Anna Triponel, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights 
Violations Abroad, 8a (Andrew Morriss ed., 2010) [Citing: Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The 
Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 
237-38 (1997)]. 
495 See BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: 
A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 13 (2006). 
496See OECD, Belgium: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, 8; BRUNO 
DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF 
SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 13(2006).  
497 BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A 
SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 13-14 (2006).  
498 Id., at 14.  
499 Cour de Cassation, February 16, 2005 [Cited in: BRUNO DEMEYERE, FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE, LAWS OF 
BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS, 14 (2006)]. 
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on the premise that corporations may be held liable under the ATS.500 The very lengthy 
judgment (138 pages in total) includes an extensive and passionate concurring opinion by Judge 
Leval.  He points out internal inconsistencies in the majority opinion on various counts and 
referred to the majority opinion’s reasoning as “illogical” on nine different occasions.501 The 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiobel on the question of corporate liability under the 
ATS.502 In the amicus briefs for the Supreme Court hearing, a vast majority of international law 
scholars endorsed Judge Leval’s reasoning and conclusions. 
(a) Authoritative Guidance by International Criminal Tribunals? 
It is striking that the Second Circuit’s majority opinion in Kiobel concludes that there is 
no tort liability of corporations under the ATS.  It reaches this conclusion not only by consulting 
international law on the existence of a “widespread agreement among the nations of the world to 
impose civil liability on corporations” for violations of the law of nations, but also by relying 
heavily on the practice and law of the international criminal tribunals.503 Applying the Sosa test, 
according to which only those international norms are actionable under the ATS that are of the 
same “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted,”504 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected 
corporate liability under the ATS on the ground that “customary international law has steadfastly 
rejected the notion of corporate liability for international crimes, and no international [criminal] 
tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations.”505 [Emphasis 
added.] In his concurring opinion, Judge Leval dissects the majority’s argument and applies a 
                                                 
500 Since the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has first upheld a claim under the ATS in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala  
(630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)), the Court has issued various rulings in corporate cases under the ATS assuming, 
without addressing, corporate liability under the ATS. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
501 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 4, 5, 9, 30, 31 n.18, 36, 28, 46, 68, 69 (2nd 
Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment). 
502 Petition for writ of certiorari granted, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 U.S. 472 (October 17, 2011). 
503 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 7-8 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion). 
504 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (Arguing that only those international norms are actionable 
which are “specific, universal, and obligatory.” [Citing: In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)]. 
505 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 9 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority opinion). 
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civil/criminal distinction with regard to remedies, a distinction that the majority opinion did not 
make.506 Thus, he dismisses authoritative guidance by international criminal tribunals for the 
scope of the ATS, which provides a civil liability remedy for violations of the law of nations. 
Judge Leval states: 
“The reasons why the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals has been limited to 
the prosecution of natural persons, as opposed to juridical entities, relate to the nature 
and purposes of criminal punishment, and have no application to the very different 
nature and purposes of civil compensatory liability.”507 
 
Prof. David Scheffer, former U.S. chief negotiator for the Rome Statute, confirms Judge 
Leval’s point in general and specifically with regard to the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court. He states that the majority opinion “misinterprets the drafting history of the 
Rome Statute”508 when they argue that it “confirms the absence of […] consensus among States 
concerning corporate liability for violations of customary international law.”509 Rather, he 
emphasized that “[t]he lack of consensus at Rome concerned the varied state of corporate 
criminal liability among national laws and did not pertain to corporate civil liability under either 
national law or international law.”510 
(b) Civil/Criminal Liability Distinction under Domestic and International Law 
In Kiobel, Judge Leval clearly distinguishes between criminal and civil liability (of 
corporations) under domestic and international law.511 He correctly recognizes that it is 
indicative for the outcome of corporate ATS cases whether corporate liability is construed as a 
matter of civil or criminal law, whereas the majority opinion has deemed this distinction neither 
                                                 
506See id., at 45 (Majority opinion). 
507Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 33 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
508 Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011).   
509 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 33 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion). 
510 Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011).   
511 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 31-39 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
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appropriate nor decisive for the case.512 As I have shown above, whereas there is a common 
acceptance of civil liability of legal persons across all legal systems, the practice of criminal 
liability of legal persons is much more controversial and varies significantly around the world. 
In fact, as Judge Leval points out correctly, corporate criminal liability still “does not [even] 
exist in many nations of the world,” unlike corporate civil liability, which is “worldwide 
practice.”513 For the question of corporate liability under the ATS this means that making civil 
liability the proper basis of analysis, as opposed to criminal liability, will affirm corporate 
liability under the ATS, since corporate civil liability can be considered a general principle of 
law that enjoys broad consensus around the world,514 whereas “practice varies considerably in 
national systems around the globe on the criminal liability of corporations.”515 Thus, the civil or 
criminal nature of liability is to be considered decisive for corporate human rights cases in 
general and under the ATS in specific.  
The majority opinion in Kiobel takes on Judge Leval’s concurrence and accuses him of 
“inventing a distinction between civil and criminal liability in customary international law that is 
contrary to [the Second Circuit’s] ATS jurisprudence.”516 According to previous case law in the 
Second Circuit, criminal law has been considered being the appropriate source of law when 
establishing the content of customary international law for purposes of the ATS, despite the civil 
                                                 
512 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 45-46 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion). 
513 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 38 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
514 Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011) (Pointing out the broad international consensus on corporate tort liability as opposed to corporate criminal 
liability where state practice still varies significantly.) Id., at 10 (Confirming that “corporate civil liability exists as a 
general principle of law for torts.”) Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Petitioners at 15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 
U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 21, 2011) (Arguing that corporate liability (in any form, i.e. civil, 
criminal, or administrative) for serious harms is a general principle of law.) Id., at 16 (Even though Steinhardt does 
not distinguish between civil and criminal liability of corporations when drawing his conclusion on what constitutes 
a general principle of law in these cases, he still emphasizes the prominent role of corporate civil liability, in 
particular; he states that “[even though] [t]he law of civil remedies does not necessarily use the terminology of 
human rights law […], […] in every jurisdiction it protects interests such as life, liberty, dignity, physical and 
mental integrity.” [emphasis added].)  
515 Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011).   
516 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 45 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion). 
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nature of the statute. Thus, Judge Katzman in his concurrence in Khulumani spearheaded this 
position by pointing out that “[t]his [civil/criminal] distinction finds no support in our case law, 
which has consistently relied on criminal law norms in establishing the content of customary 
international law for purposes of the [ATS],”517 a conclusion that he derives from Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence in Sosa.518 However, this interpretation of Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Sosa is misleading.  Justice Breyer stresses in Sosa that “universal criminal jurisdiction 
necessarily contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery” (thinking for example about 
the ‘partie civile’ procedure in Europe) and thus concludes that consensus regarding universal 
criminal jurisdiction also entails consensus regarding universal tort jurisdiction as a minimal and 
“no more threatening concept” to international comity than universal criminal jurisdiction.519 
But Breyer’s elaborations in Sosa do not merit the conclusion by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals that criminal law governs (all aspects of) liability under the ATS.  This is especially 
true considering that the First Congress used its discretion to provide the appropriate remedy at 
the domestic level and it is civil in nature by Congressional choice.520 Scheffer also agrees that 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of Sosa and confirms explicitly 
that a difference between civil and criminal liability is not only prevalent at the domestic law 
level, but also in international law.521 He underscores his position by extrapolating that “Sosa’s 
identification of a greater requisite justification for criminal liability leads not to a similarity 
between the two types of liability, but a significant difference.”522 
Judge Leval and prominent international law scholars, such as Prof. David Scheffer and 
Prof. Ralph Steinhardt (on behalf of 15 other international law scholars as amici in support of 
                                                 
517 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 270, n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J., concurring). 
518 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004) (Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
519 Id. (Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
520 See Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 
December 21, 2011); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 48-49 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment). 
521 See Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 7-11, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011).    
522 Id., at 8. 
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petitioners in Kiobel), all conclude that international law does not exempt corporations from its 
scope.523 However, Steinhardt uses a different line of argument than Judge Leval and Scheffer, 
even though they all reach the same conclusion in favor of corporate liability under the ATS; 
thus, Steinhardt does not structure his argument around a strict civil/criminal liability distinction, 
but rather focuses on corporate liability overall, which can take different forms (i.e. civil, 
criminal, quasi-criminal, administrative) in different legal systems.524 Instead of focusing on the 
differences between civil and criminal liability, as Judge Leval and Scheffer do, Steinhardt 
distills the commonality across legal systems.   Thus, “no domestic jurisdiction exempts legal 
persons from all liability”525 [emphasis added], irrespective of the nature of the remedy. 
Steinhardt therefore adopts a melded civil/criminal approach to corporate remedies under 
international law and is thus arguing within the paradigm of the majority opinion.  However, he 
arrives at a conclusion contrary to that of the Second Circuit in Kiobel. Steinhardt’s approach 
mirrors Beth Stephens’ scholarship where she describes the diversity in domestic procedures as 
a merely different “translation” of the “common concept –accountability for human rights 
abuses” in the “legal ‘language’ of each domestic legal system”526 and argues that “[a]n effort to 
impose a sharp distinction between international law’s treatment of criminal and civil actions” is 
misguided.527 As it has been pointed out previously, this dissertation argues instead that the 
civil/criminal distinction needs to be upheld, since the nature of the liability is decisive in 
corporate human rights cases before domestic courts on various counts, namely from a 
procedural law perspective (see Chapter 2), from an international law perspective (see Chapter 
3), and eventually from a behavioral compliance perspective (see Chapter 4). 
                                                 
523 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring 
only in the judgment); Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 4, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 
December 20, 2011); Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 25, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 
(U.S. December 21, 2011). 
524 Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 25, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 21, 
2011).   
525 Id.  
526 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L., 4 (2002). 
527 Id., at 44. 
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It is to be acknowledged that Steinhardt’s analysis is coherent and gives an accurate 
picture of the legal landscape with regard to corporate liability around the world. However, 
blurring the line between civil and criminal liability might have significant negative effects on 
the realization of the principal objectives of criminal punishment and civil compensation alike. It 
cannot be ignored that there are stark differences between civil and criminal liability of legal 
persons. In fact, many legal systems still feel uneasy about imposing criminal punishment on 
corporations and do not consider it to be an appropriate remedy. This “perceived 
inappropriateness of imposing criminal punishments on corporations,” as Judge Leval correctly 
describes it, relates to the nature and purpose of criminal punishment, that is often considered to 
be in tension with the corporate form as a judicial construct. Thus, many courts and scholars 
have argued that a corporation cannot form a criminal intent which is necessary under the 
prevailing guilt principle of criminal law.528 Judge Leval vividly illustrates that none of the 
objectives of criminal punishment (namely retribution for the benefit of society, change of future 
behavior, and warning and deterrence of others) are achieved when imposed on a fictional entity, 
which merely exists as a legal construct.529 The reason, he continues, is that “[a] corporation, 
having no body, no soul, and no conscience, is incapable of suffering, of remorse, or of 
pragmatic reassessment of its future behavior. Nor can it be incapacitated by imprisonment.”530 
Already in 1853, Pollock/Maitland assessed the nature of the corporation very similarly and 
pointed towards limitations when imposing sanctions on it as a fictional entity, stating that "[t]he 
corporation is invisible, incorporeal, immortal; it cannot be assaulted, beaten, or imprisoned; it 
cannot commit treason .... We even find it said that the corporation is but a name. On the other 
                                                 
528 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY, VOLUME 2, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 58 (2008) (“[M]any perceive it to be impossible to prove that a 
business entity had criminal intent, or knowledge.”); see also ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 50 (1854) (“Criminal law is concerned with a natural person; a being of thought, feeling, and 
will. A legal person is not, strictly speaking, a being of these attributes, though, through the medium of 
representation and of government, the will of certain individuals is considered the will of the corporation; but only 
for certain purposes.”) 
529 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 33-34 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
530 Id., at 35 (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment). 
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hand, it is a person. It is at once a person and yet but a name."531 Yet, most importantly “criminal 
prosecution of the corporation can undermine the objectives of criminal law by misdirecting 
prosecution away from those deserving of punishment.”532 On the other hand, “the 
compensatory purposes of civil liability are perfectly served when it is imposed on 
corporations.”533 John Coffee, a prominent corporate law scholar with a strong law & economics 
focus, has also been wary of entity liability arguing that in fact "more deterrence is generated by 
penalties focusing on an individual than on a corporation.”534 Considering that it very much 
depends on the civil or criminal nature of the remedies imposed on corporations whether the 
liability objective can be achieved as part of an effective compliance regime, one has to be 
cautious to treat corporate remedies as a melting pot of civil and criminal law elements.  
I leave it to other scholars in the field to determine which line of argument, irrespective 
of the pronounced or blurred civil/criminal distinction, is more appropriate and compelling.  
Judge Leval’s535 and Professor Scheffer’s536 approach treating civil tort liability as a matter of 
‘remedy’ (which is regulated by and widely accepted among domestic legal systems) or 
Steinhardt’s approach to establish corporate liability as general principle of international law537 
(which is supported by relevant treaty provisions and reaches the level of customary 
                                                 
531 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, I THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 490-491 (1895) [Cited in: 
Gilbert Geis & Joseph DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 
AMERICAN J. OF CRIMINAL L., 342 (2002). 
532 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 35 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
533 Id., at 39. 
534 John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal 
Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 422 (1980). 
535 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 49-50 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment) (“[I]nternational law leaves the manner of remedy to the independent 
determination of each State.”). 
536 Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 5-7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011) (In section I.A. Scheffer’s argument that “[t]he negotiators at Rome could not reach a consensus on criminal 
liability of judicial persons because, unlike that of civil liability, practice varies around the world” is premised on 
the fact that the ‘remedy’ question, i.e. how international law is enforced, is in fact a matter dealt with at the 
domestic level.); see also David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of 
Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 
29 BERKELEY J. OF INT’L L., 366 (2011) (Stating that“[i]nternational law leaves to individual states the remedy for a 
violation of international law.” [emphasis added]). 
537 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38 (1) (c), June 26, 1945. 
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international law).538 The Second Circuit’s ruling in Kiobel is in contradiction to both these 
approaches, since (1) it considers the question of corporate liability under the ATS to be a 
question of international law,539 and (2) it does not recognize norms that are accepted by all 
nations in foro domestico as a reflection of a common legal doctrine (i.e. general principles of 
law)540 to be indicative of customary international law.   On this premise, the majority opinion in 
Kiobel states: “[T]he fact that a legal norm is found in most or even all “civilized nations” does 
not make that norm a part of customary international law.”541 This question, however important 
it may be to decide whether there is corporate liability under the ATS, goes beyond the scope of 
my analysis, which focuses primarily on the civil/criminal distinction with regard to corporate 
human rights remedies and the implications for liability objectives.  
(c) Adherence to the Civil Form of the ATS 
The discrepancy between the majority opinion and Judge Leval’s concurrence on the 
(non-) existence of a civil/criminal distinction in international law, becomes apparent in another 
section of the judgment where the majority responds to Judge Leval’s critique and interpretation 
of their decision.  
“Third, Judge Leval distorts our analysis by claiming that we hold ‘that the absence of a 
universal practice among nations of imposing civil damages on corporations for 
violations of international law means that under international law corporations are not 
liable for violations of the law of nations.’ Concurring Op. 5 (emphasis added). That is 
not our holding. We hold that corporate liability is not a norm that we can recognize and 
apply in actions under the ATS because the customary international law of human rights 
does not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).”542 
 
                                                 
538 Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 22-26, Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 
December 21, 2011) (Showing that corporate liability constitutes a general principle of law.); Id., at 17-22 (Arguing 
that “a diverse array of treaties reveals the accepted understanding within the international community that 
corporations have international obligations and can be held liable for violations of international law.”) Id. at 3 
(Stating that “[a]t a minimum customary international law does not recognize, preserve, or allow” the impunity of 
corporations as created by the majority opinion in Kiobel.) 
539 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority opinion). 
540 Lord Phillimore, Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces Verbaux of the 
Proceedings of the Committee, July 16-July 24th, 1920, with Annexes (The Hague 1920) at 335 (Stating that general 
principles are “accepted by all nations in foro domestico.”). BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED 
BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS, 390 (1953) (Stating that general principles “belong to no particular system of law but 
are common to them all.”).  
541 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority opinion). 
542 Id.  
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Even though Judge Leval’s contention that the majority rejected corporate liability under 
the ATS because there is no corporate civil liability under customary international law seems to 
resonate, at least implicitly, with the majority’s holding, the majority opposes it vigorously. The 
majority opinion stands firm by its premise that international law does not distinguish between 
civil and criminal remedies; the main reason seems to be that otherwise the majority’s holding in 
Kiobel would be inconsistent with the Court’s previous decisions to hold individuals liable under 
the ATS.543 Adhering to a strict deference to civil tort liability for violations of international 
norms for the purpose of the ATS, as Judge Leval and Scheffer do, would mean that not only 
corporations but also individuals were barred from liability under the ATS since “[n]o individual 
civil liability has ever proven in international for the commission of atrocity crimes, just as no 
corporate civil liability has ever been so proven.”544 By holding individuals but not corporations 
liable under the ATS, I have concluded in an earlier publication co-authored with David 
Scheffer, that the Court “confuses [yet again] criminal law and civil law remedies.”545 It seems 
at least questionable why the majority opinion in Kiobel, as it did before as well, for example, in 
Khulumani,546 would be so rigorously ignore the civil form of the remedies under the ATS 
despite the clear legislative choice that the First Congress made when enacting the ATS. It 
almost appears as if this deflation of the differences between civil and criminal remedies for 
international law violations might be a vehicle to do what the majority accuses Judge Leval of, 
                                                 
543 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6-7 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment); see also Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Petitioners at 15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 
(2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 21, 2011).   
544 David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 366 (2011); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 51, para. 1-3 (2nd 
Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 
F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011) (“If a plaintiff had to show that civil liability for such violations was itself a norm 
of international law, no claims under the [ATS] could ever be successful, even claims against individuals.”); Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at  28, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011)  (“Thus, the fact that no 
international tribunal has been created for the purpose of holding corporations civilly liable for violations of 
international does not contribute to the analysis, because the same is true for natural persons.”). 
545 David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 366 (2011). 
546 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 270, n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzman, J., concurring). 
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when he dismisses the evidentiary value of the jurisprudence of the international criminal 
tribunals, namely to achieve a desired result “with which [one] agrees.”547 Certainly, tort liability 
under the ATS is available for violations of international law that amount to international 
crimes, but the criminal nature of the conduct is not a necessary condition, but rather a sufficient 
one.548 Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit errs when it arrives at the 
conclusion that because of the fact that most violations of international law under the ATS 
amount to international crimes, criminal law is the go-to source of law to determine liability 
under the ATS.549 
(d) The ‘Remedy’ Question  
The controversy surrounding corporate liability under the ATS has been framed as a 
matter of substantive law vs. a matter of ‘remedy,’ each of which follows different rules of law. 
The following section will recap the discussion between the majority opinion in the Second 
Circuit ruling in Kiobel and Judge Leval’s dissent in light of the recent briefing and hearing 
before the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS. The discussion 
sheds light on the complexity of human rights cases involving corporations due to the interplay 
between the international law and domestic law level. Where to draw the line between those two 
levels with regard to the different elements of liability is crucial and often decisive for the 
outcome of the cases. Particularly, the applicable law has immediate implications on corporate 
liability or impunity in the context of MNCs’ global operations, considering that corporate 
liability is a common, well-established principle in most domestic legal systems, especially in 
                                                 
547 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 45 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion). 
548 Brief of International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees at 2, Balintulo v. Daimler 
AG. No. 09-2778-CV (2d Cir. 2009); see also Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Petitioners at 8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 
(2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 2011). 
549 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 7-8 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion).  (“[C]ustomary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for international 
crimes, and no international [criminal] tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law of 
nations.”) See also, id. at 45 (Majority citing Judge Katzman concurring in Khulumani decision: “This 
[civil/criminal] distinction finds no support in our case law, which has consistently relied on criminal law norms in 
establishing the content of customary international law for purposes of the [ATS].” Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank 
Ltd., 504 F.3d at 270 n.5). 
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civil proceedings,550 whereas corporate liability is still an anomaly under the international legal 
system, which has traditionally been designed as a state-centered system binding state actors 
only.  
Therefore, whether corporate liability is available under the ATS depends largely on the 
source of law that is considered authoritative in the matter. The U.S. Supreme Court gave some 
important guidance on the nature of the ATS in its Sosa ruling from 2004. According to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa, the ATS provides a federal common law cause of action that 
is informed by international law.551 The Supreme Court held that, in its historical conception, the 
ATS “enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of 
nations and recognized at common law.”552 This hybrid nature of the ATS—as a federal 
common law action for violations of the law of nations—553is at the heart of the Kiobel case.  
The key question is how “defined by the law of nations” should be construed, i.e., which 
elements of liability under the ATS are in fact governed by the “law of nations” or by federal 
common law.  
The majority opinion in Kiobel and Judge Leval are greatly divided on the question of 
which source of law is to be consulted to establish corporate liability under the ATS, federal 
common law, or international law. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[…] the 
substantive law that determines […] jurisdiction under the ATS is neither the domestic law of 
the United States nor the domestic law of any other country.” Therefore, it is argued that 
whether corporate liability exists under the ATS is a matter of international law, more 
specifically customary international law.554 Prof. Jack Goldsmith, a prominent international law 
                                                 
550 As has been shown above, in criminal proceedings corporate liability has developed very differently in different 
legal systems and is far from being a common principle of law around the world.  
551 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 714, 20-21, 24 (2004). 
552 Id., at 712.  
553 In its amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, the U.S. government accurately describes the nature of the ATS as 
follows: “Whether a federal court should recognize a cause of action in such circumstances is a question of federal 
common law that, while informed by international law, is not controlled by it.” Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 14, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
554 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority opinion) 
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scholar, who filed an amicus brief on behalf of Chevron and five other corporations555 in support 
of the corporate respondents in Kiobel, confirms the Second Circuit in its holding by construing 
Sosa to require “that ‘federal common law’ causes of action must conform strictly to the 
international law that it supports.”556 Under this international law standard, the majority opinion 
in Kiobel denied corporate liability for a violation of international law norms.557 
Judge Leval and later the petitioners in Kiobel before the Supreme Court and the U.S. 
government, as amicus curiae for the petitioners, take a different approach on the issue.  They 
argue that the issue of corporate liability is a matter of ‘remedy,’ i.e., how international law 
norms are enforced, which is left to the discretion of each state.558 This position is shared by a 
burgeoning body of legal scholarship in the field that argues that a distinction needs be made 
between the “standards of conduct” and “remedies” for the purpose of identifying the proper 
source of law under choice of law principles.559 The majority opinion in Kiobel misconstrues the 
structure and functioning of international law when they argue that all aspects of liability under 
the ATS have to be answered by looking to international law only. Rather, one needs to look to 
international law to determine the tort (in form of an international norm that can be violated by a 
                                                                                                                                                            
 (Stating that “[W]e must ask whether a plaintiff bringing an ATS suit against a corporation has alleged a violation 
of customary international law.”). 
555 Aside from Chevron Corporation, these companies include: the Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Company, 
Ford Motor Company, Glaxosmithkline PLC, and the Procter & Gamble Company.  
556 Brief of Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Company, Ford Motor Company, 
Glaxosmithkline PLC, and the Procter & Gamble Company as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 26, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 
(U.S. February 3, 2012).   
557 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 9 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority opinion). 
This conclusion is also shared by Prof. Goldsmith on behalf of Chevron and five other amici for the respondents, 
see Brief of Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Company, Ford Motor Company, 
Glaxosmithkline PLC, and the Procter & Gamble Company as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 23, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 
(U.S. February 3, 2012).   
558 See Paul Hoffman, Brief for Petitioners at 19, 35, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011) (“[The Kiobel majority] turns a blind eye to 
federal common law and the universal availability of corporate civil liability in all legal systems, and it relies on the 
absence of an international law requirement for such liability even though international law leaves such issues to 
domestic legal systems.”); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 16, 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 
(U.S. 2011); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6, 48 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 
2010) (Leval, J., concurring only in the judgment). 
559 See Mara Theophila, ‘Moral Monsters’ Under the Bed: Holding Corporations Accountable for Violations of the 
Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., FORDHAM L. REV., 2906 (2011); see also Odette 
Murray, David Kinley, and Chip Pitts, Exaggerated Rumours of the Death of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human 
Rights and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel, 12 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L. 75-76 (2011). 
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private actor) and to federal common law to determine ancillary aspects of liability, such as the 
‘remedy’ (in form of corporate liability).560 Whereas ancillary aspects have previously mainly 
been considered to pertain merely to procedural issues,561 they are now viewed more broadly to 
“include all other issues which, whether substantive or not, do not bear on the defendant’s 
conduct.”562  
Thus, Judge Leval observes correctly, “[w]hat international law does is it prescribes 
norms of conduct. It identifies acts (genocide, slavery, war crimes, piracy, etc.) that it 
prohibits.”563 Judge Hall, in his concurrence in Khulumani, referred to it as “a hornbook 
principle that international law does not specify the means of its domestic enforcement,” which 
leads him to conclude that “Sosa’s reliance on international law applied to the question of 
recognizing substantive offenses [only.]” Granted that Judge Hall made this statement regarding 
the issue of secondary liability and not the issue of corporate liability under the ATS.  But the 
general principle holds nevertheless for both questions. Looking at how international treaties are 
designed, this basic principle of international law becomes apparent. Judge Leval uses the 
example of the Genocide Convention for this purpose. He writes:  
 “[In the] Genocide Convention, the “crime of genocide” is defined as a number of “acts” 
committed with “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, arts. I, II, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The 
Convention then provides in Article V that the State parties “undertake to enact, in 
accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to 
the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties 
for persons guilty of genocide.” The Convention leaves the details for realizing its 
                                                 
560 See William Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 644 (2006) (Arguing that “[t]he tort remedy in ATS litigation does not come from  
international law[;] [i]t is pure domestic law.” [emphasis added]. See also Odette Murray, David Kinley, and Chip 
Pitts, Exaggerated Rumours of the Death of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human Rights and the Remarkable Case 
of Kiobel, 12 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L., 75 (2011) (Arguing that “[fe]deral common law, not international law, 
governs ATS corporate liability.”) For a contrarian point of view on the choice of law principles governing ancillary 
aspects of liability under the ATS, see Chimène Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 
HASTINGS L. J., 61, 64 (2008) (Arguing that “accomplice liability [is] a conduct-regulating rule defined by 
international law, rather than an ancillary question governed  by domestic law.”) 
561 Chimène Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS  L.J. 61, 81 [Citing Doe I v. 
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 964 (9th Circ. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)].  
562 Mara Theophila, ‘Moral Monsters’ Under the Bed: Holding Corporations Accountable for Violations of the 
Alien Tort Statute after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., FORDHAM L. REV., 2907 (2011) [Citing: William 
Casto, citation omitted].  
563 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 47 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
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objectives to each nation. It says nothing about the nature or form of “effective penalties” 
to be imposed. It says nothing about civil and administrative remedies.” 
 
The U.S. government, which supports the petitioners in Kiobel as amicus curiae before 
the Supreme Court, shared this view of international law and endorsed a distinction between the 
“substantive standards of conduct,” which are governed by international law, and “the means of 
enforcing those substantive standards,” which are dealt with at a domestic level.564 In its brief, 
the U.S. government has convincingly shown that the majority’s test in Kiobel, which requires 
that corporate liability for a “violation of the law of nations” is a customary international law 
norm,565 is misguided and inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa. The U.S. 
government argues in its brief that: 
“The limitation threshold prescribed by Sosa, namely “that any claim under the ATS 
must at least ‘rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world 
and defined with’ sufficient ‘specificity,’ [Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 
(2004)] at 725—pertains to the international-law norm itself and not to whether (or how) 
that norm should be enforced in a suit under the ATS.”566 
 
The wording of the ATS supports this interpretation. Thus, the award of damages under 
the ATS only requires that a “tort” has been committed premised on a “violation of the law of 
nations.” The ATS does not, however, put forward any specification with regard to who the 
perpetrator under its scope may be.567 The U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance for courts 
on how to properly construe a statute, holding that “courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.”568Also, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly stated with regard to the ATS in a previous ruling that in fact “[t]he Alien Tort Statute 
by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants.”569 In lack of guidance by the 
                                                 
564 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 18, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
565 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6-7 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion).  
566 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
567 See Paul Hoffman, Brief for Petitioners at 19, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
568 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). 
569 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989); Brief of International Law 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 6 n.2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 21, 2011) (Illustrating this point by 
making reference to other sections of the Judiciary Act which explicitly define the proper defendant.) 
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ATS itself, much of the confusion surrounding corporate liability has been stirred by footnote 20 
in the Supreme Court’s Sosa opinion, which reads as follows: 
“A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a 
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor 
such as a corporation or individual. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 233 
U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 791-795 (CADC 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) 
(insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates international law), 
with Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (CA2 1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 
that genocide by private actors violates international law).”570 
 
The Kiobel majority interprets footnote 20 in a way that conflates the tort and the 
tortfeasor and requires that both elements constitute customary international law.  I elaborated 
on this point in an earlier publication co-authored with Prof. David Scheffer, where we stated:  
“The Kiobel majority extrapolate from this dicta footnote an overarching principle that 
the tortfeasor must also be identified as such as a matter of customary international law - 
that the commission of the narrow band of torts or crimes qualifying for subject matter 
jurisdiction under the ATS must be shown under international law to be committed by 
certain categories of tortfeasors […] in order to attract ATS jurisdiction.”571 
 
Thus, the Second Circuit in Kiobel misreads footnote 20 as not only requiring that the 
international law norm prohibiting a certain conduct is universally accepted and binding, but 
also the way how to enforce a violation of this norm.572 Reading footnote 20 closely, however, 
shows that it only requires that “international law extends the scope of liability” to a violation of 
an international law norm by a certain perpetrator. The relevant issue is not whether 
international law provides for corporate liability, but rather whether private actors can violate the 
respective international law norm in question.573 As the U.S. government brief pointed out 
correctly, this requires a case-by-case analysis instead of the one-fits-all formula that the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted, which “examined the question of corporate liability in the 
                                                 
570 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733, n. 20 (2004) (Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
571 David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 364 (2011).  
572 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 18, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
573 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 30-31 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
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abstract,”574 and therefore did not address the decisive question whether a corporation as private 
actor can in fact violate the respective norm.575 In addition to the structural misconception 
underlying the dicta of footnote 20, the majority opinion erred on yet another ground. The 
Second Circuit reads footnote 20 in a way that assumes that international law distinguishes 
between corporations and individuals for purposes of liability. In fact, neither the wording of 
footnote 20 nor international law supports this finding. The very terms of footnote 20 do not 
“imply[…] that natural persons and corporations are treated differently” for purposes of liability 
under the ATS, but rather that they are treated “identically.”576 Footnote 20 states that a different 
consideration courts have to account for when recognizing a cause of action under the ATS is 
“whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm” to a 
certain defendant, “if the defendant is a private actor.” Footnote 20 then gives examples of 
private actors, namely corporations or individuals, rather than establishing two different 
categories of individuals and corporations by stating “private actors such as a corporation or 
individual.” [emphasis added]. Therefore, corporations and individuals are not to be treated 
differently, but identically according to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sosa. In this reading, 
footnote 20 is perfectly in synch with international law. Thus, as pointed out by the U.S. 
government brief, “[t]he distinction between norms that apply only to state actors and norms that 
also apply to non-state actors [i.e. private actors] is well established in […] international law,”577 
whereas “the distinction between natural and judicial persons [is] one that finds no basis in the 
relevant norms of international law.”578 This reading of the Supreme Court’s footnote 20 in Sosa 
is further confirmed by the fact that footnote 20 explicitly makes reference to the Kadic decision, 
in which the Second Circuit held that genocide could be committed by either a state or a private 
                                                 
574 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 21, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
575 Id., at 18.  
576 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 30-31 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
577 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 17, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011). 
578 Id., at 18. 
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actor.579 Therefore, the Supreme Court set the stage for its message in footnote 20 as a matter of 
state vs. private actor liability under the ATS.580  
Judge Leval specifies the ‘substantive law vs. remedy’ argument with regard to corporate 
civil liability especially. Thus, he drives home an important point, namely that the civil/criminal 
distinction is not foreign to international law but, moreover, that “[i]nternational law not only 
recognizes differences between criminal and civil liability, but treats them differently. While 
international institutions have occasionally been established to impose criminal punishments for 
egregious violations of international law, and treaties often impose on nations the obligation to 
punish criminal violations, the basic position of international law with respect to civil liability is 
that States may impose civil compensatory liability […]”581 This reading of the source of law 
issue at hand re-affirms once again the existence of a civil/criminal distinction under 
international law that stands in contrast to the ruling of the Second Circuit in Kiobel.  
(e) Extraterritorial Civil Jurisdiction  
In an unexpected move, the issue of extraterritorial/universal jurisdiction under the ATS 
took much of the center stage during the Supreme Court hearing on Feb. 28582 that was 
originally scheduled to deal primarily with the question of corporate liability under the ATS.583 
In fact, after briefing and argument, the Supreme Court decided about a week after the hearing to 
expand the scope of review in Kiobel by the following question and put the case over to next 
term for re-hearing.  
                                                 
579 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
580See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 30-31 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment).  
581 Id., at 42.  
582 Argument transcript, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 
472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. February 28, 2012). 
583 SCOTUS Blog, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Issue, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-et-al/ (The Supreme Court originally requested briefs on the following 
two questions: “(1) Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 
is a merits question or instead an issue of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) whether corporations are immune from tort 
liability for violations of the law of nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide [or] may instead be 
sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant under the ATS for such egregious violations.”) 
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“Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows 
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within 
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”584  
 
In an international comparison, the ATS is unique in its concept and structure in that it 
prescribes universal civil jurisdiction.585 It is safe to say the universal tort liability is a less 
common and more controversial concept among international law scholars than universal 
criminal jurisdiction, which enjoys international consensus at least for a limited set of norms.586 
This also confirms that in fact a civil/criminal distinction exists under international law. This 
distinction can prove decisive for the outcome of extraterritorial ATS cases. Justice Breyer 
addressed the issue of universal jurisdiction under the ATS in his concurrence in Sosa. In 
defense of the ATS, he assessed the legality of universal tort liability by determining its effect 
on international comity. He argued that universal tort liability is no more threatening to the 
principle of international comity then universal criminal jurisdiction (which is commonly 
accepted). Many legal systems around the world provide tort recovery as part of criminal 
proceedings.587  
Goldsmith (on behalf of Chevron and five other amici in support of the respondents in 
Kiobel), takes a very different approach and reaches a contrary conclusion in his amicus brief. 
He does not take a comparative perspective on the issue of extraterritoriality as Justice Breyer 
does. Rather, the amici for the respondents once again aim to determine the issue based on their 
interpretation of international law arguing that extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over alleged 
human rights violations (as prescribed by the ATS) is contrary to international law.588 For this 
                                                 
584 Order for re-argument and supplemental briefing, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1998, 
No. 10-1491 (March 5, 2012). 
585 Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 17-34 (2002) (Explaining why other countries have not 
exercised universal tort jurisdiction over human rights violations.); Anthea Roberts, Comparative International 
Law? The role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 76 (2011) 
(“Although the ATS is often celebrated by U.S. lawyers as a domestic mechanism for enforcing international law, 
non-U.S. lawyers frequently view it as a US peculiarity […].”) 
586 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
587 Id., at 762-63. 
588 Brief of Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Company, Ford Motor Company, 
Glaxosmithkline PLC, and the Procter & Gamble Company as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 4-10, 
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purpose, Goldsmith relies on a case before the ICJ where three of the honorable judges 
commented on the extraterritorial scope of the ATS in civil matters and opined that “[…] this 
unilateral exercise [under the ATS] […] has not attracted the approbation of states generally.”589 
This is not to be contested in any way.  In fact, as the Goldsmith’s brief correctly states “[n]o 
other nation in the world permits its courts to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged 
extraterritorial human rights abuses […].”590 The argument, however, is flawed in the same way 
as it is misguided with regard to the corporate liability debate under the ATS. As has been 
discussed above, international law does not govern how its norms are enforced by each state, but 
leaves it to each state’s discretion. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that international law is 
in fact silent about corporate civil liability. No conclusion as to the non-existence of corporate 
liability under international law can be drawn therefrom.591 Rather, federal common law 
relegates the remedy to civil liability and the courts discipline the process through very 
conventional tools of, for example, ‘forum non convenience’ and the ‘political question 
doctrine.’ Moreover, minimum contacts of the non-resident entity of a MNC with the forum 
jurisdiction have been required by U.S. courts in order to establish personal jurisdiction under 
the ATS.592 The exact extent of extraterritoriality jurisdiction under the ATS still remains to be 
determined and Paul Hoffman, lead counsel to the petitioners, correctly noted before the 
Supreme Court that this is “an issue that ought to be briefed on its own.”593 (The Supreme Court 
justices agreed and set a reargument of the case for the 2013 docket.) 
For example, in the case of Royal Dutch Petroleum, jurisdiction in fact was established, 
since there was an investor relations office in New York. Even though the office was a nominal 
                                                                                                                                                            
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 
(U.S. February 3, 2012).   
589 Id., at 6-7 [Citing: Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, in Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. Reports 63, at para. 48]. 
590Id., at 6.   
591 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 6, 47-48 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, 
J., concurring only in the judgment). 
592 See PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW, 140-153 (2007) (Showing how personal 
jurisdiction can be established over non-resident entities.) 
593 Paul Hoffman, Argument transcript, 9, para. 3-4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. February 28, 2012). 
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part of Shell’s U.S. subsidiary, it nonetheless had significant relations with the non-resident 
parent company.594 This is in line with the American tradition to take a “’doing business’” 
approach to jurisdiction, i.e., establish jurisdiction based on a (minimum) connection between 
the forum and defendant.  In contrast, the bar is higher and different in European civil law 
systems where jurisdiction is rather asserted based on a connection between the forum and the 
dispute.595  
It is interesting that Goldsmith in his amicus brief for the respondents in Kiobel opened 
with the extraterritoriality argument and devoted almost half of the entire brief to the question.  
This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court never posed the question in the Kiobel case, and 
thus it was not briefed.  It almost seems like an attempt to showcase their main argument 
(namely that international law is the proper source of law for all liability aspects under the ATS) 
by the example of allegedly ‘universal civil jurisdiction,’ which is neither supported by 
international law nor exercised by any other country outside the United States. Goldsmith might 
have considered the jurisdictional perspective to be a more compelling example to support their 
overall argument than the issue of corporate liability, which is well-established in civil form in 
all jurisdictions and in criminal form in increasingly more jurisdictions around the world596 and 
is engrained in international law in terms of accountability of non-state, i.e. private, actors 
(which includes corporations and individuals).597  
As mentioned before, in the Kiobel hearing the Supreme Court took great interest in one 
of the corporate brief’s assertion that universal civil jurisdiction, as allegedly prescribed under 
                                                 
594 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2000) (Holding that a sufficient relationship 
between the local affiliate entity and the non-resident parent company existed since an Investor Relations Office in 
New York was “facilitating the relations of the parent holding companies with the investment community.”) 
595 See Christen Broecker, Alien Tort Statute Litigation and Transnational Business Activity: Investigating the 
Potential for a Bottom-Up Global Regulatory Regime, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND JUSTICE, 16 EMERGING SCHOLARS PAPER, 42 (2010). 
596 See f.ex. Brief of David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. December 20, 
2011). (Stating that “it is universally accepted that corporations are subject to civil liability under domestic law 
[…].”); Id., at 12-16 (Showing that “[t]he trend in international law since the conclusion of the negotiations on the 
Rome Statute has been toward more corporate criminal liability […].”). 
597 See discussion above on footnote 20 in Sosa ruling; see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of the Petitioners at 16, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 
472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2011) (Stating that some international law norms apply only to state actors, whereas 
others, such as genocide, can also be committed by non-state, i.e., private actors without any state involvement.). 
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the ATS, is unprecedented in any other country outside the United States and contrary to 
international law.598 The broad extraterritorial reach of the ATS has been subject to much 
criticism, especially from European governments.599 Among others, this might have motivated 
the Court to re-schedule a hearing with an expanded scope of review including the 
extraterritoriality question. Lyle Denniston, a journalist who has covered the U.S. Supreme 
Court for more than five decades, considers it “conceivable – if not very likely –“ that the Court 
might decide the case on constitutional grounds challenging “whether Congress has [even] the 
constitutional authority to pass a law authorizing a lawsuit in which both sides are non-citizens 
and the misconduct occurred entirely overseas.”600 Justice Alito hinted in this direction in the 
February 28 hearing in Kiobel.601 It remains to be seen whether the ATS, in addition to posing 
ambiguous and controversial questions of corporate law and international law as well as 
questions of international economics,602 will also become a constitutional issue before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  
 
IV. THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF THE KIOBEL DISCUSSION ON 
CORPORATE LIABILITY: A BLESSING IN THE SKY? 
The case of Kiobel has demonstrated vividly and in numerous respects that a 
civil/criminal distinction exists both at the domestic and international law level. Therefore, this 
                                                 
598 Justice Kennedy, argument transcript, 3-4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. February 28, 2012). 
599 Among others, Germany has taken this position; see Counsel for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in: 
Public Sitting, Verbatim Record, at 47 para. 36-17, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), 
International Court of Justice CR 2011/17 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/143/16677.pdf. Australia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have also voiced criticism 
against the ATS and submitted amicus briefs in Sosa arguing that “there is no basis in international law for the 
creation of an explicit U.S. civil cause of action involving disputes […]” without any link to the United States. See 
Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 7, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692 (2004), No. 03-339. 
600 Lyle Denniston, SCOTUSblog, Kiobel to be expanded and reargued, at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/ 
601Justice Alito, argument transcript at 51, paras  9-10, 13-15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. February 28, 2012) (“Is there an Article III 
source of jurisdiction for a lawsuit like this? […] [W]hat’s the constitutional basis for a lawsuit like this, where an 
alien is suing an alien?”). 
602 See Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), Nos. 11-88 and 10-1491 (U.S. December 21, 
2011). 
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distinction not only implicates the immediate outcome of ATS cases, but, especially with regard 
to corporate liability, implicates also the long-term incentive-compatibility of substantive law 
deterrence under the ATS. As correctly pointed out by Judge Leval in his Kiobel concurrence, 
the different principal objectives of criminal punishment and civil compensation cannot be 
ignored;603 an understanding of the different objectives is indispensable for determining if the 
respective forms of redress and punishment for grave human rights violations are in fact 
achieving these objectives or not. Despite its erroneous interpretation of the structure and 
functioning of international law, Goldsmith makes a valid point in his amicus brief in Kiobel on 
a side note; the brief points to a structural difference between civil and criminal liability, namely 
that the former is enforced (randomly) by private individuals whereas the later is enforced 
(centrally) by the public administration.604 Even though the conclusion that Goldsmith draws 
from this difference with regard to international law, namely that “universal civil jurisdiction is a 
different and greater intrusion on territorial sovereignty than universal criminal jurisdiction,”605 
is dubious, he makes a valid point highlighting this structural difference which helps to inform a 
behavioral economics perspective on liability enforcement in a CSR context. As will be shown 
in the next chapter, behavioral economics theory supports the conclusion that a form of 
institutional, i.e., prosecutorial, punishment in the form of criminal proceedings might be the 
venue of choice in order to achieve a deterrence effect in accordance with substantive law 
prescriptions, since the ‘veil’ of punishment might be necessary (instead of mere compensatory 
civil damages) to reach the threshold at which the deterrence theory in fact holds, according to 
behavioral economics literature.606 So, the European approach of primarily dealing with human 
                                                 
603 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 4-5 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring only in the judgment). 
604 Jack Goldsmith, Brief of Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Company, Ford Motor 
Company, Glaxosmithkline PLC, and the Procter & Gamble Company as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Respondents at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 
(2011), No. 10-1491 (U.S. February 3, 2012).   
605 Id., at 2-3. 
606 See Bruno Frey et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV., 132 (2001) (Arguing that preferences, such as intrinsic motivation, get 
“crowded in” or “crowded out” depending on the level of enforcement; Frey’s metrics includes levels of high, 
medium, and low enforcement.) 
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rights cases against corporations in a criminal context in fact might be more ‘incentive- 
compatible” than the U.S. approach of bringing such cases as a tort claim under the ATS. 
However, as pointed out in Chapter 2, the U.S. legal system is particularly favorable for 
plaintiffs in civil procedures in an international comparison and therefore the U.S. system is still 
an important and attractive forum for legal redress for these kinds of issues. Despite the 
‘hysteria’ among human rights lawyers regarding the fate of Kiobel, it is to be noted that even if 
the U.S. Supreme Court were to shut down corporate liability under the ATS, there still would 
be other venues to hold corporations liable for their overseas misconduct. According to Jonathan 
Drimmer, a prominent lawyer in the CSR legal field and now in-house counsel for Barrick Gold 
Corp., the impact that Kiobel might have on holding corporations accountable in a global 
economy might be smaller than anticipated by many civil society groups and human rights 
lawyers. Even if the Supreme Court held to preclude corporations from the scope of the ATS, 
suits could still be brought under the ATS against corporate officers and directors.607 Even the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its Kiobel ruling, while rejecting corporate liability under the 
ATS, emphasized “that nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses suits under the ATS against 
the individual perpetrators of violations of customary international law—including the 
employees, managers, officers, and directors of a corporation—as well as anyone who 
purposefully aids and abets a violation of customary international law.”608 
Considering that behavioral economic studies have shown that ‘personal relationships’ 
can ‘crowd in’ intrinsic motivation and stir corporate behavior accordingly,609 there might be 
some unexpected potential in lawyers having to possibly re-adjust their litigation strategy in 
corporate ATS cases as to target the key individuals responsible, instead of the corporation as a 
(fictional) entity. Many legal scholars have contemplated for a long time if liability of 
                                                 
607 Jonathan Drimmer, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co. and the Alien Tort Statute, 5442 EMERGING 
ISSUES, 7 (2010). 
608 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv. 064876-cv at 11 (2nd Cir. Sept. 17. 2010) (Majority 
opinion). 
609 Bruno Frey, Motivation and Human Behavior, in: RISK, TRUST, AND WELFARE, 31, 37-38 (Peter Taylor-Gooby 
ed., 2000). 
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corporations as entities is in fact achieving the optimal deterrence effect, or whether corporations 
should just be seen as what they are, namely associations of individuals.610 Along those lines, 
John Coffee has suggested that "more deterrence is generated by penalties focusing on an 
individual than on a corporation.”611 John Salmond, a prominent legal scholar of his time, also 
voiced concern with regard to the practicability of corporate entity liability since, as he states, 
"[t]en men do not in fact become one person because they associate themselves together for one 
end, any more than two horses become one animal when they draw the same cart.”612 Not only 
the practicability but also the appropriateness of liability of corporations as legal persons might 
be questionable. For example, Arthur Andersen’s role in the Enron scandal, which ultimately 
resulted in a criminal indictment of the Andersen firm as a partnership, has been drawing 
attention to the consequences of criminal liability of corporations (aside with the responsible 
officers). William Laufer cut right to the point in an effort to uncover the “failure of corporate 
criminal liability” by asking, “[h]ow can the law-abiding work of so many be associated with the 
illegal acts of so few?”613 This critique has been amplified by Albert Alschuler, who argues that 
“corporate liability is unjust since it effectively punishes innocent third parties (shareholders, 
employees, and so forth).”614 This is not to say that collective criminal liability of the 
corporation itself should not be available in addition to individual criminal liability of 
responsible officers and directors.  Rather, this work urges moving beyond pre-set notions of 
what lawyers believe does and does not work and taking a fresh perspective on the doctrine of 
corporate liability informed by an empirical approach based on behavioral economics.  
However, from the perspective of effective victims’ redress, there might be significant 
instant drawbacks of individual officer liability.  Thus, evidentiary problems might arise since 
                                                 
610 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (Justice Scalia concurring.) (Justice Scalia stating that “[t]he 
association of individuals in a business corporation is no different [than an individual] …”) 
611 John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal 
Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 422 (1980). 
612 JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 285 (1920). 
613 WILLIAM LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, 
46 (2008). 
614 Albert Alschuler, The Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AMERICAN CRIMINAL L. 
REV., 1366-67 (2009). 
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personal fault needs to be established on the part of the individual officer or manager. Corporate 
liability, on the other hand, can be established on the basis of the low ‘respondeat superior’ 
standard615 and the ‘collective knowledge’ doctrine,616 which merely requires that the members 
of the company had knowledge in an aggregate. This mental fiction lowers the evidentiary bar 
for the victim plaintiffs significantly. Moreover, the individual officer does not most likely have 
the financial resources to cover both full compensatory and possibly punitive damages resulting 
from the misconduct. As Beale has pointed out, “because of their seize, complexity, and control 
of vast resources, corporations have the ability to engage in misconduct that dwarfs that which 
could be accomplished by individuals.”617 It might therefore be considered inappropriate to hold 
the individual officer liable for an act that, granted, he carried out, but that was amplified in its 
impact through the corporate context in which it was committed.  
Considering this mixed account, it might be overstated to talk about a ‘blessing in the 
sky,’ but even an unfavorable decision regarding corporate liability in Kiobel has a good chance 
of giving momentum to a fresh perspective on corporate liability, i.e., its scope and 
effectiveness. It might initiate some critical thinking about what corporate liability wants to 
achieve and if the current system delivers on this premise. Time is ripe to start a serious 
discussion that goes beyond mere legal reasoning (however as important as it is) to reflect on the 
traditional objectives of civil and criminal liability, and address the bigger picture implications 
of ATS (and ATS-like) litigation as a means of CSR implementation. Joseph Stiglitz, an 
American economist and Nobel Prize winner, has contributed to this discussion with his recent 
amicus brief that he filed in Kiobel, where he illustrated the macro-economic implications of 
ATS litigation.618  
                                                 
615 See Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AMERICAN CRIMINAL L. REV., 
1488 (2009).  
616 See CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 118 (1993). 
617 Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AMERICAN CRIMINAL L. REV., 1484 
(2009). 
618 Brief of Joseph E. Stiglitz as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011), Nos. 11-88 and 10-1491 (U.S. December 21, 2011) 
(Showing that the ATS incentivizes corporations in a way that creates economic efficiencies. Also, showing that the 
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The next, and final chapter, will analyze the micro-economic implications of ATS 
litigation in the United States and ATS-like litigation (primarily under the ‘partie civile’ 
procedure) in Europe; the focus will be implications on the corporate incentive structure by 
conducting psychological game analysis that examines the correlation between monetary 
incentives (in form of commands through compensatory awards or settlements arrangements) 
and the ‘crowding in’ or ‘crowding out’ phenomenon of intrinsic motivation on part of the 
corporation. The question at the heart of the analysis will be, to put it in Geiss’ words: “What 
now exists in law could prove to be wrong in terms of what it seeks to achieve.”619 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
ATS has no negative implications either for economic development or the level of Foreign Direct Investment in less 
developed countries (LDCs), or for economic opportunities for U.S. Businesses abroad.). 
619 Gilbert Geis & Joseph DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 
AMERICAN J. OF CRIMINAL L., 374 (2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Behavioral Economics of Legal Liability Enforcement as an Exogenous 
Measure of CSR Implementation: 
About ‘Crowding’ and ‘Contractarian Compliance’ 
 
 
I. WHAT IS THE CHALLENGE?  
Litigation, especially under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), has been viewed as a main 
vehicle to make companies more compliant with human rights standards. Under a traditional 
legal theory this makes sense since the deterrence hypothesis620 predicts that high levels of 
punishment will deter crime, i.e. non-compliance. However, in recent years the scholarship on 
law and social norms has shown that law can also have indirect effects on incentives that are not 
predicted under the standard hypothesis and that can undermine the effectiveness of the 
punishment.621  
From a game-theoretical perspective the compliance problem in a CSR setting presents 
itself as a classical ‘prisoner’s dilemma.’622 The economics discussion on CSR has focused 
heavily on endogenous compliance mechanisms as a solution, as will be discussed in detail 
below. This final chapter aims to bridge the legal, psychology, and economic scholarship to 
assess the effectiveness of human rights liability of corporations as a form of ‘CSR liability.’ 
The main conceptual challenge that will have to be addressed is how legal liability litigation, as 
exogenous implementation, can be accommodated under a notion of CSR, which traditionally 
and by its nature was intended as corporate self-regulation.623 Amartya Sen has described the 
role of enforcement from a game-theoretical perspective as follows: 
“[All players] would be both better off with a mutual non-confession contract, but it 
would be in the interest of each to break it unless there is enforcement. Rousseau’s 
                                                 
620 See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 3 (2000). 
621 See e.g. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Robert 
Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 67-99 (1987). See also LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 
(2010). 
622 See Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone, Contractarian Compliance and the ‘Sense of Justice:’ A 
Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support, 33 ANALYSE & KRITIK, 275 (2011). 
623 See Archie Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUSINESS AND 
SOCIETY, 268-295 (1999). 
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much-researched-on statement on the necessity of being ‘forced to be free’ seems to be 
shockingly relevant. But in the absence of enforcement, they are both worse off despite 
strictly ‘rational’ behaviour.”624 
 
It is controversial, however, determining what the most effective basis for enforcement 
would be: rationality, morality, external intervention? This chapter draws upon the scholarship 
on the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in order to develop a metrics 
against which existing liability schemes on the statutory basis of the ATS and the European 
‘partie civile’ procedure can be benchmarked and their incentive-compatibility can be assessed. 
For such purpose, this chapter conducts a behavioral economic analysis of CSR compliance 
informed primarily by the scholarship on the ‘crowding’ effect.625 On this basis, this chapter will 
show that over a certain threshold of punishment (in terms of economic costs) the deterrence 
hypothesis holds, but under a certain threshold, legal enforcement is not effectively stirring 
corporate behavior.   In the latter instance, the argument rests on intrinsic motivation and resorts 
to endogenous measures of CSR implementation. This chapter joins Lynn Stout when she posits 
that “[l]argely missing from all this talk about ‘incentives’ and accountability is any serious 
discussion of the possibility that we might encourage or discourage particular behaviors by 
appealing not to selfishness, but instead to the force of conscience.”626 In this light, this work 
concludes the modest--even if not non-existent--role of liability with regard to CSR and 
promotes a hybrid framework of voluntary standards, social norms, and hard law.627 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
624 Amartya Sen, Choice, Orderings, and Morality, at 66 (1974), available at 
http://tek.bke.hu/regikorok/sen/docs/choice.pdf (Reprinted in: AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE, AND 
MEASUREMENT, 74-83 (1982) and in: Amartya Sen, Choice, Ordering and Morality, in: PRACTICAL REASON, 54-
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625 See e.g. BRUNO FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION. (1997); 
Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 131-144 (2001); Huang, Peter & Wu, Ho-Mou, More Order 
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626 LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE, 5 (2010). 
627 Wouters/Chanet have also argued for a hybrid of a voluntary and regulatory approach to CSR. See Jan Wouters 
and Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsbility: A Euorpean Perspective, 6 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 265-66 (2008). 
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II. CSR AND THE LAW 
This chapter aims to examine how endogenous and exogenous cooperative incentives 
can complement one another in a compliance setting. Traditionally, CSR norms have been 
considered to be voluntary and not externally enforceable by the legal system, but are rather left 
to the realm of corporate self-regulation.628 Instead of legal incentives, compliance with CSR 
principles is stirred by endogenous incentives, which can be induced by economic 
considerations (for example, competitive advantage)629 or moral/intrinsic considerations under a 
social contract630 paradigm.631 However, for some time now, the policy debate has been rather 
ambiguous over the right approach to ensure that global business is conducted in a socially 
responsible and sustainable manner.632 Even within the European Union’s own institutional 
structure there is a divide on the question of regulation or self-regulation of CSR. Thus, the 
European Commission promotes a strictly voluntary approach to CSR,633 whereas the European 
Parliament champions a mixed approach which also entails regulation and adjudication of issues 
related to the CSR agenda.634 According to a voluntary paradigm, CSR encompasses general 
principles in a way that is rooted in business ethics.   Much of the debate about regulation or 
self-regulation in the CSR context is a reflection of the underlying debate about the relationship 
                                                 
628 Among others, Lorenzo Sacconi has argued for a voluntary approach to CSR in terms of self-regulation based on 
a social contract paradigm. Lorenzo Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of ‘Extended’ 
Corporate Governance: an Explanation Based on The Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and 
Reciprocal Conformism, in: Reframing Self-Regulation in European Private LAW, 289-343 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 
2006). 
629 See Michael Porter & Mark Kramer, The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 84 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, 78-92 (2006). 
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RIGHT (DU CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE) (1762) [Translated  by G. D. H. Cole] (Stating the 
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direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole.”) 
631 See Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone, Contractarian Compliance and the ‘Sense of Justice:’ A 
Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support, 33 ANALYSE & KRITIK, 273-310 (2011). 
632 For a stakeholder focused approach to CSR, see FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER 
APPROACH (1984). For a critical perspective on a stakeholder centric approach to corporate governance, see Michael 
Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUSINESS ETHICS 
QUARTERLY, 235-56 (2002) (Arguing that the stakeholder theory provides no clear performance criteria against 
which management can be measured.) 
633 Commission Green Paper (EC) COM (2001) 366 final on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, at 8 (18 July 2001).  
634 Parliament Resolution (EC) of April 1999 on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing 
Countries: Towards a European Code of Conduct, 1999 O.J. (C 104/180), Recital F (Stressing that “voluntary and 
binding approaches to corporate Regulation are not mutually exclusive.”) 
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between ethics and the law.635 Ethics are to be understood as a set of accepted social norms 
based on conventions and agreements636 and as such go beyond what the mere law prescribes.637 
This last point is crucial for an understanding of CSR in a legal setting and resonates with the 
European Commission in its 2001 Greenpaper on CSR: “By stating their social responsibility 
and voluntarily taking on commitments which go beyond common regulatory and conventional 
requirements, which they would have to respect in any case, companies endeavor to raise the 
standards of social development environmental protection and respect of fundamental rights 
[…].”638  
 
1. The Limits of CSR: Fiduciary Duties 
The fact that CSR constitutes social norms, typically not codified by the law can put 
corporate managers and officers, who pursue (also) public interest objectives, at odds with their 
fiduciary duties as prescribed by corporate law. This is true particularly in common law systems 
where the premise of ‘shareholder primacy’ still prevails. Under standard economic and 
corporate law theory, fiduciary duties require corporate managers to further shareholder (not 
public) interests following the maxim of shareholder value, i.e., profit maximization.639 This 
delineation of fiduciary duties is in line with Milton Friedman’s position that businesses have no 
responsibilities other than profit maximization.640 Einer Elhauge has examined, in much detail, 
the question whether corporate managers have the discretion to “sacrifice profits in the public 
interest” or whether such an operational decision would constitute a violation of management’s 
                                                 
635 See Lorenzo Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of ‘Extended’ Corporate Governance: 
an Explanation Based on The Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism, 289, 
294-95 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006). 
636 See RICHARD HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHODS, AND POINT (1981). 
637 See Lorenzo Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of ‘Extended’ Corporate Governance: 
an Explanation Based on The Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism, 289, 
295 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006). 
638 Commission Green Paper (EC) COM (2001) 366 final on Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, at para. 3 (18 July 2001).  
639 See, e.g., STEPHEN BRAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 419–29 (2002); MICHAEL DOOLEY, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW, 97 (1995). 
640 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 133 (1982) (Stating that “there is one and only one social 
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fiduciary duty towards its shareholders and would therefore open management up to shareholder 
litigation in form of derivate actions.641 The answer first depends on whether or not a social 
norm also is enshrined in a legal norm. Under well-established law, managers have a fiduciary 
duty not to violate the law in pursuit of profit maximization.642 If, however, a particular conduct 
is not illegal but is still considered socially irresponsible, the situation is less clear.643 It is a 
commonly raised objection against corporate decisions made primarily in the social interest that 
profit-sacrificing discretion to further a public interest goal imposes a “tax” on dissenting 
shareholders.644 However, Elhauge refutes this position by arguing that “even if one narrowly 
(and mistakenly) defined efficiency to equal shareholder profit-maximization, managerial 
discretion … is still necessary because the economic efficiencies that come from delegating the 
management of a business to someone other than shareholders … cannot be achieved without 
creating such discretion.”645 In specific, in order for agency costs to be at an optimal level in 
economic terms, a tradeoff between the costs of monitoring and of allowing managerial 
discretion is necessary.646 Therefore, a certain degree of discretion of the managers and 
corporate officers to pursue public interest goals is indicated and economically sound.647 
Elhauge agrees with Blair/Stout that such managerial profit-sacrificing discretion is consistent 
with a profit-maximization duty since it enables management to make operational decisions that 
are ex post profit-minimizing, but can be ex ante profit-maximizing since they might “encourage 
                                                 
641 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 NEW YORK UNIV. L. REV., 733-869 
(2005). 
642 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How 
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, 1281, 1316–18 (2001) 
(Noting that this illegality exception with regard to fiduciary duties is implicit in fact that statutes allow 
corporations to be established only for “lawful” purposes); Miller v. AT&T Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762–63 (3d Cir. 
1974) (Holding that illegal conduct, even when undertaken to benefit the corporation, violates the fiduciary duty 
owed by management to the corporation).  
643 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 NEW YORK UNIV. L. REV., 761 
(2005). 
644 See e.g., STEPHEN BRAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 421-22 (2002); JAMES COX & THOMAS 
LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS, 69–70 (2003). 
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Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 305 (1976). 
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firm-specific investments by other stakeholders.”648 Thus, the firm invests in a relationship with 
its stakeholders and other constituents built upon the premise that the latter will comply with 
social or moral norms beneficial to the company on the reciprocal expectation that the company 
will do the same.649 
In the end, it all comes back to the question how to construe fiduciary duties and 
determine what the baseline is, i.e., what is in fact in the interest of the corporation, against 
which management decisions are being judged. The approaches vary among legal systems 
around the world. Traditionally, common law countries have favored a shareholder-focused 
approach and thus have construed fiduciary duties narrowly to extend merely to shareholders 
and their interests, whereas civil law jurisdictions in Europe and Asia have embraced 
stakeholder-centric governance structures.650 However, even in common law systems the focus 
is slowly shifting towards stakeholder inclusion. Thus, the UK has revised its Companies Act in 
2006 to extend the fiduciary duties of directors to include the duty “to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit if its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other 
matters) to […] the interests of the company’s employees, the need to foster the company’s 
business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others, [and] the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment […].”651  
Even in the United States, a majority of states (30 in number) have adopted constituency 
statutes that allow managers to take  non-shareholder interests into account, including the 
interest of employees, customers, suppliers and society as a whole;652 moreover, the ‘business 
judgment rule’ gives discretion to managers to take into account stakeholder interests, which has 
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been confirmed by case law.653 Even the supposedly conservative Delaware court system has 
affirmed by case law that managers are permitted to reject a takeover bid because of “the impact 
on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps 
even the community generally).”654 The court even went as far as declaring that “stockholder 
interests” are “not a controlling factor.” [emphasis added].655 Supporters of a traditional profit-
maximization duty have often interpreted these statutory provisions and case law narrowly as to 
permit managers “making donations, being ethical, and considering non-shareholder interests 
only to the extent that doing so maximizes profits in the long run,”656 whereas others have 
argued that it also allows stakeholder-sensitive operational decisions such as “declining to make 
profitable sales that would adversely affect national foreign policy, [or] keeping an unprofitable 
plant open to allow employees to transition to new work.”657 In contrast to the U.S. common law 
system, which still holds firm on the traditional notion of fiduciary duties to be owed to the 
interests of profits for the shareholders in the absence of statutory or judicial rules indicating 
otherwise, civil law systems such as in France, Germany, or Japan take a different approach. The 
latter group of jurisdictions feature a system of “mandatory integrated decision-making,“ which 
provides for an institutional representation of different stakeholder groups within the corporate 
governance structure.658 This opens the door for construing a director’s fiduciary duty more 
broadly so as to also extend to the consideration of social and environmental matters.659  
It is crucial to properly delineate the scope of fiduciary duties under the lege contendo 
since endogenous measures of CSR implementation, such as corporate self-commitment to 
social norms or stakeholder-sensitive business decisions that would forego immediate 
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profitability goals, are only permissible when they do not violate fiduciary duties under the law. 
However, when defining a manager’s fiduciary duty, Elhauge has argued convincingly that “the 
corporation’s sense of social responsibility [should not] end[…] at the law’s edge,” meaning it  
should not only extend to social norms that have been codified in law. Elhauge elaborates: 
“[T]here is no reason to believe that the law and the markets within which corporations 
operate are able to induce desirable behavior so completely that it would be beneficial to 
create a corporate law duty that would insulate corporations from the social and moral 
processes that help regulate non-corporate business activity.”660 
 
This view is not only held by the legal scholars.  Lorenzo Sacconi, a prominent 
economics scholar, has argued that by virtue of a social contract, fiduciary duties extend to all of 
the firm’s stakeholders.661  
 
2. The Conflation of Soft Law and Hard Law 
This chapter will deal primarily with exogenous measures of CSR implementation in the 
form of legal enforcement.   However, as will be seen below, external interventionist measures, 
such as legal liability enforcement, might not always be the most effective (i.e., incentive-
compatible) way to achieve optimal deterrence results. Therefore, this dissertation suggests a 
framework for CSR liability that is informed by behavioral economics and remains 
complementary of endogenous and exogenous incentives for CSR compliance. It is to be noted 
that the line between endogenous and exogenous mechanisms in the CSR compliance context is 
not as stark as it might seem at first glance. The effect of voluntary standards, as the result of an 
endogenous process, can be legalized in various ways. Thus, contract law can be used to include 
social standards in supplier and employment contracts, among others, and thus make those 
standards legally enforceable. Also, regulatory agencies have often referred to voluntary 
company and industry codes as mandatory reporting requirements under their institutional 
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structure.662 Eventually, a public endorsement of voluntary standards can give rise to claims of 
misrepresentation or misleading conduct in the courts of law.663 Even where these legal vehicles 
are not available, corporate codes of conduct and other sources of soft law can have a normative 
effect and eventually lead to the creation of new legal standards in the field. Underlying this 
reasoning is the premise that state behavior can be shaped by the social environment in which 
those states are embedded.664 Thus, legal standards can be induced by social behavior, rather 
than merely stirring behavior in a regulatory function.665 Caffagi also confirms the blurred line 
between soft and hard law by showing that private self-regulation can be subject to liability 
claims on various grounds, specifically a “failure to regulate,” “abuse of regulatory power,” or 
“defective or wrongful regulation.”666  
 
III. BEHAVIORAL MODELS FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
1. The Compliance Problem 
Corporate compliance under a social contract paradigm poses two independent choice 
problems that have to be overcome. According to David Gauthier, one must distinguish between 
the entry into the agreement and the compliance with the norms under the agreement.667 
Entering into an agreement, such as a social contract, is a case of ex ante rational bargaining that 
requires the acceptance by all players recognizing mutual benefits under the agreement. 
Compliance, on the other hand, is a case of an ex post personal rationality decision to violate or 
comply with the agreement contingent upon the predicted behavior of the other players.668 Thus, 
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an important difference between the level of bargaining and implementation is that the former 
requires impartial rationality, whereas compliance requires personal rationality based on 
“separate but interdependent strategy choices.”669  Substantively, the main question in the 
agreement and compliance context is also very different. Whereas the rational choice required 
when entering into an agreement focuses on joint benefits and fair distribution thereof, the 
rational choice required at the compliance level is based upon personal incentives to violate or 
comply with the norm agreed upon.670 Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone describe the compliance challenge 
as follows:  
“[T]he main problem to be solved in the compliance context is how a norm can also 
generate motivational causal forces strong enough to induce the execution of the norm in 
a situation where it may require a prima facie counter-interested behavior by the agent at 
least in the immediate term.”671 
 
Unlike entering into an agreement, which is representative of a cooperative game, the 
compliance level follows the rules of a non-cooperative game.672 The reason, according to 
Amartya Sen, among others, is an underlying conflict between individual rationality and social 
optimality.673 The compliance problem presents itself as a so-called “prisoner’s dilemma”674 
what vividly illustrates the strained relationship between rationality and morality. Thus, even 
though it would be best for both parties (and thus the collective interest) if they both made a 
mutual contract to comply, each player is even better off if he or she defected (in pursuit of his 
or her individual self-interest). The problem is that this non-cooperative behavior produces 
suboptimal results since both players are now worse off despite their rational (i.e., self-interested 
behavior).675 With regard to CSR, this means that, since in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ the only 
equilibrium point is non-compliance, the social contract will not be complied with under this 
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Hobbe’s ‘state of nature.’676 The solution would be, as suggested by Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone, to 
try to change the underlying ‘state of nature’ by agreeing on a mode of mutually cooperative 
behavior instead of rational egoitistic non-cooperative interaction between the players in the 
game.677  This joins the ‘contractarian’ approach to compliance.678 The challenge, however, is 
that compliance with such a cooperative agreement is not consistent with individual egotistic 
incentives to act.679 Therefore, additional features must be added to the game in order to change 
the ‘state of nature’ so as not to depict a ‘prisoner’s dilemma.680’ Several different attempts have 
been suggested by scholars in the field in order to change the preferences in a way that not only 
includes egotistic self-interest but also reconciles the discrepancy between individual and 
societal interest.  
 
2. Solutions to The Compliance Problem 
(a) Trust 
An increasing body of economic scholarship has elucidated the significance of trust in 
economic interactions. Trust has widely been recognized to be a key determinant for economic 
performance. Kenneth Arrow has argued that a lack of trust and moral values can create serious 
market inefficiencies.681 This hypothesis has been supported by cross-country empirical 
evidence which found that there is a positive correlation between higher trust levels and higher 
economic performance.682 Trust, for example, can solve market failures, especially in financial 
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markets,683 or simply foster cooperation among actors and thus create market efficiencies.684 
There can be many determinants of trust, one of them “sociality,” as suggested by Ben-
Ner/Putterman. Thus, they have shown the important role of “sociality” as a determinant of trust 
(experimentally supported in trust games) and have suggested an “extended preference” model 
beyond “simply payoff maximization.”685 The underlying reasoning suggested by Ben-
Ner/Putterman, is that “while the company itself is not a human being with an evolved social 
nature, its managers, … employees, customers, and even the politicians who determine relevant 
regulations and their constituents, are.”686 Thus, in order for a company to operate successfully 
in a world of individuals, it will have to show a “human face” to its customers, employees, and 
the constituents surrounding them.  Only then will a company be relatable in a way that creates 
trust on the part of those individuals.687 Other scholars also have assumed that agents have 
preferences not only for money, but also for social goods and that those preferences can be 
motivational drivers for CSR.688 Benabou/Tirole introduced another motivational factor in form 
of reputation.  Along the lines of the crowding theory, which will be discussed in detail below, 
they found that monetary extrinsic incentives ‘crowd out’ social behavior because they decrease 
the altruistic perception and thus reputational benefits for the company.689 
Aside from intrinsic motivation (as opposed to extrinsic motivation), which is the main 
focus of this dissertation, it is to be noted that CSR also can be viewed in a different way, 
namely a market-based way to address social issues. Thus, James Andreoni argues that corporate 
giving and political engagement are imperfect substitutes, whereas CSR (in terms of corporate 
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involvement) is a function of so-called “warm glow” preferences (i.e., the utility derived merely 
from the act of giving).  This appeals to consumers or investors endowed with social preferences 
in addition to their pattern of consumption or investment.690 Jason Saul has taken the market-
based approach to CSR even further, in a more polemic but no less compelling way, by 
illustrating that there is “a market for social change” in which social change can be leveraged to 
drive business profitability, for example, by tapping into underserved markets (such as ‘food 
deserts’) or developing sub-market products that address a social need.691  
(b) Conventions 
Focusing instead on a company’s intrinsic motivation to comply with social norms, the 
conventionalist school of thought has offered a different solution to the compliance problem.692 
Hume describes a convention as a “general sense of common interest; which sense all the 
members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct 
by certain rules.”693 Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone describe conventions from a game-theoretical 
perspective as regularities of behavior that emerge in repeated games and that are common 
knowledge to all players. From a game-theoretical perspective, regularity gradually converges to 
a coordination equilibrium.  Thus, conventions are Nash equilibria with no incentive for any 
player to deviate from the given regularity provided there are mutually consistent expectations 
with regard to preferences and actions.694 However, conventional theory is only of limited use to 
solve the compliance problem since, as Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone have pointed out, it overstates the 
significance of repeated models.  The “typical failure of individual rationality” which leads to 
suboptimal non-cooperative results is ignored as well as the fact that there initially is “complete 
                                                 
690 James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1447-58 (1989) 
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692 See e.g., David LEWIS, CONVENTIONS. A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969); AOKI, MASAHIKO, TOWARD A 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001) (Exploring the mechanism of evolution of different organizational 
conventions.) 
693 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, 490 (2000[1740]).  
694 See Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone, Contractarian Compliance and the ‘Sense of Justice:’ A 
Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support, 33 ANALYSE & KRITIK, 276-77 (2011). 
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uncertainty about which of the possible conventions will emerge.”695 Moreover, even after the 
emergence of a convention of coordination, already the uncertainty about what constitutes the 
optimal game solution will have suboptimal outcome consequences.696 Therefore, conventional 
theory offers a valid solution to the compliance problem but it lacks a reliable selection 
procedure for the equilibrium.697  
(c) Rational Choice and Moral Dispositions  
In another effort to reconcile rationality and morality in the compliance game, some 
scholars have revised rationality to include the rational choice of psychological dispositions to 
comply with a social norm.698 Therefore, Gauthier as a representative of the rational-choice 
literature, views “morality as a set of rational principles for choice.”699  The self-proclaimed goal 
of Gauthier’s moral theory is the “generation of moral constraints as rational.”700 However, this 
approach also proves problematic since it reduces a moral disposition to comply with a norm of 
cooperation to a question of rationality. But if a disposition, and whether to develop it, is 
considered to be a rational choice, then this entails that a rational person decides to abide by a 
moral norm even before a corresponding disposition is able to constrain his behavior.701 Also, 
other scholars have agreed that framing moral dispositions to comply with a norm as a rational 
choice decision produces contradictions.702 Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone vividly show where a strictly 
rational choice approach to morality falls short and how morality can be introduced differently 
into the compliance game in order to yield optimal outcomes:  
“What seems mistaken in this approach, however, is not the idea of analyzing moral 
dispositions but the idea that undertaking moral dispositions may be a matter of practical 
reasoning and sophisticated instrumental decision calculus, whereas it could be a matter 
of developing a moral sentiment (the 'desire' to be just) endowed with some motivational 
                                                 
695 See id., at 278.  
696 Id., at 11.  
697 See id., at 7.  
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force on its own, and capable of generating additional motivational drives to act that can 
be introduced into the players' preference systems—under proper conditions to be 
defined.”703 
 
Based on this deliberation, Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone suggest a different, novel approach to 
the compliance problem that connects this notion of moral sentiment to the social contract. Thus, 
the social contract itself has normative effect.  The compliance decision is linked to the 
rationality choice of an ex ante social contract agreement.704 Also, Amartya Sen has pointed out 
the conceptual shortfalls of framing morality as a rational choice. He writes that “[m]orality 
would seem to require a judgment among preferences whereas rationality would not.”705 This 
makes both concepts incompatible by nature. Sen therefore suggests changing the focus of the 
choice analysis to express morality “in form of choice between preference patterns rather than 
between actions.”706 For the purpose of this dissertation, which deals with aspects of law and 
morality with regard to CSR, the ‘contractarian’ approach to compliance is particularly suited, 
since it addresses the conceptual challenges of reconciling the notion of regulation and self-
regulation under a CSR paradigm. Under a ‘contractarian’ understanding of compliance, CSR 
can be construed as an integration of contracts, in terms of ex ante impartial agreements based 
on an abstract norm of extended fiduciary duties.707 Through self-endorsement by the company 
(for example, with a corporate code of conduct), the company could then be sued for a breach of 
its own commitment. Acknowledging that we are no longer in the realm of the legal order per se 
(“de jure condito”), but rather in the realm of normative innovation (“de jure condendo”), the 
‘contractarian’ approach enables accommodating legal obligations and their external 
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enforcement under the traditional notion of CSR, namely, norms intended to be voluntary by 
nature and subject merely to corporate self-regulation.708 
(d) A ‘Sense of Justice’709 in a ‘Contractarian’ Compliance Model 
Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone’s ‘contractarian’ compliance approach draws upon John Rawl’s 
‘sense of justice’ which is evolving from an ex ante agreement (under a ‘veil of ignorance’) on 
principles of justice and is then providing its own endogenous support of the stability of just 
institutions in a well-ordered society.710 The moral sentiment, as quoted above, is consistent with 
Rawl’s ‘sense of justice.’711 As Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone have pointed out, Rawl’s theory “was 
long overlooked by economists and game theorists because it is at odds with the methodologies 
of rational choice;”712 rather, it assumes a moral sentiment as a socio-psychological result, 
which, independent from rational choice, induces just and fair behavior. But it is exactly this 
socio-psychological approach to moral sentiments in society which make Rawl’s theory so 
uniquely suited to capture the role and functioning of CSR in modern-day society. It seems to 
align more with reality to assume CSR compliance as a product of a higher moral sentiment than 
as a matter of rational choice considering that, at least under a traditional model of the firm, a 
firm’s self-interest is shareholder value maximization not societal interests. As 
Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone have put it, “the idea [of Rawl’s theory] is that motives to act are now 
enriched with a new motivation able to overcome the counteracting tendency to injustice” 
[emphasis added] in terms of defecting in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’-like situation.713  
In a psychological game experiment, Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone have shown how Rawl’s 
‘sense of justice’ paradigm can be captured by a ‘behavioral model of contractarian conformist 
preference.’714 They describe the ‘sense of justice’ as a psychological equilibrium based on 
                                                 
708 See Archie Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct, 38 BUSINESS AND 
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conformist preferences, thus providing a means of endogenous social contract compliance.715 
Accordingly, economic agents are not only incentivized by ‘consequentailist,’ i.e. egoistic, but 
also by ‘conformist’ preferences in terms of intrinsic motivation to act in accordance with an 
agreed upon principle contingent on reciprocal beliefs and actions of the other agents.716 The 
findings show that agents are not only incentivized by material payoffs but also by 
psychological payoffs.717 Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone explain the theory of ‘contractarian conformist 
preference’ as follows: 
“[A] disposition to conform with agreed principles of justice, conditional on [reciprocal 
beliefs] [(‘contractarian’ aspect)], may enter the preference system of a player by 
assigning psychological payoffs—additional to material payoffs—to choices that 
approximate an ideal of justice given the other players’ choices and their level of 
conformity [(‘conformist preference’ aspect)].”718  
 
On this premise, Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone model the compliance problem based on 
psychological game theory,719 but also add a new consideration to the game, namely that 
“conformity preferences depend on an ex ante impartial agreement on a principle.”720 
Psychological payoffs are introduced to the preference system of the firm (and its stakeholders) 
by virtue of the rational choice of a social contract agreement and the subsequent development 
of a moral sentiment.  The ‘contractarian’ compliance model offers a solution to the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ in a compliance setting in a way that is not at odds with rational choice theory but still 
accounts for the socio-psychological reality of CSR. As will be discussed below, other 
behavioral economic studies also have added intrinsic motivation associated with psychological 
payoff to the preference system in order to explain the relationship between motivation and 
behavior beyond the mere ‘price effect,’ which states that as the price increases, supply increases 
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and demand falls. For example, Bruno Frey has shown that even when monetary incentives in 
form of fines are awards or involved, behavioral preferences are influenced by psychological 
payoffs as well.721  
 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL RULES ENFORCEMENT ON CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR: THE ‘CROWDING OUT’ PHENOMENON IN THE 
COMPLIANCE GAME 
1. The ‘Crowding’ Effect in Exogenous Social Contract Enforcement 
The crowding theory has introduced a well-established empirical psychological effect722 
into economic theory in an attempt to account for complex human behavior that cannot be 
entirely captured by standard economic theory.723 For the purpose of this work, corporate 
behavior is understood as managerial-decision making.724 Behavioral economic studies have 
been coined particularly by Bruno Frey, who has shown that, under conditions to be identified, 
external intervention in the form of monetary rewards or commands does not necessarily induce 
behavior in the way desired and as predicted under the ‘price effect’ of standard economic 
theory.   Rather, there are ‘hidden costs’ (and potentially also gains) associated with external 
incentives (i.e., set from outside the person considered).725 According to Frey, the ‘crowding 
out’ phenomenon is the only socio-psychological effect capable of reversing and not only 
weakening the ‘price effect’.726 Frey/Bohnet/Huck have studied the crowding out effect in the 
particular context of contract enforcement with regard to trustworthiness. In an experimental 
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game, they have shown that the crowding effect modifies and to some extent refutes standard 
economic analysis of law according to which compliance is more likely the higher the expected 
cost of breach.727 Specifically, it has been found that certain rules of law and their enforcement 
can have a non-monotonic effect on behavior. Therefore, the structure and functioning of a legal 
enforcement mechanism (under proper conditions to be defined below) can ‘crowd out’ 
trustworthiness and intrinsic motivation to act and therefore affect behavior in a counterintuitive 
way that is not compatible with the incentives intended under the law. In countries where legal 
(contract) enforcement mechanisms are more prevalent, “interpersonal trust is replaced by 
institutional trust in the legal system” and intrinsic motivation to comply is replaced by external 
incentives.728 The Bohnet/Frey/Huck crowding model provides important information on the 
relationship of formal law and intrinsic dispositions by showing that “the effectiveness of each 
depends on the other.”729 This is an important aspect in order to understand and assess the 
effectiveness of current liability schemes to hold corporations liable for human rights violations.  
The work by Bohnet/Frey/Huck adds an additional factor to the compliance problem as 
laid out above, namely legal rules and their effect on preferences. Whereas the theory of 
‘contractarian conformist preferences’ introduces a model for endogenous support of an 
underlying norm, the theory of ‘motivation crowding’ provides a model when exogenous 
measures of implementation are involved, such as in form of legal enforcement. Therefore, 
another implementation level is added to the compliance problem leading to a situation where 
cooperative preferences cannot only be induced endogenously by the underlying social contract, 
but potentially also by legal rules depending on how those rules and their enforcement are 
structured.730 In the Bohnet/Frey/Huck model, “the (legal) rules of a game have […] effects on 
behavior because they affect preferences.”731 Thus, unlike other scholarship on rules and 
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preferences before, which provided for differences in preferences,732 the Bohnet/Frey/Huck 
model accounts for changes in preferences depending on the legal rules of the game. This model 
provides a viable framework for assessing the incentive-compatibility of existing liability 
schemes for corporate human rights enforcement and identifying key characteristics with regard 
to legal rules and their enforcement, which have the potential to change preferences as predicted 
under the standard deterrence hypothesis. The ‘crowding’ theory suggests that under specific 
conditions (to be elaborated below) there is a trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation that can diminish the effectiveness of external legal enforcement. However, as 
Osterloh/Frey have pointed out, “[t]he most important condition for this trade-off is the 
existence of intrinsic motivation in the first place.”733 This means that the ‘crowding’ theory 
cannot be applied in vacuum but requires a sounds basis which induces intrinsic motivation in 
the first place.  This basis is provided by a ‘contractarian conformist’ approach to preference 
formation.  
It is to be noted that the ‘contractarian’ compliance model and the crowding theory share 
the important common feature of assuming that psychological costs are associated with 
breaching any agreement. Those psychological costs are considered motivational drivers and are 
capable of stirring behavior in an endogenous and exogenous implementation system.734 
However, there is also an important conceptual difference between the two models with regard 
to the contractual basis of their respective experimental analysis. Bohnet/Frey/Huck examine 
preferences in the context of legal contract enforcement (with regard to normal life contracts 
such as employment, investment, or lending contracts), but not in the context of social contract 
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enforcement.735 Therefore, the Bohnet/Frey/Huck model relies on a clear first and second mover 
dynamic that entails a deliberate choice on part of the first mover to enter a legal contract based 
on the perceived trustworthiness of the second mover.736  
The goal of this chapter is to apply the crowding theory to exogenous measures of CSR 
implementation, specifically legal enforcement, in order to shed light on the effectiveness (in 
terms of incentive-compatibility) of existing legal liability regimes, which have been examined 
in the previous chapters. The conceptual challenge of doing so is that instead of real world legal 
contracts, we would have to presuppose a social contract as the basis for the crowding analysis. 
Certainly, one could object that the mechanism that induces intrinsic motivation to such legal 
contracts in sensu stricto is different from a social contract. However, it can be argued that the 
acceptance of a real world legal contract entails a ‘sense of justice’ in a way similar to a social 
contract since both constitute an impartial agreement that is the result of a rational bargaining 
game.737 For the purpose of applying the crowding theory to legal enforcement under a social 
contract rather than a real world contract, this work uses the ‘contractarian’ compliance model to 
determine the contractual basis that induces trustworthiness and intrinsic preferences, which then 
might be subject to change depending on the respective legal rules of the game under the 
conditions identified by Bohnet/Frey/Huck and which are discussed below.  
 
2. Weak and Strong Stakeholders 
Agreeing to a principle under the conditions formulated by Rawl and experimentally 
supported by the model of ‘contractarian conformist preferences’ introduces trustworthiness and 
reciprocal dispositions to cooperate into the compliance game, which is emblematic of the CSR 
implementation process. This understanding of CSR is closely related to and consistent with the 
notion of so-called ‘cognitive social capital,’ defined as dispositions and reciprocal beliefs which 
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lead to trustworthy attitudes based on preferences to cooperate.738 Social capital is understood as 
‘generalized trust’ that induces a disposition to comply with social norms.739 Like a social 
contract, social capital induces cooperation in the network (in terms of social networks that 
connect agents, here stakeholders).740 Looking at CSR in terms of social capital, Antoni/Sacconi 
were able to draw important conclusions with regard to the effect that the credible threat of 
‘punishment’ on the part of stakeholders vis-à-vis the firm would have on corporate behavior. 
Their findings shed light on the effects of (prospective) ‘punishment’ in a compliance game and 
are therefore indicatory for the analysis of the behavioral economics of legal enforcement as a 
form of punishment.  
Antoni/Sacconi show that one of the main factors to promote ‘structural SC’ in form of 
“cooperative linkages among agents” is “the existence of credible sanctions against the agents 
that decide not to cooperate.”741 For this purpose, they introduce the distinction between weak 
and strong stakeholders.   The former bring strategic assets to the firm rendering the discounted 
payoff of cooperating positive for the firm. In contrast, the latter do not dispose of any such 
assets with the effect that in this case the payoff of cooperating is negative for the firm. The firm 
therefore has no incentive to cooperative with weak stakeholders. Strong stakeholders, however, 
have actual leverage to punish the firm in cases of non-compliance.742 Based on a psychological 
game model, Antoni/Sacconi show that if there exists an agreement between strong stakeholders 
and the firm on social norms, the strong stakeholders themselves “activate the other components 
of the firm’s and stakeholders’ cognitive social capital,” which in turn properly incentivizes 
strong stakeholders to punish the firm if it is not cooperating with weak stakeholders.743 
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Therefore, Antoni/Sacconi in a sense specify the theory of ‘contractarian conformist 
preferences’ in a way that an agreement on CSR principles between any stakeholder and the firm 
is not sufficient to establish a perfect psychological equilibrium. Rather, strong stakeholders 
(since they have leverage over the firm) need to enter into a social contract with the firm and 
need to be endowed with high cognitive social capital in order for cooperative behavior to be 
induced throughout the entire network, including between weak stakeholders and the firm.744  
The option to resort to private stakeholder litigation can make weak stakeholders strong 
within this framework.745 Thus, provided that those strong stakeholders are endowed with high 
‘social capital’ (i.e., beliefs and dispositions) and conformist preferences, they have the right 
incentive to ‘punish’ the corporation if the latter does not cooperate.  A punishment game can be 
modeled where the equilibrium strategy is cooperative behavior between the firm and its 
stakeholders induced by psychological payoffs under a social contract agreement and reinforced 
with the threat of legal litigation. ‘Punishment’ under a game-theoretical framework means 
endogenous punishment in terms of ‘no cooperation’ or ‘defect.’  Under economic theory 
‘punishment’ is usually understood as a market strategy that does not entail resorting to an 
institutional legal framework that is superimposed on the transactions in the game. 746 However, 
because of bound rationality limitations, it is suggested here that legal litigation may play a 
crucial complementary role to induce cooperation since it improves the bargaining position of 
stakeholders in the bargaining and compliance game.  
Therefore, this dissertation embraces a model of psychological equilibria based on 
conformist preferences, as an endogenous element of social contract compliance, that can be 
effectively complemented by legal liability litigation, as an exogenous element, as long as such 
social preferences are not changed under the ‘crowding’ theory below.  
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3. The Threshold Model 
In their game experiment on contract enforcement, Bohnet/Frey/Huck have found a 
threshold effect where over a given level of external enforcement, legal incentives are effective 
in the conventional economics sense, but under the threshold level legal enforcement can be 
counterproductive since there are ‘hidden costs’ in terms of intrinsic motivation being reduced, 
i.e., ‘crowded out.’747  
The level of enforcement is determined by the probability of bearing the expected cost of 
non-compliance.748 When the level of enforcement is high in those terms, no crowding out of 
intrinsic motivation is taking place since preferences of the actors are irrelevant in this setting.   
Personal trust is substituted by institutional trust and intrinsic motivation with extrinsic 
motivation. Actors in a game under these given conditions are effectively deterred by the 
external intervention.749  
Under a certain threshold of the enforcement probability, which is an empirical matter as 
demonstrated below, trust in the contracting partner’s behavior is crowded out. 
Bohnet/Frey/Huck describe this as a case of a medium level of enforcement in the terms above. 
At a level of medium legal enforcement, the expected payoff of entering the contract is greater 
than abstaining even if the second mover will breach the contract.750 This leads to a situation 
where trustworthiness is irrelevant for the first mover’s decision to enter the contract and is 
therefore crowded out. The second mover has no incentive to comply with the contract since 
there is no demand for trust and honesty.  It is the classical ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ in a compliance 
setting where betrayal is more beneficial to the defecting party than cooperating.751 
Consequently, the first mover cannot rely on the second mover’s reciprocal cooperative behavior 
or on the legal system since the cost of breach and the effectiveness of enforcement are 
diminished.  
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Eventually, if the level of enforcement drops further to a low (as opposed to medium) 
level, the experimental study shows that compliance rates are high again. This confirms that the 
probability of contract enforcement and the associated costs of breach have a non-monotonic 
effect on compliance behavior.752 Thus, contract compliance is not only likely when, as 
expected, “the … cost of breach is sufficiently large but also [,counter-intuitively,] when it is 
sufficiently small.” [emphasis added].753 The reason underlying this finding is that a low level of 
legal enforcement tends to ‘crowd in’ trustworthiness since the first mover cannot rely on the 
legal system to deter the second mover from breaching the agreement. The first mover therefore 
exercises cautious discretion before entering into a contract which in turn incentivizes the 
second mover to comply, with honesty being ‘crowded in.’754 As Ronald Wintrobe puts it, “[t]he 
absence of enforceability generates a demand for trust.”755 Thus, in contractual relationships 
with weak enforcement, behavior is not guided by the expected costs of breach (as a function of 
the extrinsic motivation provided by legal system), but by intrinsic motivation.  
One may conclude under this experimental game model that “[t]he worst legal regime is 
not one in which contracts cannot be enforced but one with an intermediate level of 
enforceability.”756 So, there are two viable options: either “more order with more law or more 
order with less law.”757 With regard to the ‘crowding in’ effect in low enforcement systems, 
prudence is required when applying this finding to the realm of social contract compliance, the 
reason being that the social contract, unlike a formalistic legal contract, cannot simply be 
assumed to be already ‘out there’ without any further specifications. In fact, even 
Bohnet/Frey/Huck concede that their finding that more order can be achieved through trust-
based relationships (instead of legal enforcement) only holds “when each party can predict the 
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753 Id., at 132.  
754 Id.  
755 Ronald Wintrobe, Some Economics of Ethnic Capital Formation and Conflict, in: NATIONALISM AND 
RATIONALITY, 43, 46 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 1995). 
756 Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 131, 136 (2001). 
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other’s likelihood of cooperation.”758 Under regular legal contracts such prediction might be 
easier to make than under a social contract paradigm, especially when based on a ‘contractarian’ 
compliance model as suggested here for the reasons laid out above.  
Thus, Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone find that a ‘sense of justice,’ as a moral sentiment induced 
by an impartial social contract agreement,  requires a reciprocal mental element entailing 
“shared knowledge” that all actors agreed and “shared belief” that they are all behaving in a 
cooperative way.759  There is significant uncertainty in the game since a social contract 
agreement is not a formalistic legal contract per se. To be clear, if all conditions under the 
‘contractarian’ compliance model were met with the effect that the social contract itself induced 
conformist preferences in form of a ‘sense of justice,’ then a valid policy suggestion would be to 
achieve more CSR compliance with either more stringent laws or with deregulation leaving it to 
the intrinsic motivation of corporations to comply. However, it cannot be argued that we are 
there yet and that such a social contract commitment can be taken for granted. Therefore, this 
work suggests that in order to achieve more order with a low enforcement regime, the social 
contract needs to be further instituted under international law by adopting voluntary standards, 
the content of which should be accepted and defined in a multi-stakeholder agreement and 
monitored by an independent third party. 
 
4. “A Fine is a Price:” The Commoditization of Human Rights 
The effect of (endogenous) punishment on behavior has been subject to long-standing 
scholarship in psychological, legal, and recently also economic studies. Even though the 
literature diverges on some caveats and specifications of the theory, the following deterrence 
hypothesis is accepted across the different disciplines:  the introduction of a penalty reduces the 
behavior.760 Legal761 and psychological762 scholarship have been defining the specific conditions 
                                                 
758 Id., at 133.  
759 Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo and Stefania Ottone, Contractarian Compliance and the ‘Sense of Justice:’ A 
Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support, 33 ANALYSE & KRITIK, 273, 308 (2011). 
760 See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 3 (2000). 
761 The deterrence hypothesis goes back at least to JEREMY BENTHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789). This hypothesis has recently gained more attention from law and economic 
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under which the deterrence theory holds in a similar way, arguing that a punishment is most 
effective if it is severe, certain, and instantly follows the behavior. 
A much cited case study has shown that the standard prediction under the deterrence 
theory, as cornerstone of psychology and the understanding of law deterrence, does not always 
hold.763 The study looked at the effect of fines on the frequency with which parents arrive late to 
pick up their children from day-care centers and yielded the following results which refute the 
predictions under conventional theory.  The introduction of a fine in fact resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of parents arriving late at a rate which was higher than when there was 
no fine imposed at all. Even after the fine was removed again, the level of late-coming parents 
remained at the same high. The monetary fine that was imposed was low but not insignificant.764  
The study argues that the deterrence effect would hold if the fine introduced was very large and 
thus punishment severe enough, as predicted by law and psychology theory.765 
From this field study, Gneezy/Rustichini conclude that the introduction of a fine changes 
how we perceive our environment and our obligations therein or, to speak in economic terms, 
how we perceive the game and the equilibrium.766 The reason is that a fine is usually introduced 
into an incomplete contract that does not specify the consequences of misbehavior. Introducing a 
fine, even though it makes the actual consequence of misbehaving worse, provides information 
and removes uncertainty about the punishment.   It is exactly this uncertainty about what might 
happen if one misbehaves that restrained the actors. It is the process of information-gathering 
and learning for the actors.  After the fine was introduced, parents tested the reaction of the day 
care center and learned that the fine imposed is in fact the worst that will happen to them.767 As 
                                                                                                                                                            
scholarship, see e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, 169-217 (1968); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 THE JOURNAL 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 43-67 (1996). 
762 See e.g. BARRY SCHWARTZ, PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND BEHAVIOR (1984); William Estes, An Experimental 
Study of Punishment, 57 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS, 1-40 (1944). 
763 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1-17 (2000). 
764 The day care fee for each child per month is NIS 1.400 (New Israeli Shekel); the penalty fee in the study is NIS 
10 for a delay of 10 minutes or more. Id., at 4-5.  
765 Id., at 3, 15.  
766 Id., at 3, 15-16. 
767 See id., at 10-11. 
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has been shown in the previous chapter, corporations are confronted with many legal 
uncertainties when they are sued under U.S. law for compensatory and punitive damage awards 
due to the very vague nature of the ATS and its prescribed scope, with many questions still 
remaining open for judicial review, such as the extent of its extraterritorial use,768 the mens rea 
standard for corporate aiding and abetting,769 and the availability of corporate liability under the 
ATS in general. 770  
Until now, only a handful of cases under the ATS and foreign equivalents successfully 
imposed liability on corporations, whereas most of the major cases were settled by corporations 
out of court.771 The settlement practice and terms provide information and certainty to 
corporations about the monetary risk they face when violating human rights in their overseas 
operations. This together with the litigation experience that procedural hurdles to jurisdiction set 
a high bar for victims to overcome (in fact, most cases get dismissed at the pre-trial stage),772 
firms learn that, in Gneezy’s terms, fines at an aggregated amount are the worst that will happen 
to them. This however does not account for reputational damage, which a company, being 
alleged of overseas human rights abuses or complicity therein, might face and which can be 
exorbitant. To describe it in Warren Buffet’s words: “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and 
five minutes to ruin it.” Even though empirical evidence shows that a connection between 
socially responsible business and profitability is “at best … inconclusive,”773 reputational costs 
and benefits have increasingly become part of corporations’ calculus in form of their risk 
                                                 
768 The U.S. Supreme Court has just recently extended the scope of its review in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. to also include the legal question of extraterritorial reach of the ATS. See Order for re-argument and 
supplemental briefing, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1998, No. 10-1491 (March 5, 2012). 
769 There is currently a decided circuit split on the mens rea standard with the Second Circuit endorsing an intent 
standard and the Eleventh and D.C. Circuit endorsing a knowledge standard, see above note 17.  
770 The U.S. Supreme Court will be deciding about the issue of corporate liability under the ATS during its next 
term in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.. (Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 132 U.S. 472 (2011)). 
771 See Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable views of the Bush Administration, 33BROOKLYN J. 
OF INT’L  L., 813(2008).   
772 See id., at 777.  There are various grounds on which jurisdiction can be challenged, such as the ‘political 
question doctrine,’ ‘the state action doctrine,’ and ‘comity’ considerations. Cases can also be dismissed at the pre-
trial stage on grounds of ‘forum non conveniens.’ See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION, 40-47, 87-99 (2004). 
773 DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, 29 (2006). 
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management as well as their branding and marketing efforts.774 The uncertainty about the 
reputational hit and associated costs a company could incur, through investor and consumer 
pressure respectively, is an “unspecified and uncertain but possibly more serious 
consequence”775 than the actual settlement outcome. It is therefore expected, based on 
Gneezy/Rustichini’s findings, that the deterrence theory should still hold to some degree but 
most likely not at an equilibrium point considering the experiences and learning with such 
litigation and settlements, as described above.  
Aside from filling information gaps, the imposition of a (low) fine also changes the 
perception of the relevant acts and consequently leads to a change of social norms, which 
increases misbehavior and persists even if the fine is removed again.776 By imposing a monetary 
fine, the relationship between the actors shifts from a non-market to a market orientation since 
the fine puts a price on the teachers’ over-time and thus commoditizes it.777  Gneezy/Rustichini 
identify two major social norms778 underlying this change in perception. First, “[w]hen 
[something] is offered for no compensation in a moment of need, accept it with restraint[;] when 
[something] is offered for a price, buy as much as you find convenient.” And second, “[a] fine is 
a price [under the given conditions of the study].”779 The shown effect of monetary fines on 
social norms provides valuable insights into the relationship between legal liability enforcement 
(with monetary awards) and CSR.  
Applied to a CSR context, Gneezy/Rustichini’s line of reasoning would play out as 
follows:   If CSR is considered to be a non-market aspect by firms, then they would perceive the 
environment and society in which they operate as the constituent which granted them the 
                                                 
774 See MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA, AND CHIP PITTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS, at 45-46(2009).  
775 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 10 (2000). 
776 Id., at 14-15. 
777 Id., at 14.  
778 Gneezy/Rustichi base their study on the definition of ‘social norm’ by J. Coleman who argues that a social norm 
is ‘‘a norm concerning a specific action […] when the socially defined right to control the action is held not by the 
actor but by the others’’ with the authority of the others vested in them “by the social consensus.” (Uri Gneezy and 
Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 13, n. 12 (2000) [Quoting: J. COLEMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY, 293 (1990)].  
779 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 14 (2000). 
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generous privilege to do business and which they ought not to take advantage of. Under this 
paradigm, firms would strive to just do the “right thing” and not do harm by exercising due 
diligence. However, if by means of damage or settlements awards a price is put on human rights 
then firms would perceive violations as, to put it bluntly, mere collateral damage of their global 
business activities that can be compensated for if and as much is needed. Imposing a monetary 
fine prevents guilt or shame to attach since the act of buying a commodity is neutral in itself.780  
Granted that this might be an overstated way of looking at this phenomenon in a CSR 
context, but the findings in this case study have proven valid and have been confirmed by the 
burgeoning crowding literature at the intersection of psychology and economics.781 Moreover, 
the hypothesis of commoditizing non-market activities through legal liability awards also 
provides valuable lessons to the legal debate about social norms and the law.782 Some might 
argue that a case study on a day care center and tardy parents is very different from human rights 
abuses in the context of global business activities. It is acknowledged that in substance the two 
different scenarios might be different. But as shown above, they share common traits which 
allow similar conclusions with regard to the effect of monetary punishment on behavior. 
Gneezy/Rustichini themselves declare their findings applicable to both private and social 
contracts.783 The increasing literature on behavioral economics has supported 
                                                 
780 See id.  
781 Several scholars have explored the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and found that under 
specific conditions there is a tradeoff between the two. Lepper/Greene have been referring to this phenomenon as 
"hidden costs of rewards" MARK LEPPER & DAVID GREENE, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF REWARDS: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION (1978). Deci has described the same phenomenon as "the corruption 
effect of extrinsic motivation" and Bruno Frey has framed it as a “crowding out effect.” EDWARD DECI, INTRINSIC 
MOTIVATION (1975); BRUNO FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 
(1997).  
782 For the role of social norms with regard to the law and legal compliance, see, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Social Norms 
and Roles, 96 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 903-968 (1996) (Suggesting that “norm management is an important 
strategy for accomplishing the objectives of law.”) Also, see LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD 
LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2010). 
783 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1 (2000). 
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Gneezy/Rustichin’s findings in different settings, such as legal rules enforcement784 and 
taxation.785 
In conclusion, the results of the case study by Gneezy/Rustichini are consistent with the 
crowding theory by Bohnet/Frey/Huck.  Both works find that if a fine is imposed, which is not 
very high but not very low either, then this fine produces worse deterrence and worse 
compliance than would the imposition of no fine at all. Therefore, Gneezy/Rustichini predict a 
‘crowding out’ effect for low but significant fines similar to the medium level enforcement 
measures under the Bohnet/Frey/Huck model. However, even when punishment is structured in 
a way that the deterrence theory holds, its effects can be reduced by another phenomenon. Under 
the economic analysis of the effects of punishment, “a complete consideration of market forces” 
requires that the decision problem of a single agent is not looked at in isolation since the agents’ 
behavior affects one another.786 Thus, for example, the predicted reduction in crime might be 
smaller than anticipated under the deterrence hypothesis when some agents abstain from their 
criminal behavior, since this in turn increases the returns of crime.787  
 
IV. HOW INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE ARE U.S. AND EUROPEAN LIABILITY 
SYSTEMS WHEN IT COMES TO HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
AGAINST CORPORATIONS? OR DOES THE DETERRENCE 
HYPOTHESIS HOLD? 
This section will assess how incentive-compatible the liability schemes are when 
imposed on corporations under the ATS and European criminal codes. For this purpose, this 
analysis builds upon the legal findings from Chapters 2 and 3 which aimed to distill the key 
features of the respective liability approaches to holding corporations liable for violations of 
                                                 
784 See Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 131-44 (2001). 
785  Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Direct Democracy, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 525–31 
(2005). (Showing, at the example of Swiss cantons, direct democracy shapes tax morale.) Lars Feld and Bruno 
Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3 ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 87–99 (2002) (Showing 
that the “psychological tax contract” is violated in hierarchical systems.). 
786 See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 2 (2000). 
787 Id., at 3.  
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international law, respectively human rights. These comparative law findings will be tested 
under economic game theory and behavioral economics, as laid out above, with the goal to 
determine the effect of the different modes of punishment—in the United States and Europe—on 
the behavior of corporations.  
 
1. Out-of-Court Settlements and the ‘Crowding Out’ Effect 
There is a civil-criminal divide between Europe and the United States when it comes to 
holding corporations liable for violations of human rights law. This dissertation has argued, 
contrary to some other scholars,788 that the civil or criminal nature of the punishment matters 
with regard to the effectiveness of the redress and punishment under the respective liability 
system. One important feature of a civil as opposed to a criminal liability system is the legal 
option of the parties to settle the case out of court by agreement, usually providing for monetary 
awards in return for a disclaimer that the defendant is not assuming any legal responsibility and 
that the dispute between the parties is ended without trial. Most of the times the terms of the 
settlements are confidential.789 In legal systems which impose criminal sanctions on 
corporations for overseas human rights violations, it is not within the victims’ power to decide 
whether to prosecute or stop prosecuting the criminal offenses.  In most legal systems, especially 
in Europe, the rule of thumb is that it is at the sole discretion of the prosecutor to initiate 
proceedings or drop the charges.790 The legal option for the parties to settle the case out of court 
is therefore an important difference between civil and criminal liability enforcement in the CSR 
context and, based on the crowding theory, impacts the effects that punishment has on corporate 
compliance behavior in the United States and Europe. 
                                                 
788 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies 
for International Human Rights Violations, 27 THE YALE J. OF INTL. L., 1-58 (2002). 
789 See Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1339-1391 (1994); Rule 16(c)(7) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that in pre-trial 
conferences judges might "consider and take action with respect to . . . the possibility of settlement or the use of 
extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute.”  
790 See Robert Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities 
Implicated in International Crimes, 40 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 882 (2009). 
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As pointed out in previous chapters, almost all cases against corporations for overseas 
human rights abuses have been brought in U.S. courts under the ATS.791 Until now, only one 
case has been decided by verdict in favor of the plaintiffs with award of damages.792 Many 
landmark cases against major MNCs, however, have been settled out-of-court, often just when 
the case was about to enter the trial phase.793 To account for these realities in the context of 
holding corporations liable for human rights abuses, this section will conduct an empirical 
analysis of the major out-of-court settlements. The goal is to assess whether corporate liability 
enforcement under the ATS is incentive-compatible or whether it ‘crowds out’ intrinsic 
motivation and therefore produces results contrary to the predictions under the deterrence 
hypothesis. In other words, does the legal enforcement of human rights against corporations 
yield the results desired, i.e., optimal compliance? The findings with regard to the enforcement 
practice under the ATS will occasionally be contrasted with the criminal practice in Europe in 
order to determine key liability features for optimal compliance outcomes.  
There has been one settlement in a case of alleged human rights abuses by a corporation 
in Europe. The case in question involved Total for its operations in Burma (now Myanmar).   As 
a joint venture partner of Unocal, Total had been sued under the ‘partie civile’ mechanism as 
part of criminal proceedings launched against Total by the French prosecutor. As a general rule, 
civil parties do not have the autonomy to control the criminal proceedings in most legal systems, 
including France. Unlike in civil proceedings, the parties cannot enter into an arrangement that 
                                                 
791 See, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/LegalPortal/Home/Countrywherelawsuitfiled/Americas (For a list of all human rights cases field 
against corporations distinguished by countries where the lawsuits were filed.) 
792 See Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable views of the Bush Administration, 33BROOKLYN J. 
OF INT’L L., 813(2008).  In addition to one jury verdict against a corporate defendant under the ATS, another major 
judgment came down in Ecuadorian courts against Chevron where the plaintiffs were awarded damages in a record 
high of $9.5 billion. See THE ECONOMIST, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: MONSTER OR VICTIM? (February 17, 
2011), at http://www.economist.com/node/18182242. 
793 See Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable views of the Bush Administration, 33BROOKLYN J. 
OF INT’L L., 813(2008).  (Illustrating that after 1997, when the Second Circuit held in Doe v. Unocal Corp. that a 
corporation can be liable under the ATS, “approximately [52]  international human rights cases involving corporate 
defendants have been litigated (not including cases  addressing abuses committed during World War II, which raise 
unique issues). Of the [52], [33] have been dismissed […], [3] have settled, and in [1] a jury returned a verdict for 
the plaintiff.” Thus, a verdict was achieved for one plaintiff in Jama v. Esmor Corr. Serv., Civ. No. 97-03093, 2008 
WL 724337 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2007). This article that has not accounted yet for three further more recent settlements, 
namely in the cases of Xiaoning et al v. Yahoo! Inc. (2007), Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell (2009), and Adamu vs. 
Pfizer (2011).  
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ends the criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the parties settled the matter among themselves 
which in fact led to the prosecution’s case to collapse.  The victims would not be available 
anymore, under the terms of the settlement, to provide the necessary information and cooperate 
with the judicial and investigating apparatus in the host country, which can be cumbersome.794   
The Total settlement will be excluded from the scope of the analysis because it is only 
one settlement in the context of the European ‘partie civile’ procedure and thus too small of a 
sample to draw meaningful conclusions in regard to the effects on corporate behavior. Also, 
including the Total settlement in the analysis of ATS settlements would distort the analysis and 
results since, as has been shown in Chapter 2, the procedural environment and legal culture are 
very different in the United States and Europe with regard to those matters. Eventually, 
including the Total settlement would make for an imperfect comparison because in that case the 
settlement was rather a matter of reality than a matter of law, what would have pointed only to 
limited conclusions with regard to the effects of the legal system on corporate behavior.  
Settlement arrangements in which corporations agree to monetary awards in exchange 
for the victim plaintiffs to drop their lawsuit commoditize human rights, as discussed above.   
Human rights become a matter of market exchange under Gneezy/Rustichini’s theory rather than 
a non-market aspect of compliance behavior induced by preferences. This leads to a ‘crowding 
out’ of intrinsic motivation under the conditions defined.  Specifically, the ‘crowding out’ effect 
was observed when monetary incentives by virtue of external intervention are provided, which 
amount to a medium level of enforcement. The worst legal regime to induce compliance has 
been shown to be one of medium enforceability.795 For the reasons stated above, the terms of 
settlements serve as the point of reference in order to determine the level of legal enforcement 
                                                 
794 See Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet, Corporate Human Rights Responsbility: A Euorpean Perspective, 6 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, at para. 97 (2008). 
795 See Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 131, 141 (2001). 
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(in terms of economic cost of breach) according to Frey/Bohnet/Huck796 or the magnitude of the 
fine according to Gneezy/Rustichini.797 Both benchmarks are consistent with each other.  
Looking at the out-of-court settlements in landmark cases of liability of corporations 
under the ATS, it will be accounted for in terms of (1) the settlement sum in U.S. dollars 
(contrasted to the worldwide revenue of the respective MNC in the year of the settlement), (2) 
the terms of the settlement (i.e., monetary/market exchange or non-monetary/intrinsic act), and 
(3) transparency (i.e., public or confidential). The goal of this dissertation is to provide a 
behavioral economics framework, informed by a comparative legal understanding, for assessing 
the effects of legal enforcement on corporate incentives to comply with human rights norms. 
The framework will be illustrated with some prominent examples, but this dissertation does not 
claim to conduct a full-fledged empirical analysis of the issues at hand since this would go 
beyond the scope of this work.  
In order to properly assess the effect that settlements in the context of legal enforcement 
under the ATS have on corporate compliance behavior, one should determine  (1) if the 
settlement relationship between the firm and its stakeholders is either a market exchange or an 
intrinsic act, which is accounted for by the monetary or non-monetary nature of the settlement 
terms, and (2) if the level of enforcement (in terms of the cost of breach) is high, medium, or 
low, which is accounted for by the total settlement sum in U.S. dollars (relative to annual 
revenues of respective firm). The transparency of the settlement agreement and its terms help to 
provide the broader context in which the agreement has to be seen.  The public or confidential 
nature of the settlement does not directly impact the classification of the settlement agreement 
along the lines outlined above. It provides, however, some guidance regarding the reputational 
aspect pertaining to such litigation and settlements, which can have a needle-moving impact on 
corporate behavior since reputational damage attracts an indirect cost,798 and might actually push 
                                                 
796 See id., at 131-144. 
797 See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1-17 (2000). 
798 See Terry O’Collaghan, Disciplining Multinational Enterprises: The Regulatory Power of Reputation Risk, 21 
GLOBAL SOC’Y 100-14 (2007). 
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the respective punishment over the threshold level and reinstate the deterrence effect. An in-
depth analysis of the reputational aspect in legal human rights enforcement and its effect on 
corporate behavior, under the crowding theory, would require further investigation and goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, which as pointed out above, primarily aims at developing a 
framework to assess the incentive-compatibility of corporate human rights enforcement rather 
than conducting a detailed empirical analysis.  
The settlement sum compared to the annual revenues of the year of the agreement 
indicates whether the ‘cost of breach’ was high, medium, or low for the respective agent. The 
terms of the settlement (if disclosed) can be seen to an important indication of the nature of the 
relationship between a firm and its stakeholders. Providing merely monetary compensation 
would rather point towards the settlement being a business transaction and thus a market aspect, 
which can lead to a commoditization of human rights under Gneezy/Rustichini’s framework.  If, 
however, the terms of the settlement also stipulate other commitments which extend beyond 
mere monetary compensation and do not account for a cost factor (under a cost-benefit analysis), 
the settlement agreement would also have features of a stipulation of an intrinsic CSR 
commitment in a non-market sense. 
The transparency factor accounts for potential reputational costs. Major brand-name 
companies, which are subject to ATS litigation, particularly face a risk of reputational damage 
due to the highly polarized issues of human rights abuses and alleged corporate complicity in 
these cases. It therefore comes as no surprise that companies would be particularly inclined to 
settle human rights cases right when the cases were about to enter the trial phase, which would 
entail detailed evidence production and would therefore require a reconstruction of the facts and 
disclosure of internal company information regarding its business dealings in emerging 
markets.799  For example, Shell, as is the reality with many other extractive companies, has 
                                                 
799 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, WIWA ET AL. V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM ET al, at 
http://ccrjustice.org/Wiwa. (Confirming that the settlement in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was reached literally 
“on the eve of trial.”) As of 2008, only two corporate cases under the ATS went to trial; one of them was the case of 
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conceded in its Sustainability Report “[t]he search for oil and gas can take energy companies to 
places with poor human rights records. This clearly presents challenges and requires making 
trade-offs. Refusing to operate allows access to less principled competitors. Staying in such 
countries puts a company at risk of being seen as complicit in a government’s practices.”800  
MNCs operate worldwide, including in emerging markets with often repressive regimes.  
There is usually an immediate business necessity for corporations to cooperate with the host 
government in joint ventures (particularly in the natural resources sector)801 or sign on to the 
host government’s terms of conducting business in a closed society (particularly in the 
information communication technology sector in China).802 This ties corporations to the 
repressive policies of such systems in a sensitive way in the eye of the public.803 Even though 
this could be considered a reality of globalized business, it is one that corporations would rather 
not wish to discuss in the courts of law or even worse, in the court of public opinion. Bringing 
legal proceedings to an end with a confidential out-of-court settlement therefore can be 
considered as a way to control the information flow to the broad public and a company’s 
consumer base and control possible reputation risk.  
Table 1 shows that, relative to the annual revenues of the respective companies, the 
amount for which human rights cases under the ATS were settled is rather low, but not 
insignificant. For confidential settlements with undisclosed terms, it is relied on approximations 
based on reported costs. Relative to the annual revenue stream of the companies concerned, the 
cost of breach that they encountered cannot be considered ‘high.’ For example, in 2009 Royal 
Dutch/Shell was heading up the list of Fortune 500 companies with an annual revenue stream of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., No. 7:02-00665 (N.D. Ala. July 26, 2007) which lost after a jury trial on 
appeal.  
800 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, RESPONSIBLE ENERGY: THE SHELL SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2007, 30.  
801 See Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing 
Industries: Patterns and Liability Risks, 6 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 329-30 
(2008), at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v6/n2/5. 
802 See David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. OF 
INT’L L., 383-85 (2011).  
803 See e.g. John Markoff, Suit Claims Cisco Helped China Pursue Falun Gong, N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, 
available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/technology/23cisco.html. 
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more than $458 billion; a settlement for $15.5 million is not insignificant but it is not very high 
considering such total revenue. With regard to damage awards by verdict –granted in only one 
case under the ATS before U.S. courts to date–the situation might be different. In 2011, an 
Ecuadoran court ordered Chevron to pay $9.5 billion in damages, which would increase to $17.2 
billion if Chevron did not issue a public apology within 15 days.804 David Uhlman, an expert on 
environmental law, has stated that this “is one of the largest judgments ever imposed for 
environmental contamination in any court.”805 This leads one to conclude that if ATS and ATS-
like cases in fact do succeed, this example would suggest that the damage awards might be of 
such a high level that the deterrence effect would hold.   This might be particularly true in the 
United States where punitive damages are broadly available for civil plaintiffs.806 However, it 
has to be kept in mind that most of such cases get dismissed at the pre-trial level due to 
procedural hurdles including the transnational and often politicized nature of overseas human 
rights cases. Eventually, the level of enforcement would rely not only on the magnitude of the 
fine, but also on the probability with which it is enforced.807 
Further, Table 1 shows that the terms of all settlement arrangements focused primarily 
on granting significant monetary compensation, which has usually been managed through a trust 
fund. While this monetary focus clearly points towards the settlement arrangements as a market 
exchange and a commoditization of human rights, all settlement arrangement also commit the 
company to establish an additional fund addressing the broad social issues relating to the 
situation in question. This might make the settlement arrangement seem less of a business 
transaction and more of an act induced (at least particularly) by intrinsic motivation. However, 
first, the companies are usually not constructively involved in the work of these social funds 
                                                 
804 See THE ECONOMIST, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION: MONSTER OR VICTIM? (February 17, 2011), at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18182242. 
805 Simon Romero and Clifford Krauss, Ecuador judge orders Chevron to pay $9 billion, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(February 14, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html. [Quoting: 
David Uhlmann]. 
806 See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States the “Odd 
Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZONA J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L., 402 (1999). 
807 Gneezy/Rustichini’s field study simply works on the assumption that there is high probability or even certainty 
that the fine will the enforced. Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES, 10 (2000). (“[N]o uncertainty of punishment exists, since parents are sure they will be detected.”). 
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beyond their monetary contribution.  Second, all these social funds are so closely related to the 
situation charged in the class action lawsuits that they can be regarded as part of the 
compensation package.  
Overall, the settlement arrangements that companies have entered into constitute a 
commoditization of human rights with the effects on deterrence and compliance, as laid out 
above. Merely, Yahoo! addressed the subject issue of the settlement within its own corporate 
structure by implementing a framework program for the established trust fund. Yahoo!’s 
Business and Human Rights Program became an integral part of its legal department and was 
endowed with the mandate “to coordinate and lead Yahoo!’s efforts to protect and promote free 
expression and privacy” to deliver on Yahoo!’s self-proclaimed “human rights obligations.”808 
This substantive commitment beyond monetary contributions offers an example of how 
settlement arrangements could be structured in a way that diminishes the commoditization of 
human rights and therefore achieves better future compliance rates. Finally, aside from one 
example, all settlement agreements were confidential, which enabled companies to control the 
information flow and reputation risk, as pointed out above. 
Table 1 
Case Settled (Year) Total $ Settlement Sum— 
$ Annual Revenues 
Terms of the Settlement Transparency 
Doe v. Unocal (2005) 
regarding operations in 
Myanmar (former Burma)809 
Undisclosed (reportedly $ 30 
million)— 
$ 8.2 billion (2004)810 
 
 
Monetary compensation 
including funds to establish 
“to develop programs to 
improve living conditions, 
health care and education and 
protect the rights of people 
from the pipeline region."811 
Confidential  
Xiaoning et al v. Yahoo! Inc. 
(2007) regarding operations 
in China812 
Undisclosed— 
$ 6.97 billion813 
 
(1) Monetary 
compensation; 
(2) Creation of Yahoo! 
Confidential  
                                                 
808 YAHOO! BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, at http://www.yhumanrightsblog.com/blog/our-
initiatives/business-human-rights-program/. 
809 See THE ECONOMIST, A STITCH IN TIME: HOW COMPANIES MANAGE RISKS TO THEIR REPUTATION, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/10491043 (January 17, 2008); THE GUARDIAN, ENERGY GIANT AGREES 
SETTLEMENTS WITH BURMESE VILLAGERS (December 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/dec/15/burma.duncancampbell.  
810 See Federal Register, Chevron Corporation and Unocal Corporation; Analysis of Agreement Containing 
Consent Order to Aid Public Comment (June 20, 2005), at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2005/06/20/05-
12044/chevron-corporation-and-unocal-corporation-analysis-of-agreement-containing-consent-order-to-aid. 
811 Joint statement by plaintiffs and Unocal on Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal, available at 
http://www.earthrights.org/legal/final-settlement-reached-doe-v-unocal. 
812 See Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. C07-02151 (N.D. Cal. November 13, 2007), 
available at  http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
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Human Rights 
Fund “to provide 
humanitarian and 
legal aid to 
dissidents who have 
been imprisoned for 
expressing their 
views online.”814  
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell 
(2009) regarding operations 
in Nigeria815 
$15.5 million 
$ 458 billion (2009)816 
 
(1) Monetary 
compensation; 
(2) Creation of social 
and educational 
trust fund to benefit 
Ogoni people.  
Public 
Adamu vs. Pfizer (2011) 
regarding human 
experimentation in Nigeria 
—in U.S. courts—817 
 
 
 
 
 
 
—in Nigerian courts—818 
 
 
 
 
 
Undisclosed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undisclosed (reportedly $75 
million)— 
$ 67.4 billion819 
 
 
 
US cases joined 
Healthcare/Meningitis Trust 
Fund established under 
settlements.820 
 
 
 
(1) Monetary 
compensation 
managed through 
newly established 
Healthcare/Meningi
tis Trust Fund; 
(2) Financial support of 
health care 
initiatives.  
 
 
 
Confidential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidential 
 
 
3. A Metrics for Incentive-Compatibility of Liability Schemes 
As Frey/Bohnet/Huck have stated, “[b]y providing a specific legal enforcement regime, 
the state affects the degree of trust and trustworthiness in a society.”821 Based on their 
                                                                                                                                                            
courts/california/candce/4:2007cv02151/191339/114/0.pdf?ts=1195000579; Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with 
Chinese Families, THE WASHINGTON POST (November 14, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/13/AR2007111300885.html.  
813 Annual Financials for Yahoo! Inc., at http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/yhoo/financials. 
814 Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. C07-02151 (N.D. Cal. November 13, 2007). 
815 See Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (S.D.N.Y June 8, 2009), 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Wiwa_v_Shell_SETTLEMENT_AGREEMENT.Signed-1.pdf; Ingrid Wuerth, 
Wiwa v. Shell: The $15.5 Million Settlement, ASIL INSIGHTS, at http://www.asil.org/insights090909.cfm; Jad 
Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 8, 2009).  
816 Gobal 500: 1. Royal Dutch Shell, CNN MONEY, at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/snapshots/6388.html. 
817 See Bill Berkrot, Pfizer Settles Remaining Nigeria, US suits, REUTERS (February 22, 2011), at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE71L0MV20110222.  
818 See BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTER, CASE PROFILE: PFIZER LAWSUIT (RE NIGERIA), at 
http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/PfizerlawsuitreNigeria. 
819 Pfizer Inc., Earnings 2011, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, at 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/earnings/earnings.asp?ticker=PFE:US (last accessed March 26, 
2012). 
820 See Sue Reisinger, Pfizer Settles Lawsuits Over Drug Trials on Children in Nigeria, CORPORATE COUNSEL 
(February 23, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202482854504.  
821 Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 132 (2001). 
  
167 
 
‘crowding’ framework and Gneezy’s ‘commoditization’ hypothesis, the following factors are 
decisive with regard to the trade-off between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: 
(1) Monetary incentives in the form of the economic cost of a breach; monetary incentives 
are effective only when they are very high. Below a certain threshold, they can ‘crowd 
out’ intrinsic motivation and therefore yield non-monotonic and suboptimal compliance 
results. 
(2) Punitive and non-monetary elements; punitive rather than compensatory elements in the 
liability structure avoid a commoditization of human rights and therefore a ‘crowding 
out’ of intrinsic motivation. A criminal law approach to corporate human rights cases, 
such as in Europe, would be preferable to the U.S. system in this regard, especially 
considering that the legal option of out-of–court settlements does not exist in criminal 
proceedings, thus diminishing  the commoditizing effect of the enforcement scheme.822 
(3) Personal relationships; individual officer liability as opposed to liability of the 
corporation as a legal person would add a personal dimension to legal enforcement 
schemes and would therefore increase personal accountability with the effect of 
‘crowding in’ intrinsic motivation in the framework.823 A criminal law approach to the 
issue, such as in Europe, would prevail over the U.S. approach in this regard as well.  
Since corporate liability is still an ambiguous concept in many civil law countries, as 
shown above, a significant number of continental European systems instead still rely on 
individual officer liability.824 Individual officer liability is a function of the aggregation 
theory under corporate law, according to which a corporation is simply an aggregation of 
                                                 
822 It is to be noted, however, that there is some punitive element in American tort redress, since in addition to 
compensatory damages, punitive damages can be awarded. According to Dan Dobbs, punitive damages are 
“criminal or quasi-criminal punishments.” (Dan Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-
Measured Remedies, 40 ALABAMA L. REV., 837 (1988)). 
823 See Bruno Frey, Motivation and Human Behavior, in: RISK, TRUST, AND WELFARE, 31, 37-38 (Peter Taylor-
Gooby ed., 2000) (Arguing that personal relationships ‘crowd in’ intrinsic motivation.). See also John Coffee, Jr., 
Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL L. REV., 422 (1980) (Arguing that "more deterrence is generated by penalties focusing on an individual 
than on a corporation."). 
824 See Edward Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine  
Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 THE YALE L. J., 142 (2008); see also Robert Thompson et al., 
Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INT’L L. REV., 871-72 (2009). 
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its management and shareholders as opposed to a separate artificial entity.825 Also, 
Justice Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in Citizens United 
embraced this understanding of the corporation as a mere association of individuals.826 
These characteristics can induce the incentive-compatibility of a liability system. They 
therefore identify levers than can be pulled in an effort to improve how liability systems in the 
context of corporate human rights enforcement are currently designed. Based on the three 
characteristics identified, the European approach of holding corporations liable in the form of 
public prosecution seems to be the more incentive-compatible methodology and it yields more 
optimal compliance results under behavioral economic theories. However, when examining this 
finding in relation to the findings in Chapter 2, a paradox emerges: Whereas the European 
approach is in concept designed to yield incentive-compatible compliance results and is thus 
superior the ATS structure, it in practice surrenders to the American approach. The reason is 
that the U.S. legal system provides a much more favorable forum for such claims than European 
legal systems in terms of procedural rules, such as discovery process, fee structure, and the 
availability of class action suits.  
In conclusion, the best legal system is one that provides a high level of enforcement in 
terms of severe punishment and high fines. Only then can external interventions, such as legal 
liability enforcement, effectively stir corporate behavior in the desired way. A half-hearted 
system at a medium level of enforcement produces the worst results, which in fact are worse 
than having no punishment in place at all.  In this chapter, I have argued that endogenous 
incentives under a social contract paradigm can be a viable solution provided that the social 
contract is not just taken for granted but that pro-active steps are taken at an international level 
to adopt coherent standards, which then translate into ‘conformist preferences’ according to 
                                                 
825 For an overview over the theories of the nature of the corporation, see David Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J., 224 (1990). 
826Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (Justice Scalia concurring.) (Justice Scalia 
stating that “[t]he association of individuals in a business corporation is no different [than an individual] -- or at 
least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”). 
  
169 
 
Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone.  The result points to a mixed implementation system where endogenous 
and exogenous incentives complement one another.  
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined the relatively popular concept of CSR, particularly 
corporate human rights responsibility, by telling a “story of law and incentives.” Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the liability frameworks for holding corporations accountable for human rights 
violations vary considerably between the United States and Europe. Whereas civil human rights 
litigation is a phenomenon largely unique to the United States, most European jurisdictions 
provide criminal remedies with the option for the victims to join the criminal proceedings as a 
‘partie civile.’ Rather than siding with the existing scholarship that those differences are merely 
a country-specific “translation” into the “language” of the respective legal system, this 
dissertation has illustrated that those differences arise for far more complex reasons.  The 
European and American methodologies matter from multiple angles and have sensitive 
implications on the effectiveness of both legal redress for victims and punishment of corporate 
perpetrators.  
Most of the scholarship dealing with human rights enforcement against corporations has 
mainly focused on substantive law issues, particularly under the ATS, without paying serious 
attention to comparative approaches in other legal systems, such as in Europe. An in-depth 
comparative legal analysis of corporate human rights liability under the ATS and the European 
‘partie civile’ mechanism provides the basis to critically assesses the effectiveness of the 
different liability systems as implicated not solely by substantive law, but also by procedural 
rules and legal tradition. Chapter 2 explores differences in procedures (in terms of civil and 
criminal liability) and differences in legal culture (in terms of a common law and civil law 
tradition) that explain why ATS-like cases have primarily been litigated in the United States as 
opposed to Europe. The in-depth analysis in Chapter 3 of the landmark case in Kiobel, currently 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, has confirmed the need for a strict deference to the criminal or 
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civil nature of the proceedings, rather than conflating both concepts interchangeably and at will, 
as has often been done in ATS jurisprudence. The reason is that conflating civil and criminal 
elements not only can impact the immediate outcome of the case, but they also can have 
unintended consequences with regard to the incentive-compatibility of corporate liability under 
the ATS.  
Substantive law, procedural law, and legal tradition still do not provide a complete 
set of motivational drivers when determining how effective the respective liability 
approaches are in terms of influencing corporate behavior. Law is only one driver for CSR 
compliance that can be effectively complemented by social norms.827 In particular, the 
behavioral economic scholarship provides valuable lessons that have not been applied yet in 
the context of CSR compliance.   Most importantly, studies in the field found that external 
enforcement can yield counter-intuitive and suboptimal results since, under certain 
conditions, it ‘crowds out’ intrinsic motivation. Psychological predictions with regard to 
corporate behavior helped to develop a metrics of three factors that are decisive to ensure the 
incentive-compatibility of liability schemes in a way that is in line with the deterrence 
hypothesis. Those important factors are (1) economic cost of breach, (2) punitive elements, 
and (3) personal relationships.  
Based on this metrics and key predictions under behavioral economics, this 
dissertation has found that the existing liability system to hold corporations accountable for 
human rights violations under the ATS is a system of medium enforceability, which, 
according to the scholarship by Frey/Bohnet/Huck828 and Huang/Wu Works829, is the 
“worst” legal system since the deterrence effect is not high enough.   But to its detriment, the 
CSR network of hard and soft compliance fails to appreciate the factor of trust enough. This 
                                                 
827 See e.g. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2010). 
828 Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey and Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 131-44 (2001). 
829Huang, Peter & Wu, Ho-Mou, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational 
Cultures, 10 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION, 390-406 (1994). 
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is not to say that the “hard” side of the equation—legal liability—does not have a role in 
inducing corporate compliance. It merely means that its role appears to be more modest than 
originally anticipated.  
The overall goal of this dissertation is to understand why the American legal system 
is the forum of choice for victim plaintiffs over its European counter-parts and whether 
findings dictated by the procedural rules and legal tradition withstand a critical analysis from 
a behavioral economics perspective.  Of particular note is the finding that even though the 
litigation environment in the United States is exceptionally favorable to ATS-like suits 
against corporations, it yields suboptimal results under behavioral theories.  In contrast, the 
European approach to corporate human rights redress, while stifled by a less liberal and 
more bureaucratic procedural environment, comes out ahead in behavioral economics terms. 
Thus, the European approach to deal with corporate human rights violations in the context of 
criminal rather than purely civil proceedings entails two main characteristics, which, in 
concept, effectively induce corporate behavior. First, Europeans focus primarily on 
institutional punishment rather than generating a litigation environment that encourages 
‘striking a deal’ in the form of monetary settlements, which leads to a ‘commoditization’ of 
human rights and thus achieves worse compliance results than no punishment at all.830  
Second, the European approach focuses on personal relationships, since corporate entity 
liability is a fairly controversial concept in criminal law (unlike in civil law).   Therefore, 
many European civil law countries still rely on individual officer liability instead, which 
leads to a ‘crowding in’ of intrinsic motivation and therefore achieves better compliance 
rates.  
This dissertation has sought to develop a framework within which the micro-
economic implications of corporate human rights liability can be assessed in a way that is 
also sensitive to standard psychology literature.   I did not aim to conduct a comprehensive 
                                                 
830 See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1-17(2000). 
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empirical analysis since this would have been beyond the scope of this dissertation. Future 
research might be suggested to further elaborate on the specific variables in this framework 
and metrics.  Specifically, it remains to be further examined how exactly reputational costs 
are to be factored in the ‘level of enforcement’ under the ‘crowding theory.’   As previously 
noted, reputational costs might be able to alleviate enforceability under the framework to a 
‘high’ level where the standard deterrence theory holds. Also, the scope and nature of 
‘personal relationships’ that would ‘crowd in’ intrinsic motivation in the network would 
merit a future area of research.  
Sometimes more order can be achieved without more law by relying on intrinsic 
motivation. This is an important point to introduce into the discussions about corporate 
human rights litigation and CSR in general. It is therefore suggested to apply a differentiated 
model complementing endogenous and exogenous incentives depending on the respective 
legal rules of the game. Still, legal liability can be an effective, and sometimes 
indispensable, tool to ensure corporate compliance.  However, this is only the case if we 
start thinking critically and constructively about how to provide both legal and non-legal 
incentives to affect corporate compliance behavior in the most effective and impactful way 
with an willingness to learn from other legal systems and without fear of uncovering 
counter-intuitive and perhaps undesired results.
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